DNSSEC Cryptographic Algorithm Recommendation Update Process
draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc8624-bis-02
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 9904.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Wes Hardaker , Warren Kumari | ||
| Last updated | 2024-11-20 (Latest revision 2024-10-18) | ||
| Replaces | draft-hardaker-dnsop-rfc8624-bis | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 9904 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc8624-bis-02
Network Working Group W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft USC/ISI
Intended status: Informational W. Kumari
Expires: 21 April 2025 Google
18 October 2024
DNSSEC Cryptographic Algorithm Recommendation Update Process
draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc8624-bis-02
Abstract
<EDITOR NOTE: This document does not change the status (MUST, MAY,
RECOMMENDED, etc) of any of the algorithms listed in [RFC8624]; that
is the work of future documents. Instead, this document moves the
canonical list of algorithms from [RFC8624] to an IANA registry.
This is done for two reasons: 1) to allow the list to be updated more
easily, and, much more importantly, 2) to allow the list to be more
easily referenced.>
The DNSSEC protocol makes use of various cryptographic algorithms to
provide authentication of DNS data and proof of non-existence. To
ensure interoperability between DNS resolvers and DNS authoritative
servers, it is necessary to specify both a set of algorithm
implementation requirements and usage guidelines to ensure that there
is at least one algorithm that all implementations support. This
document updates [RFC8624] by moving the canonical source of
algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance for DNSSEC
from [RFC8624] to an IANA registry. Future extensions to this
registry can be made under new, incremental update RFCs.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 April 2025.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Document Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Adding usage and implementation recommendations to the IANA
DNSSEC tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. DNS System Algorithm Numbers Column Values . . . . . . . . . 6
4. DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type Digest
Algorithms Column Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Update to the "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" table . . 9
7.2. Update to the "Digest Algorithms" table . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. ChangeLog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.1. Changes from ietf-01 to ietf-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.2. Changes from ietf-00 to ietf-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.3. Changes from hardaker-04 to ietf-00 . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.4. Changes from -03 to -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.5. Changes since RFC8624 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC9364] is used to provide
authentication of DNS data. The DNSSEC signing algorithms are
defined by various RFCs, including [RFC4034], [RFC4509], [RFC5155],
[RFC5702], [RFC5933], [RFC6605], [RFC8080].
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To ensure interoperability, a set of "mandatory-to-implement" DNSKEY
algorithms are defined in [RFC8624]. To make the current status of
the algorithms more easily accessible and understandable, and to make
future changes to these recommendations easier to publish, this
document moves the canonical status of the algorithms from [RFC8624]
to the IANA DNSSEC algorithm registries. Additionally, as advice to
operators, it adds recommendations for deploying and the usage of
these algorithms.
<Editor: This is similar to the process used for the
[TLS-ciphersuites] registry, where the canonical list of ciphersuites
is in the IANA registry, and the RFCs reference the IANA registry.>
1.1. Document Audience
The recommendations columns added to the "DNS Security Algorithm
Numbers" and "Digest Algorithms" IANA tables target DNSSEC operators
and implementers.
Implementations need to meet both high security expectations as well
as provide interoperability between various vendors and with
different versions.
The field of cryptography evolves continuously. New, stronger
algorithms appear, and existing algorithms may be found to be less
secure then originally thought. Therefore, algorithm implementation
requirements and usage guidance need to be updated from time to time
in order to reflect the new reality, and to allow for a smooth
transition to more secure algorithms, as well as deprecation of
algorithms deemed to no longer be secure.
Cryptographic algorithm choices implemented in and required by
software must be conservative to minimize the risk of algorithm
compromise.
The perspective of implementers may differ from that of an operator
who wishes to deploy and configure DNSSEC with only the safest
algorithm. As such this document also adds new recommendations about
which algorithms should be deploy regardless of implementation
status. In general it is expected that deployment of aging
algorithms should generally be reduced before implementations stop
supporting them.
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1.2. Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels
By the time a DNSSEC cryptographic algorithm is made mandatory-to-
implement, it should already be available in most implementations.
This document defines an IANA registration modification to allow
future documents to specify the implementation recommendations for
each algorithm, as the recommendation status of each DNSSEC
cryptographic algorithm is expected to change over time. For
example, there is no guarantee that newly introduced algorithms will
become mandatory-to-implement in the future. Likewise, published
algorithms are continuously subjected to cryptographic attack and may
become too weak, or even be completely broken, and will require
deprecation in the future.
It is expected that the deprecation of an algorithm will be performed
gradually. This provides time for implementations to update their
implemented algorithms while remaining interoperable. Unless there
are strong security reasons, an algorithm is expected to be
downgraded from MUST to NOT RECOMMENDED or MAY, instead of directly
from MUST to MUST NOT. Similarly, an algorithm that has not been
mentioned as mandatory-to-implement is expected to be first
introduced as RECOMMENDED instead of a MUST.
Since the effect of using an unknown DNSKEY algorithm is that the
zone is treated as insecure, it is recommended that algorithms which
have been downgraded to NOT RECOMMENDED or lower not be used by
authoritative nameservers and DNSSEC signers to create new DNSKEY's.
This will allow for deprecated algorithms to become used less and
less over time. Once an algorithm has reached a sufficiently low
level of deployment, it can be marked as MUST NOT, so that recursive
resolvers can remove support for validating it.
Validating recursive resolvers are encouraged to retain support for
all algorithms not marked as MUST NOT.
1.3. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
[RFC2119] considers the term SHOULD equivalent to RECOMMENDED, and
SHOULD NOT equivalent to NOT RECOMMENDED. The authors of this
document have chosen to use the terms RECOMMENDED and NOT
RECOMMENDED, as this more clearly expresses the recommendations to
implementers.
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2. Adding usage and implementation recommendations to the IANA DNSSEC
tables
Per this document, the following columns are being added to the
following DNSSEC algorithm tables registered with IANA:
+===================================+===============================+
| Table | Column added |
+===================================+===============================+
| Domain Security Algorithm Numbers | Use for DNSSSEC Signing |
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Domain Security Algorithm Numbers | Use for DNSSSEC Validation |
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Domain Security Algorithm Numbers | Implement for DNSSSEC |
| | Signing |
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Domain Security Algorithm Numbers | Implement for DNSSSEC |
| | Validation |
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Digest Algorithm | Use for DNSSSEC Delegation |
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Digest Algorithm | Use for DNSSSEC Validation |
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Digest Algorithm | Implement for DNSSSEC |
| | Delegation |
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Digest Algorithm | Implement for DNSSSEC |
| | Validation |
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
Table 1
Adding a new entry to the "DNS System Algorithm Numbers" registry
with a recommended value of MAY in the "Use for DNSSSEC Signing",
"Use for DNSSSEC Validation", "Implement for DNSSSEC Signing", or
"Implement for DNSSSEC Validation" columns requires RFC publication.
Adding a new entry to, or changing existing values in, the "DNS
System Algorithm Numbers" registry for the "Use for DNSSSEC Signing",
"Use for DNSSSEC Validation", "Implement for DNSSSEC Signing", or
"Implement for DNSSSEC Validation" columns to any other value than
MAY requires a Standards Action.
Adding a new entry to the "Digest Algorithms" registry with a
recommended value of MAY in the "Use for DNSSSEC Delegation", "Use
for DNSSSEC Validation", "Implement for DNSSSEC Delegation", or
"Implement for DNSSSEC Validation" columns requires RFC publication.
Adding a new entry to, or changing existing values in, the "DNS
System Algorithm Numbers" registry for the "Use for DNSSSEC
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Delegation", "Use for DNSSSEC Validation", "Implement for DNSSSEC
Delegation", or "Implement for DNSSSEC Validation" columns to any
other value than MAY requires a Standards Action.
If an item is not marked as "RECOMMENDED", it does not necessarily
mean that it is flawed; rather, it indicates that the item either has
not been through the IETF consensus process, has limited
applicability, or is intended only for specific use cases.
The following sections state the initial values to be populated into
these rows, with Implementation values transcribed from [RFC8624].
Use for columns was also set to the same values from [RFC8624], as
there is no existing documented values and general interpretation of
the tables to date indicate they should be the same, although may
differ in the future.
3. DNS System Algorithm Numbers Column Values
Initial recommendation columns of use and implementation
recommendations for the "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC)
Algorithm Numbers" are shown in Table 2. When there are multiple
RECOMMENDED algorithms in the "use" column, operators should choose
the best algorithm according to local policy.
<Editor's note: A space was deliberately added to "RSASHA1-NSEC3-
SHA1" to make the table fit within the standard internet draft text
width. Additionally the algorithm number column was abbreviated to
'N'.>
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+==+===============+===========+===========+===========+===========+
|N |Mnemonics |Use for |Use for |Implement |Implement |
| | |DNSSEC |DNSSEC |for DNSSEC |for DNSSEC |
| | |Signing |Validation |Signing |Validation |
+==+===============+===========+===========+===========+===========+
|1 |RSAMD5 |MUST NOT |MUST NOT |MUST NOT |MUST NOT |
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
|3 |DSA |MUST NOT |MUST NOT |MUST NOT |MUST NOT |
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
|5 |RSASHA1 |NOT |RECOMMENDED|NOT |MUST |
| | |RECOMMENDED| |RECOMMENDED| |
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
|6 |DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 |MUST NOT |MUST NOT |MUST NOT |MUST NOT |
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
|7 |RSASHA1-NSEC3- |NOT |RECOMMENDED|NOT |MUST |
| |SHA1 |RECOMMENDED| |RECOMMENDED| |
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
|8 |RSASHA256 |RECOMMENDED|RECOMMENDED|MUST |MUST |
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
|10|RSASHA512 |NOT |RECOMMENDED|NOT |MUST |
| | |RECOMMENDED| |RECOMMENDED| |
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
|12|ECC-GOST |MUST NOT |MAY |MUST NOT |MAY |
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
|13|ECDSAP256SHA256|RECOMMENDED|RECOMMENDED|MUST |MUST |
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
|14|ECDSAP384SHA384|MAY |RECOMMENDED|MAY |RECOMMENDED|
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
|15|ED25519 |RECOMMENDED|RECOMMENDED|RECOMMENDED|RECOMMENDED|
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
|16|ED448 |MAY |RECOMMENDED|MAY |RECOMMENDED|
+--+---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
Table 2
4. DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type Digest
Algorithms Column Values
Initial recommendation columns of use and implementation
recommendations for the "DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) Resource
Record (RR) Type Digest Algorithms" registry are shown in Table 3.
When there are multiple RECOMMENDED algorithms in the "use" column,
operators should choose the best algorithm according to local policy.
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+======+=========+===========+===========+==========+=============+
|Number|Mnemonics|Use for |Use for |Implement | Implement |
| | |DNSSEC |DNSSEC |for DNSSEC| for DNSSEC |
| | |Delegation |Validation |Delegation| Validation |
+======+=========+===========+===========+==========+=============+
|0 |NULL (CDS|MUST NOT |MUST NOT |MUST NOT | MUST NOT |
| |only) |[*] |[*] |[*] | [*] |
+------+---------+-----------+-----------+----------+-------------+
|1 |SHA-1 |MUST NOT |RECOMMENDED|MUST NOT | MUST |
+------+---------+-----------+-----------+----------+-------------+
|2 |SHA-256 |RECOMMENDED|RECOMMENDED|MUST | MUST |
+------+---------+-----------+-----------+----------+-------------+
|3 |GOST R |MUST NOT |MAY |MUST NOT | MAY |
| |34.11-94 | | | | |
+------+---------+-----------+-----------+----------+-------------+
|4 |SHA-384 |MAY |RECOMMENDED|MAY | RECOMMENDED |
+------+---------+-----------+-----------+----------+-------------+
Table 3
5. Security Considerations
This document makes no modifications to the security of the existing
protocol or recommendations described in [RFC8624]. Thus the
security considerations remain the same, which we quote below.
The security of cryptographic systems depends on both the strength of
the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of the keys used
with those algorithms. The security also depends on the engineering
of the protocol used by the system to ensure that there are no non-
cryptographic ways to bypass the security of the overall system.
This document concerns itself with the selection of cryptographic
algorithms for the use of DNSSEC, specifically with the selection of
"mandatory-to-implement" algorithms. The algorithms identified in
this document as MUST or RECOMMENDED to implement are not known to be
broken at the current time, and cryptographic research so far leads
us to believe that they are likely to remain secure into the
foreseeable future. However, this isn't necessarily forever, and it
is expected that future documents will be issued from time to time to
reflect the current best practices in this area.
Retiring an algorithm too soon would result in a zone signed with the
retired algorithm being downgraded to the equivalent of an unsigned
zone. Therefore, algorithm deprecation must be done very slowly and
only after careful consideration and measurement of its use.
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6. Operational Considerations
DNSKEY algorithm rollover in a live zone is a complex process. See
[RFC6781] and [RFC7583] for guidelines on how to perform algorithm
rollovers.
DS algorithm rollover in a live zone is also a complex process.
Upgrading algorithm at the same time as rolling the new KSK key will
lead to DNSSEC validation failures, and users MUST upgrade the DS
algorithm first before rolling the Key Signing Key.
7. IANA Considerations
The IANA is requested to update the [DNSKEY-IANA] and [DS-IANA]
registries according to the following sections.
7.1. Update to the "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" table
This document requests IANA update the "DNS Security Algorithm
Numbers" registry ([DNSKEY-IANA]) table with the following additional
columns:
* "Use for DNSSEC Signing"
* "Use for DNSSEC Validation"
* "Implement for DNSSEC Signing"
* "Implement for DNSSEC Validation"
These values should be populated using values from Table 2 of this
document.
Additional, the registration policy for the [DNSKEY-IANA] registry
should match the text describing the requirements in this document.
7.2. Update to the "Digest Algorithms" table
This document requests IANA update the "Digest Algorithms" registry
([DS-IANA]) table with the following additional columns:
* "Use for DNSSEC Delegation"
* "Use for DNSSEC Validation"
* "Implement for DNSSEC Delegation"
* "Implement for DNSSEC Validation"
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These values should be populated using values from Table 3 of this
document.
* Update the registration policy for the [DNSKEY-IANA] registry to
match the text describing update requirements above.
8. Acknowledgments
This document is based on, and extends, RFC 8624, which was authored
by Paul Wouters, and Ondrej Sury.
The contents of this document was heavily discussed by participants
of the DNSOP working group. We appreciate the thoughtfulness of the
many opinions expressed by working group participants that all helped
shaped this document. We thank Paul Hoffman and Paul Wouters for
their contributed text.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[DNSKEY-IANA]
IANA, "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Algorithm
Numbers", n.d., <https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-
alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml>.
[DS-IANA] IANA, "Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type
Digest Algorithms", n.d.,
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8624] Wouters, P. and O. Sury, "Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for DNSSEC", RFC 8624,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8624, June 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8624>.
[RFC9364] Hoffman, P., "DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)", BCP 237,
RFC 9364, DOI 10.17487/RFC9364, February 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9364>.
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9.2. Informative References
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4034>.
[RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
(DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4509, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4509>.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5155>.
[RFC5702] Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY
and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5702,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5702, October 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5702>.
[RFC5933] Dolmatov, V., Ed., Chuprina, A., and I. Ustinov, "Use of
GOST Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource
Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5933, DOI 10.17487/RFC5933, July
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5933>.
[RFC6605] Hoffman, P. and W.C.A. Wijngaards, "Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 6605,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6605, April 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6605>.
[RFC6781] Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC
Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6781, December 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6781>.
[RFC7583] Morris, S., Ihren, J., Dickinson, J., and W. Mekking,
"DNSSEC Key Rollover Timing Considerations", RFC 7583,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7583, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7583>.
[RFC8080] Sury, O. and R. Edmonds, "Edwards-Curve Digital Security
Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 8080,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8080, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8080>.
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[TLS-ciphersuites]
IANA, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-
parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4>.
Appendix A. ChangeLog
A.1. Changes from ietf-01 to ietf-02
* Changed the MUST values in the tables for the Use columns to
RECOMMENDED based on discussions no the dnsop mailing list.
* Other minor wording and formatting changes
A.2. Changes from ietf-00 to ietf-01
* Only NIT fixing
A.3. Changes from hardaker-04 to ietf-00
* Just a draft name and number change.
A.4. Changes from -03 to -04
* Changed the columns being added from 2 per table to 4, based on
discussion within the dnsop working group mailing list. This was
a fairly major set of changes.
A.5. Changes since RFC8624
* The primary purpose of this revision is to introduce the new
columns to existing registries. It makes no changes to the
previously defined values.
* Merged in RFC9157 updates.
* Set authors as Wes Hardaker, Warren Kumari.
Authors' Addresses
Wes Hardaker
USC/ISI
Email: ietf@hardakers.net
Warren Kumari
Google
Email: warren@kumari.net
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