

OCF Security Specification

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1 Scope

This document defines security objectives, philosophy, resources and mechanism that impacts OCF base layers of ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018. ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018 contains informative security content. The OCF Security Specification contains security normative content and may contain informative content related to the OCF base or other OCF documents.

2 Normative References

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018 Information technology -- Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) Specification -- Part 1: Core specification
<https://www.iso.org/standard/53238.html>
Latest version available at:
https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Core_Specification.pdf

ISO/IEC 30118-3:2018 Information technology -- Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) Specification -- Part 3: Bridging specification
<https://www.iso.org/standard/74240.html>
Latest version available at:
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OCF Wi-Fi Easy Setup, Information technology – Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) Specification – Part 7: Wi-Fi Easy Setup specification
Latest version available at:
https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Wi-Fi_Easy_Setup_Specification.pdf

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459 IETF RFC 8520, *Manufacturer Usage Description Specification*, Mar 2019,
460 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8520>

461 oneM2M Release 3 Specifications, <http://www.onem2m.org/technical/published-drafts>

462 OpenAPI specification, aka *Swagger RESTful API Documentation Specification*, Version 2.0
463 <https://github.com/OAI/OpenAPI-Specification/blob/master/versions/2.0.md>

464

3 Terms, definitions, and abbreviated terms

3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018 and the following apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- ISO Online browsing platform: available at <https://www.iso.org/obp>
- IEC Electropedia: available at <http://www.electropedia.org/>

3.1.1

Access Management Service (AMS)

dynamically constructs ACL Resources in response to a Device Resource request.

Note 1 to entry: An AMS can evaluate access policies remotely and supply the result to a Server which allows or denies a pending access request. An AMS is authorised to provision ACL Resources.

3.1.2

Access Token – moved to OCF Cloud Security document

3.1.3

Authorization Provider – moved to OCF Cloud Security document

3.1.4

Client

Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

3.1.5

Credential Management Service (CMS)

a name and Resource Type ("oic.sec.cms") given to a Device that is authorized to provision credential Resources.

3.1.6

Device

Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

3.1.7

Device Class

Note 1 to entry: As defined in IETF RFC 7228. IETF RFC 7228 defines classes of constrained devices that distinguish when the OCF small footprint stack is used vs. a large footprint stack. Class 2 and below is for small footprint stacks.

3.1.8

Device UUID

a stack instance identifier.

3.1.9

Device Ownership Transfer Service (DOTS)

a logical entity that establishes device ownership

3.1.10

3.1.11 Device Registration – moved to OCF Cloud Security document

End-Entity

any certificate holder which is not a Root or Intermediate Certificate Authority.

Note 1 to entry: Typically, a device certificate.

3.1.12

Entity

Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

510 **3.1.13**
511 **OCF Interface**
512 Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

513 **3.1.14**
514 **Intermediary**
515 a Device that implements both Client and Server roles and may perform protocol translation, virtual
516 device to physical device mapping or Resource translation

517 **3.1.15**
518 **OCF Cipher Suite**
519 a set of algorithms and parameters that define the cryptographic functionality of a Device. The OCF
520 Cipher Suite includes the definition of the public key group operations, signatures, and specific
521 hashing and encoding used to support the public key.

522 **3.1.16**
523 **OCF Cloud User – moved to OCF Cloud Security spec**

524 **3.1.17**
525 **OCF Rooted Certificate Chain**
526 a collection of X.509 v3 certificates in which each certificate chains to a trust anchor certificate
527 which has been issued by a certificate authority under the direction, authority, and approval of the
528 Open Connectivity Foundation Board of Directors as a trusted root for the OCF ecosystem.

529 **3.1.18**
530 **Onboarding Tool (OBT)**
531 a tool that implements DOTS(3.1.9), AMS(3.1.1) and CMS(3.1.5) functionality

532 **3.1.19**
533 **Out of Band Communication Channel**
534 any mechanism for delivery of a secret from one party to another, not specified by OCF

535 **3.1.20**
536 **Owner Credential (OC)**
537 a credential, provisioned to a Device, for the purposes of mutual authentication of the Device and
538 OBT(3.1.18) during subsequent interactions, identified by having a Subject UUID matching the
539 Resource Owner Id of the Device Ownership Transfer Resource hosted by a Device that has the
540 credential

541 **3.1.21**
542 **Platform ID**
543 Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

544 **3.1.22**
545 **Property**
546 Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

547 **3.1.23**
548 **Resource**
549 Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

550 **3.1.24**
551 **Role (Network context)**
552 stereotyped behavior of a Device; one of [Client, Server or Intermediary]

3.1.25

Role Identifier

a Property of an OCF credentials Resource or element in a role certificate that identifies a privileged role that a Server Device associates with a Client Device for the purposes of making authorization decisions when the Client Device requests access to Device Resources.

3.1.26

Secure Resource Manager (SRM)

a module in the OCF Core that implements security functionality that includes management of security Resources such as ACLs, credentials and Device owner transfer state.

3.1.27

Security Virtual Resource (SVR)

a resource supporting security features.

Note 1 to entry: For a list of all the SVRs please see clause 13.

3.1.28

Server

Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

3.1.29

Trust Anchor

a well-defined, shared authority, within a trust hierarchy, by which two cryptographic entities (e.g. a Device and an OBT(3.1.18)) can assume trust

3.1.30

Device Configuration Resource (DCR)

a Resource that is any of the following:

- a) a Discovery Core Resource, or
- b) a Security Virtual Resource, or
- c) a Wi-Fi Easy Setup Resource ("oic.r.easysetup", "oic.r.wificonf", "oic.r.devconf"), or
- d) a CoAP Cloud Configuration Resource ("oic.r.coapcloudconf"), or
- e) a Software Update Resource ("oic.r.softwareupdate"), or
- f) a Maintenance Resource ("oic.wk.mnt").

3.1.31

Non-Configuration Resource (NCR)

a Resource that is not a Device Configuration Resource (3.1.30).

3.1.32

Bridged Device

Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-3:2018.

3.1.33

Bridged Protocol

Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-3:2018.

3.1.34

Bridge

Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-3:2018.

3.1.35

Bridging Platform

Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-3:2018.

597 **3.1.36**
598 **Virtual Bridged Device**

599 Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-3:2018.

600 **3.1.37**
601 **Virtual OCF Device**

602 Note 1 to entry: The details are defined in ISO/IEC 30118-3:2018.

603 **3.1.38**
604 **OCF Security Domain**
605 set of onboarded OCF Devices that are provisioned with credentialing information for confidential
606 communication with one another

607 **3.1.39**
608 **Owned (or "in Owned State")**
609 having the "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" resource equal to "TRUE"

610 **3.1.40**
611 **Unowned (or "in Unowned State")**
612 having the "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" resource equal to "FALSE"

613 **3.1.41**
614 **OCF Onboarding**
615 initial establishment of ownership over a Device, and initial provisioning of the Device for normal
616 operation

617 **3.1.42**
618 **Auditable Event**
619 system activity that may be indicative of a violation of security policy

620 **3.1.43**
621 **Auditable Event Entry**
622 record of the details of an Auditable Event

623 **3.2 Abbreviated terms**

624 **3.2.1**
625 **AC**
626 Access Control

627 **3.2.2**
628 **ACE**
629 Access Control Entry

630 **3.2.3**
631 **ACL**
632 Access Control List

633 **3.2.4**
634 **AES**
635 Advanced Encryption Standard

636 Note 1 to entry: See NIST FIPS 197, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)"

637 **3.2.5**
638 **AMS**
639 Access Management Service

640 **3.2.6**
641 **CMS**
642 Credential Management Service

643 **3.2.7**
644 **CRUDN**
645 CREATE, RETREIVE, UPDATE, DELETE, NOTIFY

646 **3.2.8**
647 **CSR**
648 Certificate Signing Request

649 **3.2.9**
650 **CVC**
651 Code Verification Certificate

652 **3.2.10**
653 **ECC**
654 Elliptic Curve Cryptography

655 **3.2.11**
656 **ECDSA**
657 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

658 **3.2.12**
659 **EKU**
660 Extended Key Usage

661 **3.2.13**
662 **DOTS**
663 Device Ownership Transfer Service

664 **3.2.14**
665 **ID**
666 Identity/Identifier

667 **3.2.15**
668 **JSON**
669 JavaScript Object Notation.

670 Note 1 to entry: See ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

671 **3.2.16**
672 **JWS**
673 JSON Web Signature.

674 Note 1 to entry: See IETF RFC 7515, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)"

675 **3.2.17**
676 **KDF**
677 Key Derivation Function

678 **3.2.18**
679 **MAC**
680 Message Authentication Code

681 **3.2.19**
682 **MITM**
683 Man-in-the-Middle

684 **3.2.20**
685 **NVRAM**
686 Non-Volatile Random-Access Memory

687 **3.2.21**
688 **OC**
689 Owner Credential

690 **3.2.22**
691 **OCSP**
692 Online Certificate Status Protocol

693 **3.2.23**
694 **OBT**
695 Onboarding Tool

696 **3.2.24**
697 **OID**
698 Object Identifier

699 **3.2.25**
700 **OTM**
701 Owner Transfer Method

702 **3.2.26**
703 **OWASP**
704 Open Web Application Security Project.
705 Note 1 to entry: See <https://www.owasp.org/>

706 **3.2.27**
707 **PE**
708 Policy Engine

709 **3.2.28**
710 **PIN**
711 Personal Identification Number

712 **3.2.29**
713 **PPSK**
714 PIN-authenticated pre-shared key

715 **3.2.30**
716 **PRF**
717 Pseudo Random Function

718 **3.2.31**
719 **PSI**
720 Persistent Storage Interface

721 **3.2.32**
722 **PSK**
723 Pre Shared Key

724 **3.2.33**
725 **RBAC**
726 Role Based Access Control

727 **3.2.34**
 728 **RM**
 729 Resource Manager

 730 **3.2.35**
 731 **RNG**
 732 Random Number Generator

 733 **3.2.36**
 734 **SBAC**
 735 Subject Based Access Control

 736 **3.2.37**
 737 **SEE**
 738 Secure Execution Environment

 739 **3.2.38**
 740 **SRM**
 741 Secure Resource Manager

 742 **3.2.39**
 743 **SVR**
 744 Security Virtual Resource

 745 **3.2.40**
 746 **SW**
 747 Software

 748 **3.2.41**
 749 **3.2.42**
 750 **URI**
 751 Uniform Resource Identifier

 752 Note 1 to entry: See ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.
 753 **3.2.43**
 754 **VOD**
 755 Virtual OCF Device

 756 Note 1 to entry: See ISO/IEC 30118-3:2018.
 757 **3.2.44**
 758 **RFNOP**
 759 Ready for Normal Operation

 760 **3.2.45**
 761 **RFOTM**
 762 Ready for OTM

 763 **3.2.46**
 764 **RFPRO**
 765 Ready for Provisioning

 766 **3.2.47**
 767 **SRESET**
 768 Soft Reset

3.2.48

AEE

Auditable Event Entry

4 Document Conventions and Organization

4.1 Conventions

This document defines Resources, protocols and conventions used to implement security for OCF core framework and applications.

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018 apply.

Figure 1 depicts interaction between OCF Devices.




Figure 1 – OCF Interaction

Devices may implement a Client role that performs Actions on Servers. Actions access Resources managed by Servers. The OCF stack enforces access policies on Resources. End-to-end Device interaction can be protected using session protection protocol (e.g. DTLS) or with data encryption methods.

4.2 Notation

In this document, features are described as required, recommended, allowed or DEPRECATED as follows:

Required (or **shall** or **mandatory**).

These basic features shall be implemented to comply with OCF Core Architecture. The phrases "shall not", and "PROHIBITED" indicate behaviour that is prohibited, i.e. that if performed means the implementation is not in compliance.

Recommended (or **should**).

These features add functionality supported by OCF Core Architecture and should be implemented. Recommended features take advantage of the capabilities OCF Core Architecture, usually without imposing major increase of complexity. Notice that for compliance testing, if a recommended feature is implemented, it shall meet the specified requirements to be in compliance with these guidelines. Some recommended features could become requirements in the future. The phrase "should not" indicates behaviour that is permitted but not recommended.

Allowed (may or allowed).

These features are neither required nor recommended by OCF Core Architecture, but if the feature is implemented, it shall meet the specified requirements to be in compliance with these guidelines.

Conditionally allowed (CA)

802 The definition or behaviour depends on a condition. If the specified condition is met, then the
803 definition or behaviour is allowed, otherwise it is not allowed.

804 **Conditionally required (CR)**

805 The definition or behaviour depends on a condition. If the specified condition is met, then the
806 definition or behaviour is required. Otherwise the definition or behaviour is allowed as default
807 unless specifically defined as not allowed.

808 **DEPRECATED**

809 Although these features are still described in this document, they should not be implemented except
810 for backward compatibility. The occurrence of a deprecated feature during operation of an
811 implementation compliant with the current document has no effect on the implementation's
812 operation and does not produce any error conditions. Backward compatibility may require that a
813 feature is implemented and functions as specified but it shall never be used by implementations
814 compliant with this document.

815 Strings that are to be taken literally are enclosed in "double quotes".

816 Words that are emphasized are printed in *italic*.

817 **4.3 Data types**

818 See ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

819 **4.4 Document structure**

820 Informative clauses may be found in the Overview clauses, while normative clauses fall outside of
821 those clauses.

822 The Security Specification may use the OpenAPI specification as the API definition language. The
823 mapping of the CRUDN actions is specified in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

824

5 Security Overview

5.1 Preamble

The goal of OCF's security architecture is to protect the data and device states represented by the OCF Resources. From the OCF perspective, a Device is a certifiable logical entity that participates in an OCF ecosystem. During interactions between Devices, the Device acting as the Server holds and controls the Resources and provides the Device acting as a Client access to those Resources, subject to a set of security mechanisms and conforming to the policies configured by the OCF Security Domain Owner. The Platform hosting the Device may provide security hardening to ensure robustness of the variety of operations described in this document. Multiple Devices may be hosted by the same Platform.

The security model is depicted in Figure 2 and described in the following steps:




Figure 2 – OCF Layers

- 1) The Client establishes a network connection to the Server (Device holding the Resources).
- 2) The Devices (Server and Client) exchange messages either via a mutually-authenticated secure channel between the two Devices or via an unsecured connection.
 - a) The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource on each Device holds the credentials used for mutual authentication and credentials used for role authorization.
 - b) Messages received over a secured channel are associated with a "deviceUUID". In the case of a certificate credential, the "deviceUUID" is part of the certificate received from the other Device. In the case of a symmetric key credential, the "deviceUUID" is associated with the credential in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource.
 - c) The Client may present its role certificate to request association with a role identifier ("roleid"). The Server may associate the Client with any number of role identifiers.
 - d) Requests received by a Server over an unsecured channel are treated as anonymous and are not associated with any "deviceUUID" or "roleid".

851 3) The Client submits a request to the Server.

852 4) The Server receives the request.

853 a) If the request is received over an unsecured channel, the Server treats the request as
854 anonymous and no "deviceUUID" or "roleid" are associated with the request.

855 b) If the request is received over a secured channel, then the Server associates the request
856 with the "deviceUUID" of the Client and all valid "roleid" values of the Client by default.

857 c) The Server then consults the Access Control List (ACL), and looks for an Access Control
858 Entry (ACE) matching the following criteria:

859 i) The requested Resource matches a Resource reference in the ACE

860 ii) The requested operation is permitted by the "permissions" of the ACE, and

861 iii) The "subjectUUID" contains either one of a special set of wildcard values or, if the
862 Device is not anonymous, the subject matches the Client "deviceUUID" associated with
863 the request or a valid "roleid" associated with the request. The special wildcard values
864 authorize all Devices communicating over either authenticated and encrypted sessions
865 or unsecured sessions to interact according to the ACE.

866 If there is a matching ACE, then access to the Resource is permitted; otherwise access
867 is denied. Access is enforced by the Server's Secure Resource Manager (SRM).

868 5) The Server sends a response back to the Client.

869 Resource protection includes protection of data both while at rest and during transit. Aside from
870 access control mechanisms, the OCF Security Specification does not include specification of
871 secure storage of Resources. Secure storage may be accomplished through the use of hardware
872 security or encryption of data at rest. The exact implementation of secure storage is subject to a
873 set of hardening requirements that are specified in clause 14 and may be subject to certification
874 guidelines.

875 Data in transit protection is specified fully as a normative part of this document. This document
876 only supports in transit data protection at the transport layer through use of mechanisms such as
877 DTLS.

878 NOTE: DTLS will provide packet by packet protection, rather than protection for the payload as whole. For instance, if
879 the integrity of the entire payload as a whole is required, separate signature mechanisms must have already been in
880 place before passing the packet down to the transport layer.

881 Figure 3 depicts OCF Security Enforcement Points.




Figure 3 – OCF Security Enforcement Points

5.2 Access Control

5.2.1 Access Control General

The OCF framework assumes that Resources are hosted by a Server and are made available to Clients subject to access control and authorization mechanisms. The Resources at the Server are protected through implementation of access control, authentication and confidentiality protection. This clause provides an overview of access control through the use of Access Control Lists. However, access control in OCF is agnostic regarding transport and connectivity abstraction layers.

Implementation of access control relies on a-priori definition of a set of access policies for the Resource. The policies are stored locally in an ACL Resource provisioned by an Access Management Service (AMS) in the form of Access Control Entries (ACE). The lack of such an associated ACE results in the Resource being inaccessible. Multiple types of access control mechanisms may be applied:

- Subject-based access control (SBAC), where the ACE matches the identity of the Client against the subject included in the policy defined for the Resource. Asserting the identity of the Client requires an authentication process.
- Role-based Access Control (RBAC), where the ACE matches a role identifier included in the policy for the Resource to a role identifier associated with the Client.
- Wildcard-based Access Control, where the ACE matches a connection type, used to access the Resource (i.e. any mutually-authenticated connection).

The ACE only applies if the ACE matches both the subject (i.e. Client) and the requested Resource. There are multiple ways a subject could be matched, (1) Device UUID, (2) Role Identifier or (3) wildcard. The way in which the Client connects to the Server may be relevant for making access

control decisions. Wildcard matching on authenticated vs. unauthenticated and encrypted vs. unencrypted connection allows an access policy to be broadly applied to subject classes.

Example Wildcard Matching Policy:

```
"aclist2": [  
  {  
    "subject": {"conntype": "anon-clear" },  
    "resources": [  
      { "wc": "*" }  
    ],  
    "permission": 31  
  },  
  {  
    "subject": {"conntype": "auth-crypt" },  
    "resources": [  
      { "wc": "*" }  
    ],  
    "permission": 31  
  },  
]
```

Details of the format for ACL are defined in clause 12. The ACL is composed of one or more ACEs.

Some Resources, such as Collections, generate requests to linked Resources when appropriate Interfaces are used. In such cases, additional access control considerations are necessary. Additional access control considerations for Collections when using the batch OCF Interface are found in clause 12.2.7.3. ACL Resource requires the same security protection as other sensitive Resources when it comes to both storage and handling by the SRM.

5.2.2 ACL Architecture

The Server examines the Resource(s) requested by the client before processing the request. The access control resource is searched to find one or more ACE entries that match the Client and the requested Resources. If a match is found, then permission and period constraints are applied. If more than one match is found, then each ACE entry is evaluated for a match independently.


The Server uses the connection context to determine whether the subject has authenticated or not and whether data confidentiality has been applied or not. If the user has authenticated, then subject matching may happen at increased granularity based on role or device identity.

Each ACE contains the permission set that will be applied for a given Client. Permissions consist of a combination of CREATE, RETREIVE, UPDATE, DELETE and NOTIFY (CRUDN) actions. Clients authenticate as a Device and optionally operating with one or more roles. Devices may acquire elevated access permissions when asserting a role. For example, an "oic.role.owner" role might expose additional Resources and OCF Interfaces not normally accessible.

Servers host ACL Resources locally. Local ACLs allow greater autonomy in access control processing.

The following use cases describe the operation of access control:

Use Case 1: As depicted in Figure 4, Server Device hosts 4 Resources (R1, R2, R3 and R4). Client Device D1 requests access to Resource R1 hosted at Server Device 5. ACL[0] corresponds to Resource R1 and includes D1 as an authorized subject. Thus, Device D1 receives access to Resource R1 because the local ACL "/oic/sec/acl2/0" matches the request.



955 **Figure 4 – Use case-1 showing simple ACL enforcement**

956 **5.3 Onboarding Overview**

957 **5.3.1 Onboarding General**

958 Before a Device becomes operational in an OCF environment and is able to interact with other
959 Devices, it needs to be appropriately onboarded. The first step in onboarding a Device is to
960 configure the ownership where the legitimate user that owns/purchases the Device uses an
961 Onboarding tool (OBT) and using the OBT uses one of the Owner Transfer Methods (OTMs) to
962 establish ownership. Once ownership is established, the OBT provisions the Device, at the end of
963 which the Device becomes operational and is able to interact with other Devices in an OCF
964 environment.

965 Figure 5 depicts an overview of Onboarding.




Figure 5 – Onboarding overview

This clause explains the onboarding and security provisioning process but leaves the provisioning of non-security aspects to other OCF documents. In the context of security, all Devices are required to be provisioned with minimal security configuration that allows the Device to securely interact/communicate with other Devices in an OCF environment. This minimal security

configuration is defined as the Onboarded Device "Ready for Normal Operation" and is specified in 7.5.

5.3.2 Onboarding Steps

The flowchart in Figure 6 shows the typical steps that are involved during onboarding. Although onboarding may include a variety of non-security related steps, the diagram focus is mainly on the security related configuration to allow a new Device to function within an OCF environment. Onboarding typically begins with the Device becoming an Owned Device followed by configuring the Device for the environment that it will operate in. This would include setting information such as who may access the Device and what actions may be performed as well as what permissions the Device has for interacting with other Devices.




Figure 6 – OCF Onboarding Process

5.3.3 Establishing a Device Owner

The objective behind establishing Device ownership is to allow the OCF Security Domain Owner to assert itself as the owner and manager of the Device and introduce the Device into the OCF

Security Domain. This is done through the use of a DOTS that includes the creation of an ownership context between the new Device and the DOTS and asserts operational control and management of the Device. The DOTS is hosted on an OBT.

The DOTS uses one of the OTMs specified in 7.3 to securely establish Device ownership.

An OTM establishes a new owner (the operator of DOTS) that is authorized to manage the Device. Ownership Transfer accomplishes the following:

- The DOTS provisions an Owner Credential (OC) to the "creds" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource of the Device. This OC allows the Device and DOTS to mutually authenticate during subsequent interactions. The OC associates the DOTS Device UUID with the "rowneruid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource establishing it as the resource owner.
- The Device owner establishes trust in the Device through the OTM.
- Provisioning of appropriate credentials for the Device to be a member of the OCF Security Domain.

5.3.4 Provisioning for Normal Operation

Once the Device has the necessary information to initiate provisioning, the next step is to provision additional security configuration that allows the Device to become operational. This may include setting various parameters and may also involve multiple steps. Also provisioning of ACL's for the various Resources hosted by the Server on the Device is done at this time. The provisioning step is not limited to this stage only. Device provisioning may happen at multiple stages in the Device's operational lifecycle. However specific security related provisioning of Resource and Property state would likely happen at this stage at the end of which, each Device reaches the "Ready for Normal Operation" (RFNOP) State. The RFNOP State is consistent and well defined regardless of the specific OTM used or regardless of the variability in what gets provisioned. However individual OTM mechanisms and provisioning steps may specify additional configuration of Resources and Property states. The minimal mandatory configuration required for a Device to be in RFNOP state is specified in 8.

5.3.5 Device Provisioning for OCF Cloud and Device Registration Overview – moved to OCF Cloud Security document

This clause is intentionally left blank.

5.3.6 OCF Compliance Management System

The OCF Compliance Management System (OCMS) is a service maintained by the OCF that provides Certification status and information for OCF Devices.

The OCMS shall provide a JSON-formatted Certified Product List (CPL), hosted at the URI: <https://www.openconnectivity.org/certification/ocms-cpl.json>

The OBT shall possess the Root Certificate needed to enable https connection to the URI <https://www.openconnectivity.org/certification/ocms-cpl.json>.

The OBT should periodically refresh its copy of the CPL via the URI <https://www.openconnectivity.org/certification/ocms-cpl.json>, as appropriate to OCF Security Domain owner policy requirements.

5.4 Provisioning

5.4.1 Provisioning General

OCF security provisioning includes processes during and after the ownership transfer like configuration of credentials for interacting with provisioning services, configuration of any security related Resources and credentials for interacting with any services or Devices that the provisioned Device needs to contact later on.

1032 The Device needs to engage with the CMS and AMS to be provisioned with:

- 1033 – Security credentials through a CMS, which is currently assumed to be embedded in the same
- 1034 OBT as the DOTS.
- 1035 – Access control policies and ACLs through an AMS, which is currently assumed to be embedded
- 1036 in the same OBT as the DOTS.
- 1037

1038 To be able to support the use of distinct device management services, some Device Secure Virtual

1039 Resources (SVRs) have an associated Resource owner identified in the Resource's rowneruuid

1040 Property.

1041 The "rowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" and "/oic/sec/pstat" resources identifies the

1042 DOTS.

1043 The "rowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" resource identifies the CMS.

1044 The "rowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/acl2" resource identifies the AMS.

1045 The DOTS provisions credentials that enable secure connections between OCF Services and the

1046 new Device. The DOTS initiates client-directed provisioning by signaling the OCF Service.

1047 **5.4.2 Access Control Provisioning**

1048 ACL provisioning is performed over a secure connection between the AMS and its Devices. The

1049 AMS provisions the ACL by updating the Device's ACL Resource.

1050 **5.4.3 Credential Provisioning**

1051 The CMS securely provisions credentials for Device-to-Device interactions using the CMS

1052 credential provisioned by the DOTS during the onboarding procedure. The CMS is also expected

1053 to proactively monitor the credentials installed on the Device and update them when needed (e.g.

1054 close to the expiration date).

1055 **5.4.4 Role Provisioning**

1056 The Servers, receiving requests for Resources they host, need to verify the role identifier(s)

1057 asserted by the Client requesting the Resource and compare that role identifier(s) with the

1058 constraints described in the Server's ACLs. Thus, a Client may need to be provisioned with one or

1059 more role credentials. Once provisioned, the Client can assert the role it is using as described in

1060 10.4.2, if it has a certificate role credential.

1061 Each Device holds the assertable role(s) information as a Property within the Credential Resource.

1062 Each Device holds the asserted role(s) information as Properties within the Roles Resource.

1063 All asserted roles are used in ACL enforcement. When a server has multiple roles asserted for a

1064 Client, access to a Resource is granted if it would be granted under any of the roles.

1065 **5.5 Secure Resource Manager (SRM)**

1066 SRM plays a key role in the overall security operation. In short, SRM performs both management

1067 of SVR and access control for requests to access and manipulate Resources. SRM consists of 3

1068 main functional elements:

- 1069 – A Resource manager (RM): responsible for 1) Loading SVRs from persistent storage (using PSI)
- 1070 as needed. 2) Supplying the Policy Engine (PE) with Resources upon request. 3) Responding
- 1071 to requests for SVRs. While the SVRs are in SRM memory, the SVRs are in a format that is
- 1072 consistent with device-specific data store format. However, the RM will use JSON format to
- 1073 marshal SVR data structures before being passed to PSI for storage, or travel off-device.

- A Policy Engine (PE) that takes requests for access to SVRs and based on access control policies responds to the requests with either "ACCESS_GRANTED" or "ACCESS_DENIED". To make the access decisions, the PE consults the appropriate ACL and looks for best Access Control Entry (ACE) that can serve the request given the subject (Device or role) that was authenticated by DTLS.
- Persistent Storage Interface (PSI): PSI provides a set of APIs for the RM to manipulate files in its own memory and storage. The SRM design is modular such that it may be implemented in the Platform's secure execution environment; if available.

Figure 7 depicts OCF's SRM Architecture.




Figure 7 – OCF's SRM Architecture

5.6 Credential Overview

Devices may use credentials to prove the identity and role(s) of the parties in the Client to Server communication. Credentials may be symmetric or asymmetric. Each Device stores secret and public parts of its own credentials where applicable, as well as credentials for other Devices that have been provisioned by the DOTS or a CMS. These credentials may then be used in the establishment of secure communication sessions (e.g. using DTLS). Role certificates may be used after an authenticated session is established to assert one or more roles for a Device.

The credential types available within this document include:

- Pairwise symmetric keys
- Certificates
- Raw asymmetric keys

Devices may not support all of these credential types. The set of supported credential types for any Device is contained in its "sct" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource.

5.7 Event Logging

5.7.1 Event Logging General

An OCF Platform can generate various kinds of Auditable Events. These Auditable Events can be used for log analysis or for real-time understanding of a system condition. Usually multiple

1102 Auditable Events are stored to backtrack problems that have occurred in the system. The storage
1103 capacity of IoT devices is typically very limited, so a specific type of data structure such as a ring
1104 buffer is often used.

1105 An OCF Device logs Auditable Event Entries (AEE) for all Auditable Events that satisfy the
1106 "categoryfilter" and "priorityfilter" Properties of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource. The AEEs are stored in
1107 local storage (see Figure 1). Due to the limited size of the local storage, OCF Security Domain
1108 Owner is expected to adjust the filtering options.



Figure 8 – Store Events in local storage

6 Security for the Discovery Process

6.1 Preamble

The main function of a discovery mechanism is to provide Universal Resource Identifiers (URIs, called links) for the Resources hosted by the Server, complemented by attributes about those Resources and possible further link relations. (in accordance to clause 10 in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018)

6.2 Security Considerations for Discovery

When defining discovery process, care must be taken that only a minimum set of Resources are exposed to the discovering entity without violating security of sensitive information or privacy requirements of the application at hand. This includes both data included in the Resources, as well as the corresponding metadata.

To achieve extensibility and scalability, this document does not provide a mandate on discoverability of each individual Resource. Instead, the Server holding the Resource will rely on ACLs for each Resource to determine if the requester (the Client) is authorized to see/handle any of the Resources.

The `"/oic/sec/acl2"` Resource contains ACL entries governing access to the Server hosted Resources. (See 13.5)

Aside from the privacy and discoverability of Resources from ACL point of view, the discovery process itself needs to be secured. This document sets the following requirements for the discovery process:

- 1) Providing integrity protection for discovered Resources.
- 2) Providing confidentiality protection for discovered Resources that are considered sensitive.

The discovery of Resources is done by doing a RETRIEVE operation (either unicast or multicast) on the known `"/oic/res"` Resource.

The discovery request is sent over a non-secure channel (multicast or unicast without DTLS), a Server cannot determine the identity of the requester. In such cases, a Server that wants to authenticate the Client before responding can list the secure discovery URI (e.g. `coaps://IP:PORT/oic/res`) in the unsecured `"/oic/res"` Resource response. This means the secure discovery URI is by default discoverable by any Client. The Client will then be required to send a separate unicast request using DTLS to the secure discovery URI.

For example, a Client with Device UUID `"d1"` (UUID:`"0685B960-736F-46F7-BEC0-9E6CBD61ADC1"`) makes a RETRIEVE request on the `"/door"` Resource hosted on a Server with Device UUID `"d3"` where d3 has the ACL2s:

```
{
  "aclist2": [
    {
      "subject": {"uuid": "0685B960-736F-46F7-BEC0-9E6CBD61ADC1"},
      "resources": [{"href": "/door"}],
      "permission": 2, // RETRIEVE
      "aceid": 1
    },
    {
      "subject": {"authority": "owner", "role": "owner"},
      "resources": [{"href": "/door"}],
      "permission": 2, // RETRIEVE
    }
  ]
}
```

```

1156     "aceid": 2
1157 },
1158 {
1159     "subject": {"uuid": "0685B960-736F-46F7-BEC0-9E6CBD61ADC1"},
1160     "resources": [{"href": "/door/lock"}],
1161     "permission": 4, // UPDATE
1162     "aceid": 3
1163 }
1164 ],
1165 "rowneruuid": "0685B960-736F-46F7-BEC0-9E6CBD61ADC1"
1166 }

```

1167 The ACL indicates that Client "d1" has RETRIEVE permissions on the Resource. Hence when
1168 device "d1" does a discovery on the "/door" Resource of the Server "d3", the response will include
1169 all the URIs in the "/door" Resource. Client "d2" without a Role ID "owner" will get an error response
1170 that includes no URI.

1171 Discovery results delivered to d1 regarding d3's "/door" Resource from the secure interface:

```

1172 [
1173 {
1174     "href": "/door",
1175     "rel": "self",
1176     "rt": ["oic.wk.col"],
1177     "if": ["oic.if.ll", "oic.if.b", "oic.if.baseline"],
1178     "eps":[{"ep": "coaps://[2001:db8:a::b1d4]:55555}"]
1179 },
1180 {
1181     "href": "/door/lock",
1182     "rt": ["oic.r.lock.status"],
1183     "if": ["oic.if.a", "oic.if.baseline"],
1184     "eps":[{"ep": "coaps://[2001:db8:a::b1d4]:55555}"]
1185 }
1186 ]

```

7 Security Provisioning

7.1 Device Identity

7.1.1 General Device Identity

A Device shall be identified by a Device UUID value that is established as part of the device onboarding and contained in the "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource. Device UUIDs shall be unique within the scope of the corresponding OCF Security Domain, and are expected to be randomly generated and provisioned by the OBT. The DOTS is expected to verify that the chosen new Device UUID does not conflict with Device UUIDs previously introduced into the OCF Security Domain.

Devices maintain an association of their Device UUIDs and their own cryptographic credential(s) via "/oic/sec/cred" Resource. The identity is cryptographically bound in case of a certificate credential, or is bound via internal mappings in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource otherwise. The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource maintains a list of a Device's own and other Device's credentials. Multiple credentials may be associated with the same Device UUID. A Device is expected to only present credentials associated with its own Device UUID for peer authentication purposes. Devices regard the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource as authoritative when verifying authentication credentials of a peer Device.

In case of an authenticated connection, the Device UUID is treated as a Client's identity for purposes of the Access Control check for the target Resource. The Device UUID of a Client is matched against the Subject UUIDs in the pre-provisioned entries of Server's "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource. The Server determines Client's Device UUID based on the credential used for the establishment of the session.

An OCF Platform, which may host multiple Devices, is identified by a Platform ID. The Platform ID is globally unique and inserted in the device in an integrity protected manner (e.g. inside secure storage or signed and verified).

An OCF Platform may have a secure execution environment, used to secure unique identifiers and secrets. If a Platform hosts multiple Devices, some mechanism is needed to provide each Device with the appropriate and separate security context.

7.1.2 Device Identity for Devices with UAID [Deprecated]

This clause is intentionally left blank.

7.2 Device Ownership

This is an informative clause. Devices are logical entities that are security endpoints that have an identity that is authenticable using cryptographic credentials. A Device is Unowned when it is first initialized. Establishing device ownership is a process by which the device asserts its identity to the DOTS and the DOTS provisions an owner identity. This exchange results in the device changing its ownership state, thereby preventing a different DOTS from asserting administrative control over the device.

The ownership transfer process starts with the OBT discovering a new device that is in Unowned state through examination of the "Owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource of the new device. At the end of ownership transfer, the following is accomplished:

- 1) The DOTS establishes a secure session with new device.
- 2) Optionally asserts any of the following:
 - a) Proximity (using PIN) of the OBT to the Platform.
 - b) Manufacturer's certificate asserting Platform vendor, model and other Platform specific attributes.

- 3) Determines the device identifier.
- 4) Determines the device owner.
- 5) Specifies the device owner (e.g. Device UUID of the OBT).
- 6) Provisions the device with owner's credentials.
- 7) Sets the "Owned" state of the new device to TRUE.

7.3 Device Ownership Transfer Methods

7.3.1 OTM implementation requirements

This document provides specifications for several methods for ownership transfer. Implementation of each individual ownership transfer method is considered optional. However, each device shall implement at least one of the ownership transfer methods not including vendor specific methods.

All OTMs included in this document are considered optional. Each vendor is required to choose and implement at least one of the OTMs specified in this document. The OCF, does however, anticipate vendor-specific approaches will exist. Should the vendor wish to have interoperability between a vendor-specific OTM and OBTs from other vendors, the vendor must work directly with OBT vendors to ensure interoperability. Notwithstanding, standardization of OTMs is the preferred approach. In such cases, a set of guidelines is provided in 7.3.7 to help vendors in designing vendor-specific OTMs.

The "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource is extensible to accommodate vendor-defined owner transfer methods (OTM). The DOTS determines which OTM is most appropriate to onboard the new Device. All OTMs shall represent the onboarding capabilities of the Device using the "oxms" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource. The DOTS queries the Device's supported credential types using the "credtype" Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource. The DOTS and CMS provision credentials according to the credential types supported.

Figure 9 depicts new Device discovery sequence.




Figure 9 – Discover New Device Sequence

Table 1 – Discover New Device Details

Step	Description
1	The DOTS queries to see if the new device is not yet owned.
2	The new device returns the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource containing ownership status and supported OTMs. It also contains a temporal Device UUID that may change subsequent to successful owner transfer. The device should supply a temporal ID to facilitate discovery as a guest device. Clause 7.3.9 provides security considerations regarding selecting an OTM.

Vendor-specific device OTMs shall adhere to the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource Specification for OCs that results from vendor-specific device OTM. Vendor-specific OTM should include provisions for establishing trust in the new Device by the DOTS and optionally establishing trust in the OBT by the new Device.

The new device may have to perform some initialization steps at the beginning of an OTM. For example, if the Random PIN Based OTM is initiated, the new device may generate a random PIN value. The DOTS updates the oxmsel property of "/oic/sec/doxm" to the value corresponding to the OTM being used, before performing other OTM steps. This update notifies the new device that ownership transfer is starting.

The end state of a vendor-specific OTM shall allow the new Device to authenticate to the OBT and the OBT to authenticate to the new device.

Additional provisioning steps may be performed subsequent to owner transfer success leveraging the established OTM session.

7.3.2 SharedKey Credential Calculation

The SharedKey credential is derived using a PRF that accepts the key_block value resulting from the DTLS handshake used for onboarding. The new Device shall use the following calculation to ensure interoperability across vendor products (the DOTS performs the same calculation):

SharedKey = PRF(Secret, Message);

Where:

- PRF shall use TLS 1.2 PRF defined by IETF RFC 5246 clause 5.
- Secret is the key_block resulting from the DTLS handshake
 - See IETF RFC 5246 clause 6.3
 - The length of key_block depends on cipher suite.
 - (e.g. 96 bytes for TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
40 bytes for TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8)
- Message is a concatenation of the following:
 - DoxmType string for the current onboarding method (e.g. "oic.sec.doxm.jw")
 - See clause 13.2.2 for specific DoxmTypes
 - Owner ID is a UUID identifying the device owner identifier and the device that maintains SharedKey.
 - Use raw bytes as specified in IETF RFC 4122 clause 4.1.2
 - Device UUID is new device's UUID
 - Use raw bytes as specified in IETF RFC 4122 clause 4.1.2
- SharedKey Length will be 32 octets.
 - If subsequent DTLS sessions use 128 bit encryption cipher suites the left most 16 octets will be used. DTLS sessions using 256-bit encryption cipher suites will use all 32 octets.

7.3.3 Certificate Credential Generation

The Certificate Credential will be used by Devices for secure bidirectional communication. The certificates will be issued by a CMS or an external certificate authority (CA). This CA will be used to mutually establish the authenticity of the Device.

7.3.4 Just-Works OTM

7.3.4.1 Just-Works OTM General

Just-works OTM creates a symmetric key credential that is a pre-shared key used to establish a secure connection through which a device should be provisioned for use within the owner's OCF Security Domain. Provisioning additional credentials and Resources is a typical step following ownership establishment. The pre-shared key is called SharedKey.

The DOTS selects the Just-works OTM using the "oxmsel" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource and establishes a DTLS session using a ciphersuite defined for the Just-works OTM.

Just Works OTM sequence is shown in Figure 10 and steps described in Table 2.




Figure 10 – A Just Works OTM

1312

Table 2 – A Just Works OTM Details

Step	Description
1, 2	The DOTS notifies the Device that it selected the "Just Works" method.
3 - 8	A DTLS session is established using anonymous Diffie-Hellman. ^a
^a This method assumes the operator is aware of the potential for man-in-the-middle attack and has taken precautions to perform the method in a clean-room network.	

1313 **7.3.4.2 Security Considerations**

1314 Anonymous Diffie-Hellman key agreement is subject to a man-in-the-middle attacker. Use of this
 1315 method presumes that both the DOTS and the new device perform the "just-works" method
 1316 assumes onboarding happens in a relatively safe environment absent of an attack device.

1317 This method doesn't have a trustworthy way to prove the Device UUID asserted is reliably bound
 1318 to the device.

1319 The new device should use a temporal Device UUID prior to transitioning to an owned device while
 1320 it is considered a guest device to prevent privacy sensitive tracking. The device asserts a non-
 1321 temporal Device UUID that could differ from the temporal value during the secure session in which
 1322 owner transfer exchange takes place. The DOTS verifies the asserted Device UUID does not
 1323 conflict with a Device UUID already in use. If it is already in use the existing credentials are used
 1324 to establish a secure session.

1325 An un-owned Device that also has established device credentials might be an indication of a
 1326 corrupted or compromised device.

1327 **7.3.5 Random PIN based OTM**

1328 **7.3.5.1 Random PIN based OTM General**

1329 The Random PIN method establishes physical proximity between the new device and the OBT can
 1330 prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The Device generates a random number that is communicated
 1331 to the DOTS over an Out of Band Communication Channel. The definition of an Out of Band
 1332 Communication Channel is outside the scope of the definition of device OTMs. The DOTS and new
 1333 Device use the PIN in a key exchange as evidence that someone authorized the transfer of
 1334 ownership by having physical access to the new Device via the Out-of-Band Communication
 1335 Channel.

1336 **7.3.5.2 Random PIN based Owner Transfer Sequence**

1337 Random PIN-based OTM sequence is shown in Figure 11 and steps described in Table 3.




Figure 11 – Random PIN-based OTM

Table 3 – Random PIN-based OTM Details

Step	Description
1, 2	The DOTS notifies the Device that it selected the "Random PIN" method.
3 - 8	A DTLS session is established using PSK-based Diffie-Hellman ciphersuite. The PIN is supplied as the PSK parameter. The PIN is randomly generated by the new device then communicated via an Out of Band Communication Channel that establishes proximal context between the new device and the DOTS. The security principle is the attack device will be unable to intercept the PIN due to a lack of proximity.

The following requirements apply to the DTLS handshake messages for this OTM:

- The new Device shall set the "psk_identity_hint" field of the ServerKeyExchange message to the "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource being sent in responses when the new Device is in RFOTM and when a Device Onboarding Connection is not currently established.
- The new Device determines that the Random PIN-based OTM is being applied if that the "psk_identity" field of the ClientKeyExchange message matches the string "oic.sec.doxm.rdp".

1349 If the Random PIN-based OTM is being applied, then the new Device shall apply the key
1350 derivation below.

1351 NOTE The string "oic.sec.doxm.rdp" is the URN defined for the Random PIN-based OTM in Table 18 and is included to
1352 allow future OTMs to re-use the DTLS ciphersuites without confusion about which OTM should be applied.

1353 This OTM uses a pseudo-random function (PBKDF2) defined by IETF RFC 2898 and a PIN
1354 exchanged via an Out of Band Communication Channel to generate a pre-shared key. The PIN-
1355 authenticated pre-shared key (PPSK) is supplied to TLS ciphersuites that accept a PSK.

1356 – PPSK = PBKDF2(PRF, PIN, Device UUID, c, dkLen)

1357 The PBKDF2 function has the following parameters:

1358 – PRF – Uses the TLS 1.2 PRF defined by IETF RFC 5246.

1359 – PIN – obtained via Out of Band Communication Channel.

1360 – Device UUID – the "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource being sent in
1361 responses when the new Device is in RFOTM and when a Device Onboarding Connection is
1362 not currently established.

1363 Use raw bytes as specified in IETF RFC 4122 clause 4.1.2

1364 – c – Iteration count initialized to 1000

1365 – dkLen – Desired length of the derived PSK in octets.

1366 7.3.5.3 Security Considerations

1367 Security of the Random PIN mechanism depends on the entropy of the PIN. Using a PIN with
1368 insufficient entropy may allow a man-in-the-middle attack to recover any long-term credentials
1369 provisioned as a part of onboarding. In particular, learning the provisioned symmetric key
1370 credentials allows an attacker to masquerade as the onboarded device.

1371 It is recommended that the entropy of the PIN be enough to withstand an online brute-force attack,
1372 40 bits or more. For example, a 12-digit numeric PIN, or an 8-character alphanumeric (0-9a-z), or
1373 a 7-character case-sensitive alphanumeric PIN (0-9a-zA-Z). A man-in-the-middle attack (MITM) is
1374 when the attacker is active on the network and can intercept and modify messages between the
1375 DOTS and device. In the MITM attack, the attacker must recover the PIN from the key exchange
1376 messages in "real time", i.e., before the peer's time out and abort the connection attempt. Having
1377 recovered the PIN, he can complete the authentication step of key exchange. The guidance given
1378 here calls for a minimum of 40 bits of entropy, however, the assurance this provides depends on
1379 the resources available to the attacker. Given the parallelizable nature of a brute force guessing
1380 attack, the attack enjoys a linear speedup as more cores/threads are added. A more conservative
1381 amount of entropy would be 64 bits. Since the Random PIN OTM requires using a DTLS ciphersuite
1382 that includes an ECDHE key exchange, the security of the Random PIN OTM is always at least
1383 equivalent to the security of the JustWorks OTM.

1384 The Random PIN OTM also has an option to use PBKDF2 to derive key material from the PIN. The
1385 rationale is to increase the cost of a brute force attack, by increasing the cost of each guess in the
1386 attack by a tuneable amount (the number of PBKDF2 iterations). In theory, this is an effective way
1387 to reduce the entropy requirement of the PIN. Unfortunately, it is difficult to quantify the reduction,
1388 since an X-fold increase in time spent by the honest peers does not directly translate to an X-fold
1389 increase in time by the attacker. This asymmetry is because the attacker may use specialized
1390 implementations and hardware not available to honest peers. For this reason, when deciding how
1391 much entropy to use for a PIN, it is recommended that implementers assume PBKDF2 provides no
1392 security, and ensure the PIN has sufficient entropy.

1393 The Random PIN device OTM security depends on an assumption that a secure Out of Band
1394 Communication Channel for communicating a randomly generated PIN from the new device to the
1395 OBT exists. If the Out of Band Communication Channel leaks some or the entire PIN to an attacker,

this reduces the entropy of the PIN, and the attacks described above apply. The Out of Band Communication Channel should be chosen such that it requires proximity between the DOTS and the new device. The attacker is assumed to not have compromised the Out of Band Communication Channel. As an example Out of Band Communication Channel, the device may display a PIN to be entered into the OBT software. Another example is for the device to encode the PIN as a 2D barcode and display it for a camera on the DOTS device to capture and decode.

7.3.6 Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM

7.3.6.1 Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM General

The manufacturer certificate-based OTM shall use a certificate embedded into the device by the manufacturer and may use a signed OBT, which determines the Trust Anchor between the device and the DOTS.

Manufacturer embedded certificates do not necessarily need to chain to an OCF Root CA trust anchor.

For some environments, policies or administrators, additional information about device characteristics may be sought. This list of additional attestations that OCF may or may not have tested (understanding that some attestations are incapable of testing or for which testing may be infeasible or economically unviable) can be found under the OCF Security Claims x509.v3 extension described in 9.4.2.2.6.

When utilizing certificate-based ownership transfer, devices shall utilize asymmetric keys with certificate data to authenticate their identities with the DOTS in the process of bringing a new device into operation on an OCF Security Domain. The onboarding process involves several discrete steps:

1) Pre-on-board conditions

- a) The credential element of the Device's credential Resource ("/oic/sec/cred") containing the manufacturer certificate shall be identified by the "credusage" Property containing the string "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert" to indicate that the credential contains a manufacturer certificate.
- b) The manufacturer certificate chain shall be contained in the identified credential element's "publicdata" Property.
- c) The device shall contain a unique and immutable ECC asymmetric key pair.
- d) If the device requires authentication of the DOTS as part of ownership transfer, it is presumed that the DOTS has been registered and has obtained a certificate for its unique and immutable ECC asymmetric key pair signed by the predetermined Trust Anchor.
- e) User has configured the DOTS app with network access info and account info (if any).

2) The DOTS authenticates the Device using ECDSA to verify the signature. Additionally, the Device may authenticate the DOTS to verify the DOTS signature.

3) If authentication fails, the Device shall indicate the reason for failure and return to the Ready for OTM state. If authentication succeeds, the Device shall establish an encrypted link with the DOTS in accordance with the negotiated cipher suite.

7.3.6.2 Certificate Profiles


See 9.4.2 for details.

7.3.6.3 Certificate Owner Transfer Sequence Security Considerations

The OBT shall authenticate the device during onboarding. The device will not authenticate the OBT. During the DTLS handshake the server shall not send a Certificate Request.

1440 **7.3.6.4 Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM Sequence**

1441 Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM sequence is shown in Figure 12 and steps described in
1442 Table 4.



1443
1444 **Figure 12 – Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM Sequence**
1445

1446

Table 4 – Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM Details

Step	Description
1, 2	The DOTS notifies the Device that it selected the "Manufacturer Certificate" method.
3 - 8	A DTLS session is established using the device's manufacturer certificate and optional DOTS certificate. The device's manufacturer certificate may contain data attesting to the Device hardening and security properties.

1447 **7.3.6.5 Security Considerations**

1448 The manufacturer certificate private key is embedded in the Platform with a sufficient degree of
1449 assurance that the private key cannot be compromised.

1450 The Platform manufacturer issues the manufacturer certificate and attests the private key
1451 protection mechanism.

1452 **7.3.7 Vendor Specific OTMs**

1453 **7.3.7.1 Vendor Specific OTM General**

1454 The OCF anticipates situations where a vendor will need to implement an OTM that accommodates
1455 manufacturing or Device constraints. The Device OTM resource is extensible for this purpose.
1456 Vendor-specific OTMs must adhere to a set of conventions that all OTMs follow.

- 1457 – The OBT must determine which credential types are supported by the Device. This is
1458 accomplished by querying the Device's "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource to identify supported
1459 credential types.
- 1460 – The OBT provisions the Device with OC(s).
- 1461 – The OBT supplies the Device UUID and credentials for subsequent access to the OBT.
- 1462 – The OBT will supply second carrier settings sufficient for accessing the owner's OCF Security
1463 Domain subsequent to ownership establishment.
- 1464 – The OBT may perform additional provisioning steps but must not invalidate provisioning tasks
1465 to be performed by a security service.

1466 **7.3.7.2 Vendor-specific Owner Transfer Sequence Example**

1467 Vendor-specific OTM sequence example is shown in Figure 13 and steps described in Table 5.




Figure 13 – Vendor-specific Owner Transfer Sequence

Table 5 – Vendor-specific Owner Transfer Details

Step	Description
1, 2	The DOTS selects a vendor-specific OTM.
3	The vendor-specific OTM is applied

7.3.7.3 Security Considerations

The vendor is responsible for considering security threats and mitigation strategies.

7.3.8 Establishing Owner Credentials


Once the OBT and the new Device have authenticated and established an encrypted connection using one of the defined OTM methods, the Owner Credential(s) can be provisioned.

The Owner Credential is provisioned as part of Ownership Transfer Method, and may be provisioned directly by CMS.

The steps for establishing Device's owner credentials (OC) as part of OTM are:

- 1) The OBT establishes the Device UUID and Device Owner Id.
- 2) The OBT then establishes Device's symmetric OC - See Figure 14 and Table 6.
- 3) Configure Device services.
- 4) Configure Device for peer to peer interaction.

Symmetric Owner Credential (OC) Assignment Sequence






Figure 14 – Symmetric Owner Credential Provisioning Sequence

Table 6 – Symmetric Owner Credential Assignment Details

Step	Description
1, 2	The OBT uses a pseudo-random-function (PRF), the master secret resulting from the DTLS handshake, and other information to generate a symmetric key credential resource Property - SharedKey.
3	The OBT creates a credential resource Property set based on SharedKey and then sends the resource Property set to the new Device with empty "privatedata" Property value.
4, 5	The new Device locally generates the SharedKey and updates it to the "privatedata" Property of the credential resource Property set.
6	The new Device sends a success message.
7	The onboarding service creates a subjects resource for the new device (e.g./A71C3xx-...)
8	The onboarding service provisions its "/oic/svc/dots/subjects/A71C3xx-/cred" resource with

	the owner credential. Credential type is SYMMETRIC KEY.
9	(optional) The onboarding service provisions its own "/oic/sec/cred" resource with the owner credential for new device. Credential type is SYMMETRIC KEY.

1490 In particular when OBT establishes symmetric owner credentials as part of OTM sequence:

- 1491 – The OBT generates a Shared Key using the SharedKey Credential Calculation method
- 1492 described in 7.3.2.
- 1493 – The OBT sends an empty key to the new Device's "/oic/sec/cred" Resource, identified as a
- 1494 symmetric pair-wise key. The Subject UUID of the "/oic/sec/cred" entry shall match the Device
- 1495 UUID of the OBT.
- 1496 – Upon receipt of the OBT's symmetric owner credential, the new Device shall independently
- 1497 generate the Shared Key using the SharedKey Credential Calculation method described in 7.3.2
- 1498 and store it with the owner credential.
- 1499 – The new Device shall use the Shared Key owner credential(s) stored via the "/oic/sec/cred"
- 1500 Resource to authenticate the owner during subsequent connections.

1501 **7.3.9 Security considerations regarding selecting an Ownership Transfer Method -**

1502 **Moved to OCF Onboarding Tool document**

1503 This clause is intentionally left blank.

1504 **7.3.10 Security Profile Assignment**

1505 OCF Devices may have been evaluated according to an OCF Security Profile. Evaluation results

1506 could be accessed from a manufacturer's certificate, OCF web server or other public repository.

1507 The DOTS reviews evaluation results to determine which OCF Security Profiles the OCF Device is

1508 authorized to possess and configures the Device with the subset of evaluated security profiles best

1509 suited for the OCF Security Domain owner's intended segmentation strategy.

1510 The OCF Device vendor shall set a manufacturer default value for the "supportedprofiles" Property

1511 of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource to match those approved by OCF's testing and certification process.

1512 The "currentprofile" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource shall be set to one of the values

1513 contained in the "supportedprofiles". The manufacturer default value shall be re-asserted when the

1514 Device transitions to RESET Device State.

1515 The OCF Device shall only allow the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource to be updated when the Device is in

1516 one of the following Device States: RFOTM, RFPRO, SRESET and may not allow any update as

1517 directed by a Security Profile.

1518 The DOTS may update the "supportedprofiles" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource with a subset

1519 of the OCF Security Profiles values the Device achieved as part of OCF Conformance testing. The

1520 DOTS may locate conformance results by inspecting manufacturer certificates supplied with the

1521 OCF Device by selecting the "credusage" Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource having the value

1522 of "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert". The DOTS may further locate conformance results by visiting a well-

1523 known OCF web site URI corresponding to the ocfCPLAttributes extension fields (clause 9.4.2.2.7).

1524 The DOTS may select a subset of Security Profiles (from those evaluated by OCF conformance

1525 testing) based on a local policy.

1526 As part of onboarding (while the OTM session is active) the DOTS should configure ACE entries to

1527 allow DOTS access subsequent to onboarding.

1528 The DOTS should update the "currentprofile" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource with the value

1529 that most correctly depicts the OCF Security Domain owner's intended Device deployment strategy.

1530 The CMS may issue role credentials using the Security Profile value (e.g. the "sp-blue-v0 OID") to
1531 indicate the OCF Security Domain owner's intention to segment the OCF Security Domain
1532 according to a Security Profile. The CMS retrieves the supportedprofiles Property of the
1533 "/oic/sec/sp" Resource to select role names corroborated with the Device's supported Security
1534 Profiles when issuing role credentials.

1535 If the CMS issues role credentials based on a Security Profile, the AMS supplies access control
1536 entries that include the role designation(s).

1537 **7.4 Provisioning**

1538 **7.4.1 Provisioning Flows**

1539 **7.4.1.1 Provisioning Flows General**

1540 As part of onboarding a new Device a secure channel is formed between the new Device and the
1541 OBT. Subsequent to the Device ownership status being changed to "owned", there is an opportunity
1542 to begin provisioning. The OBT provisions the support services that should be subsequently used
1543 to complete Device provisioning and on-going Device management.

1544 The Device employs a Client-directed provisioning strategy. The "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource
1545 identifies the provisioning strategy and current provisioning status. The provisioning service should
1546 determine which provisioning strategy is most appropriate for the OCF Security Domain. See 13.8
1547 for additional detail.

1548 **7.4.1.2 Client-directed Provisioning**

1549 Client-directed provisioning relies on a provisioning service that identifies Servers in need of
1550 provisioning then performs all necessary provisioning duties.

1551 An example of Client-directed provisioning is shown in Figure 15 and steps described in Table 7.




Figure 15 – Example of Client-directed provisioning

Table 7 – Steps describing Client -directed provisioning

Step	Description
1	Discover Devices that are owned and support Client-directed provisioning.
2	The "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource identifies the Device and it's owned status.
3	DOTS (on OBT) obtains the new Device's provisioning status found in "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource
4	The "pstat" Resource describes the types of provisioning modes supported and which is currently configured. A Device manufacturer should set a default current operational mode ("om"). If the "om" isn't configured for Client-directed provisioning, its "om" value can be changed.
5 - 6	Change Device state to Ready-for-Provisioning.
7 - 8	CMS (on OBT) instantiates the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource. It contains credentials for the provisioned services and other Devices

9 - 10	AMS (on OBT) instantiates "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource.
11	The new Device provisioning status mode is updated to reflect that ACLs have been configured. (Ready-for-Normal-Operation state)
12	The secure session is closed.

7.4.1.3 Server-directed Provisioning [DEPRECATED]

This clause is intentionally left blank.

7.4.1.4 Server-directed Provisioning Involving Multiple Support Services [DEPRECATED]

This clause is intentionally left blank.

7.5 Device Provisioning for OCF Cloud – moved to OCF Cloud Security document

This clause is intentionally left blank.

8 Device Onboarding State Definitions

8.1 Device Onboarding General

As explained in 5.3, the process of onboarding completes after the ownership of the Device has been transferred and the Device has been provisioned with relevant configuration/services as explained in 5.4. The Figure 16 shows the various states a Device can be in during the Device lifecycle. Device shall reject any requests to perform a state transition not shown on Figure 16.

The "/pstat.dos.s" Property is RW by the "/oic/sec/pstat" resource owner (e.g. "doxs" service) so that the resource owner can remotely update the Device state. When the Device is in RFNPRO or RFPRO, ACLs can be used to allow remote control of Device state by other Devices. When the Device state is SRESET the Device OC may be the only indication of authorization to access the Device. The Device owner may perform low-level consistency checks and re-provisioning to get the Device suitable for a transition to RFPRO.




Figure 16 – Device state model

As shown in the diagram, at the conclusion of the provisioning step, the Device comes in the "Ready for Normal Operation" state where it has all it needs in order to start interoperating with other Devices. Clause 8.5 specifies the minimum mandatory configuration that a Device shall hold in order to be considered as "Ready for Normal Operation".

In the event of power loss or Device failure, the Device should remain in the same state that it was in prior to the power loss / failure

If a Device or resource owner OBSERVEs "/pstat.dos.s", then transitions to SRESET will give early warning notification of Devices that may require SVR consistency checking.

In order for onboarding to function, the Device shall have the following Resources installed:

- 1) "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource
- 2) "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource
- 3) "/oic/sec/cred" Resource

The values contained in these Resources are specified in the state definitions in 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6.

8.2 Device Onboarding-Reset State Definition

The /pstat.dos.s = RESET state is defined as a "hard" reset to manufacturer defaults. Hard reset also defines a state where the Device asset is ready to be transferred to another party.

The Platform manufacturer should provide a physical mechanism (e.g. button) that forces Platform reset. All Devices hosted on the same Platform transition their Device states to RESET when the Platform reset is asserted.

The following Resources and their specific properties shall have the value as specified:

- The "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall transition to FALSE.
- The "devowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be nil UUID.
- The "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer default value.
- The "sct" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be reset to the manufacturer's default value.
- The "oxmsel" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be reset to the manufacturer's default value.
- The "isop" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be FALSE.
- The "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be updated: dos.s shall equal "RESET" state.
- The "om" (operational modes) Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer default value.
- The "sm" (supported operational modes) Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer default value.
- The "rowneruuid" Property of "/oic/sec/pstat", "/oic/sec/doxm", "/oic/sec/acl2", and "/oic/sec/cred" Resources shall be nil UUID.
- The "usedspace" Property of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource shall be set to 0.

- 1616 – The "categoryfilter" Property of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer's
1617 default value.
- 1618 – The "priorityfilter" Property of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer's
1619 default value.
- 1620 – The "events" Property of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource shall be set to an empty array.
- 1621 – The "supportedprofiles" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer
1622 default value.
- 1623 – The "currentprofile" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer
1624 default value.

1625 **8.3 Device Ready-for-OTM State Definition**

1626 The following Resources and their specific properties shall have the value as specified when the
1627 Device enters ready for ownership transfer:

- 1628 – The "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be FALSE and will transition to
1629 TRUE.
- 1630 – The "devowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be nil UUID.
- 1631 – The "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be set to the manufacturer
1632 default value.
- 1633 – The "isop" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be FALSE.
- 1634 – The "dos" of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be updated: "dos.s" shall equal "RFOTM" state.
- 1635 – The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall contain credential(s) if required by the selected OTM

1636 **8.4 Device Ready-for-Provisioning State Definition**

1637 The following Resources and their specific properties shall have the value as specified when the
1638 Device enters ready for provisioning:

- 1639 – The "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be TRUE.
- 1640 – The "devowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall not be nil UUID.
- 1641 – The "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall not be nil UUID and shall be
1642 set to the value that was determined during RFOTM processing.
- 1643 – The "oxmsel" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall have the value of the actual OTM
1644 used during ownership transfer.
- 1645 – The "isop" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be FALSE.
- 1646 – The "dos" of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be updated: "dos.s" shall equal "RFPRO" state.
- 1647 – The "rowneruuid" Property of every installed Resource shall be set to a valid Resource owner
1648 (i.e. an entity that is authorized to instantiate or update the given Resource). Failure to set a
1649 "rowneruuid" may result in an orphan Resource.
- 1650 – The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall contain credentials for each entity referenced by
1651 "rowneruuid" and "devowneruuid" Properties.
- 1652 – All requests to the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource received over a mutually-authenticated connection
1653 established using an identity certificate shall be granted, regardless of the configuration of the
1654 ACEs in the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource, subject to the conditions in clause 10.4.2.

1655 **8.5 Device Ready-for-Normal-Operation State Definition**

1656 The following Resources and their specific properties shall have the value as specified when the
1657 Device enters ready for normal operation:

- 1658 – The "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be TRUE.

- 1659 – The "devowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall not be nil UUID.
- 1660 – The "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall not be nil UUID and shall be
1661 set to the ID that was configured during OTM. Also the value of the "di" Property in "/oic/d" shall
1662 be the same as the deviceuuid.
- 1663 – The "oxmsel" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall have the value of the actual OTM
1664 used during ownership transfer.
- 1665 – The "isop" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be set to TRUE by the Server once
1666 transition to RFNOP is otherwise complete.
- 1667 – The "dos" of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be updated: "dos.s" shall equal "RFNOP" state.
- 1668 – The "rowneruuid" Property of every installed Resource shall be set to a valid resource owner
1669 (i.e. an entity that is authorized to instantiate or update the given Resource). Failure to set a
1670 "rowneruuid" results in an orphan Resource.
- 1671 – The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall contain credentials for each service referenced by
1672 "rowneruuid" and "devowneruuid" Properties.
- 1673 – All requests to the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource received over a mutually-authenticated connection
1674 established using an identity certificate shall be granted, regardless of the configuration of the
1675 ACEs in the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource, subject to the conditions in clause 10.4.2.

1676 **8.6 Device Soft Reset State Definition**

1677 The soft reset state is defined (e.g. "/pstat.dos.s" = SRESET) where entrance into this state means
1678 the Device is not operational but remains owned by the current owner. The Device may exit
1679 SRESET by authenticating to a DOTS (e.g. "rt" = "oic.r.doxx") using the OC provided during original
1680 onboarding (but should not require use of an OTM /doxm.oxms).

1681 If the DOTS credential cannot be found or is determined to be corrupted, the Device state
1682 transitions to RESET. The Device should remain in SRESET if the DOTS credential fails to validate
1683 the DOTS. This mitigates denial-of-service attacks that may be attempted by non-DOTS Devices.

1684 When in SRESET, the following Resources and their specific Properties shall have the values as
1685 specified.

- 1686 – The "owned" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall be TRUE.
- 1687 – The "devowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall remain non-null.
- 1688 – The "deviceuuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall remain non-null.
- 1689 – The "sct" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall retain its value.
- 1690 – The "oxmsel" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall retain its value.
- 1691 – The "isop" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be FALSE.
- 1692 – The "/oic/sec/pstat.dos.s" Property shall be SRESET.
- 1693 – The "om" (operational modes) Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource shall be "client-directed
1694 mode".
- 1695 – The "sm" (supported operational modes) Property of "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource may be updated
1696 by the Device owner (aka DOTS).
- 1697 – The "rowneruuid" Property of "/oic/sec/pstat", "/oic/sec/doxm", "/oic/sec/acl2", and
1698 "/oic/sec/cred" Resources may be reset by the Device owner (aka DOTS) and re-provisioned.
- 1699 – All requests to the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource received over a mutually-authenticated connection
1700 established using an identity certificate shall be granted, regardless of the configuration of the
1701 ACEs in the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource, subject to the conditions in clause 10.4.2.

1702

1703 **9 Security Credential Management**

1704 **9.1 Preamble**

1705 This clause provides an overview of the credential types in OCF, along with details of credential
1706 use, provisioning and ongoing management.

1707 **9.2 Credential Lifecycle**

1708 **9.2.1 Credential Lifecycle General**

1709 OCF credential lifecycle has the following phases: (1) creation, (2) deletion, (3) refresh and (4)
1710 revocation.

1711 **9.2.2 Creation**

1712 The CMS can provision credentials to the credential Resource onto the Device. The Device shall
1713 verify the CMS is authorized by matching the rowneruuid Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource
1714 to the DeviceID of the credential the CMS used to establish the secure connection.

1715 Credential Resources created using a CMS may involve specialized credential issuance protocols
1716 and messages. These may involve the use of public key infrastructure (PKI) such as a certificate
1717 authority (CA), symmetric key management such as a key distribution centre (KDC) or as part of a
1718 provisioning action by a DOTS, CMS or AMS.

1719 **9.2.3 Deletion**

1720 The CMS can delete credentials from the credential Resource. The Device (e.g. the Device where
1721 the credential Resource is hosted) should delete credential Resources that have expired.

1722 An expired credential Resource may be deleted to manage memory and storage space.

1723 Deletion in OCF key management is equivalent to credential suspension.

1724 **9.2.4 Refresh**

1725 Credential refresh may be performed before it expires. The CMS performs credential refresh.

1726 The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource supports expiry using the Period Property. Credential refresh may be
1727 applied when a credential is about to expire or is about to exceed a maximum threshold for bytes
1728 encrypted.

1729 A credential refresh method specifies the options available when performing key refresh. The
1730 Period Property informs when the credential should expire. The Device may proactively obtain a
1731 new credential using a credential refresh method using current unexpired credentials to refresh the
1732 existing credential. If the Device does not have an internal time source, the current time should be
1733 obtained from a CMS at regular intervals.

1734 If the onboarding established credentials are allowed to expire the DOTS shall re-onboard the
1735 Device to re-apply device owner transfer steps.

1736 All Devices shall support at least one credential refresh method.

1737 **9.2.5 Revocation**

1738 Credentials issued by a CMS may be equipped with revocation capabilities. In situations where the
1739 revocation method involves provisioning of a revocation object that identifies a credential that is to
1740 be revoked prior to its normal expiration period, a credential Resource is created containing the
1741 revocation information that supersedes the originally issued credential. The revocation object
1742 expiration should match that of the revoked credential so that the revocation object is cleaned up
1743 upon expiry.

1744 It is conceptually reasonable to consider revocation applying to a credential or to a Device. Device
1745 revocation asserts all credentials associated with the revoked Device should be considered for
1746 revocation. Device revocation is necessary when a Device is lost, stolen or compromised. Deletion
1747 of credentials on a revoked Device might not be possible or reliable.

1748 **9.3 Credential Types**

1749 **9.3.1 Preamble**

1750 The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource maintains a credential type Property that supports several
1751 cryptographic keys and other information used for authentication and data protection. The
1752 credential types supported include symmetric pair-wise key, group symmetric group key,
1753 asymmetric signing key, asymmetric signing key with certificate and shared-secret (i.e. PIN or
1754 password). The Device shall always support symmetric pair-wise key and asymmetric signing key
1755 with certificate credential types. Other credential types are optional.

1756 **9.3.2 Pair-wise Symmetric Key Credentials**

1757 The CMS shall provision exactly one other pair-wise symmetric credential to a peer Device. The
1758 CMS should not store pair-wise symmetric keys it provisions to managed Devices.

1759 Pair-wise keys could be established through ad-hoc key agreement protocols.

1760 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the symmetric key.

1761 The "PublicData" Property may contain a token encrypted to the peer Device containing the pair-
1762 wise key.

1763 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

1764 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the
1765 "PrivateData" remains private.

1766 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection
1767 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized
1768 modifications.

1769 **9.3.3 Group Symmetric Key Credentials**

1770 Group keys are symmetric keys shared among a group of Devices (3 or more). Group keys are
1771 used for efficient sharing of data among group participants.

1772 Group keys do not provide authentication of Devices but only establish membership in a group.

1773 The CMS shall provision group symmetric key credentials to the group members. The CMS
1774 maintains the group memberships.

1775 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the symmetric key.

1776 The "PublicData" Property may contain the group name.

1777 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

1778 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the
1779 "PrivateData" remains private.

1780 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection
1781 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized
1782 modifications.

1783 **9.3.4 Asymmetric Authentication Key Credentials**

1784 **9.3.4.1 Asymmetric Authentication Key Credentials General**

1785 Asymmetric authentication key credentials contain either a public and private key pair or only a
1786 public key. The private key is used to sign Device authentication challenges. The public key is used
1787 to verify a device authentication challenge-response.

1788 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the private key.

1789 The "PublicData" Property contains the public key.

1790 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

1791 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the
1792 "PrivateData" remains private.

1793 Devices should generate asymmetric authentication key pairs internally to ensure the private key
1794 is only known by the Device. See 9.3.4.2 for when it is necessary to transport private key material
1795 between Devices.

1796 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection
1797 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized
1798 modifications.

1799 **9.3.4.2 External Creation of Asymmetric Authentication Key Credentials**

1800 Devices should employ industry-standard high-assurance techniques when allowing off-device key
1801 pair creation and provisioning. Use of such key pairs should be minimized, particularly if the key
1802 pair is immutable and cannot be changed or replaced after provisioning.

1803 When used as part of onboarding, these key pairs can be used to prove the Device possesses the
1804 manufacturer-asserted properties in a certificate to convince a DOTS or a user to accept
1805 onboarding the Device. See 7.3.3 for the OTM that uses such a certificate to authenticate the
1806 Device, and then provisions new OCF Security Domain credentials for use.

1807 **9.3.5 Asymmetric Key Encryption Key Credentials**

1808 The asymmetric key-encryption-key (KEK) credentials are used to wrap symmetric keys when
1809 distributing or storing the key.

1810 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the private key.

1811 The "PublicData" Property contains the public key.

1812 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

1813 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the
1814 "PrivateData" remains private.

1815 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection
1816 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized
1817 modifications.

1818 **9.3.6 Certificate Credentials**

1819 Certificate credentials are asymmetric keys that are accompanied by a certificate issued by a CMS
1820 or an external certificate authority (CA).

1821 A certificate enrolment protocol is used to obtain a certificate and establish proof-of-possession.

1822 The issued certificate is stored with the asymmetric key credential Resource.

1823 Other objects useful in managing certificate lifecycle such as certificate revocation status are
1824 associated with the credential Resource.

1825 Either an asymmetric key credential Resource or a self-signed certificate credential is used to
1826 terminate a path validation.

1827 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the private key.

1828 The "PublicData" Property contains the issued certificate.

1829 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

1830 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the
1831 PrivateData remains private.

1832 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection
1833 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized
1834 modifications.

1835 **9.3.7 Password Credentials**

1836 The "PrivateData" Property in the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource contains the PIN, password and other
1837 values useful for changing and verifying the password.

1838 The "PublicData" Property may contain the user or account name if applicable.

1839 The "OptionalData" Property may contain revocation status.

1840 The Device implementer should apply hardened key storage techniques that ensure the
1841 "PrivateData" remains private.

1842 The Device implementer should apply appropriate integrity, confidentiality and access protection
1843 of the "/oic/sec/cred", "/oic/sec/roles", "/oic/sec/csr" Resources to prevent unauthorized
1844 modifications.

1845 **9.4 Certificate Based Key Management**

1846 **9.4.1 Overview**

1847 To achieve authentication and transport security during communications in OCF Security Domain,
1848 certificates containing public keys of communicating parties and private keys can be used.

1849 The certificate and private key may be issued by a local or remote certificate authority (CA).

1850 The OCF certificate format is a subset of X.509 format, only elliptic curve algorithm and PEM
1851 encoding format are allowed, most of optional fields in X.509 are not supported so that the format
1852 intends to meet the constrained Device's requirement.

1853 The CMS manages the certificate lifecycle for certificates it issues. The DOTS assigns a CMS to a
1854 Device when it is newly onboarded.

1855 **9.4.2 X.509 Digital Certificate Profiles**

1856 **9.4.2.1 Digital Certificate Profile General**

1857 An OCF certificate format is a subset of X.509 format (version 3 or above) as defined in
1858 IETF RFC 5280.

This clause develops a profile to facilitate the use of X.509 certificates within OCF applications for those communities wishing to make use of X.509 technology. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of OCF specific extension(s). The supported standard certificate extensions are also listed.

Certificate Format: The OCF certificate profile is derived from IETF RFC 5280. However, this document does not support the "issuerUniqueID" and "subjectUniqueID" fields which are deprecated and shall not be used in the context of OCF. If these fields are present in a certificate, compliant entities shall ignore their contents.

Certificate Encoding: Conforming entities shall use the Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) to encode certificates.

Certificates Hierarchy and Crypto Parameters. OCF supports a three-tier hierarchy for its Public Key Infrastructure (i.e., a Root CA, an Intermediate CA, and EE certificates). OCF accredited CAs SHALL use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) keys (secp256r1 – OID:1.2.840.10045.3.1.7) and use the ecdsaWithSHA256 (OID:1.2.840.10045.4.3.2) algorithm for certificate signatures. Elliptic Curve Cryptography public keys shall be encoded using uncompressed Elliptic Curve points.

The following clauses specify the supported standard and custom extensions for the OCF certificates profile.

9.4.2.2 Certificate Profile and Fields

9.4.2.2.1 Root CA Certificate Profile

Table 8 describes X.509 v1 fields required for Root CA Certificates.

Table 8 – X.509 v1 fields for Root CA Certificates

V1 Field	Value / Remarks
signatureAlgorithm	ecdsa-with-SHA256 (OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
Version	v3 (value is 2)
SerialNumber	SHALL be a positive integer, unique among all certificates issued by a given CA
Issuer	SHALL match the Subject field
Subject	SHALL match the Issuer field
notBefore	The time at which the Root CA Certificate was generated. See 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
notAfter	No stipulation for expiry date. See 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
Subject Public Key Info	id-ecPublicKey (OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1) secp256r1 (OID:1.2.840.10045.3.1.7) Elliptic Curve Cryptography public keys shall be encoded using uncompressed Elliptic Curve points.

Table 9 describes X.509 v3 extensions required for Root CA Certificates.

Table 9 - X.509 v3 extensions for Root CA Certificates

Extension	Required/Optional	Criticality	Value / Remarks
authorityKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A
subjectKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A

keyUsage	REQUIRED	Critical	keyCertSign (5) & cRLSign (6) bits shall be enabled. digitalSignature(0) bit may be enabled. All other bits shall not be enabled.
basicConstraints	REQUIRED	Critical	cA = TRUE pathLenConstraint = not present (unlimited)

9.4.2.2.2 Intermediate CA Certificate Profile

Table 10 describes X.509 v1 fields required for Intermediate CA Certificates.

Table 10 - X.509 v1 fields for Intermediate CA Certificates

V1 Field	Value / Remarks
signatureAlgorithm	ecdsa-with-SHA256 (OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
Version	v3 (value is 2)
SerialNumber	SHALL be a positive integer, unique among all certificates issued by Root CA
Issuer	SHALL match the Subject field of the issuing Root CA
Subject	(no stipulation)
notBefore	The time at which the Intermediate CA Certificate was generated. See clause 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
notAfter	No stipulation for expiry date. See clause 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
Subject Public Key Info	id-ecPublicKey (OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1) secp256r1 (OID: 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7) Elliptic Curve Cryptography public keys shall be encoded using uncompressed Elliptic Curve points.

Table 11 describes X.509 v3 extensions required for Intermediate CA Certificates.

Table 11 – X.509 v3 extensions for Intermediate CA Certificates

Extension	Required/Optional	Criticality	Value / Remarks
authorityKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A
subjectKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A
keyUsage	REQUIRED	Critical	keyCertSign (5) & cRLSign (6) bits shall be enabled. digitalSignature (0) bit may be enabled All other bits shall not be enabled.
basicConstraints	REQUIRED	Critical	cA = TRUE pathLenConstraint = 0 (can only sign End-Entity certs)
certificatePolicies	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	(no stipulation)
cRLDistributionPoints	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	1 or more URIs where the Certificate Revocation List

			(CRL) from the Root can be obtained.
authorityInformationAccess	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	OCSP URI – the URI of the Root CA's OCSP Responder

9.4.2.2.3 End-Entity Black Certificate Profile

Table 12 describes X.509 v1 fields required for End-Entity Certificates used for Black security profile.

Table 12 – X.509 v1 fields for End-Entity Certificates

V1 Field	Value / Remarks
signatureAlgorithm	ecdsa-with-SHA256 (OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
Version	v3 (value is 2)
SerialNumber	SHALL be a positive integer, unique among all certificates issued by the Intermediate CA
Issuer	SHALL match the Subject field of the issuing Intermediate CA
Subject	Subject DN shall include: o=OCF-verified device manufacturer organization name. The Subject DN may include other attributes (e.g. cn, c, ou, etc.) with no stipulation by OCF.
notBefore	The time at which the End-Entity Certificate was generated. See clause 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
notAfter	No stipulation. See clause 10.4.5 for details around IETF RFC 5280-compliant validity field formatting.
Subject Public Key Info	id-ecPublicKey (OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1) secp256r1 (OID: 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7) Elliptic Curve Cryptography public keys shall be encoded using uncompressed Elliptic Curve points.

Table 13 describes X.509 v3 extensions required for End-Entity Certificates.

Table 13 – X.509 v3 extensions for End-Entity Certificates

Extension	Required/Optional	Criticality	Value / Remarks
authorityKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A
subjectKeyIdentifier	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	N/A
keyUsage	REQUIRED	Critical	digitalSignature (0) and keyAgreement(4) bits SHALL be the only bits enabled
basicConstraints	OPTIONAL	Non-Critical	cA = FALSE pathLenConstraint = not present
certificatePolicies	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	End-Entity certificates chaining to an OCF Root CA SHOULD contain at least one PolicyIdentifierId set to

			<p>the OCF Certificate Policy OID – (1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.1.2) corresponding to the version of the OCF Certificate Policy under which it was issued.</p> <p>Additional manufacturer-specific CP OIDs may also be populated.</p>
extendedKeyUsage	REQUIRED	Non-critical	<p>The following extendedKeyUsage (EKU) OIDs SHALL both be present:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • serverAuthentication - 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 • clientAuthentication - 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 <p>Exactly ONE of the following OIDs SHALL be present:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identity certificate - 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.6 • Role certificate - 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7 <p>End-Entity certificates SHALL NOT contain the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID (2.5.29.37.0)</p>
subjectAlternativeName	REQUIRED UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS	Non-critical	<p>The subjectAltName extension is used to encode one or more Role ID values in role certificates, binding the roles to the subject public key.</p> <p>When the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) extension contains the Identity Certificate OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.6), the subjectAltName extension SHOULD NOT be present.</p> <p>If the EKU extension contains the Role Certificate OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7), the subjectAltName extension SHALL be present and populated as follows:</p> <p>Each GeneralName in the GeneralNames SEQUENCE which encodes a role shall be a directoryName, which is of type Name. Name is an X.501 Distinguished Name. Each Name shall contain exactly one CN (Common Name) component, and zero or one OU (Organizational Unit) components. The OU component, if present, shall specify the authority that defined the semantics of the role. If the OU component is absent, the certificate issuer has defined the role. The CN</p>

			component shall encode the role ID. Other GeneralName types in the SEQUENCE may be present, but shall not be interpreted as roles. The role, and authority shall be encoded as ASN.1 PrintableString type, the restricted character set [0-9a-z-A-z '()+,./:=?].
cRLDistributionPoints	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	1 or more URIs where the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) from the Intermediate CA can be obtained.
authorityInformationAccess	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	OCSP URI – the URI of the Intermediate CA's OCSP Responder
OCF Compliance	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	See 9.4.2.2.4
Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	Contains a single Uniform Resource Locator (URL) that points to an on-line Manufacturer Usage Description concerning the certificate subject. See 9.4.2.2.5
OCF Security Claims	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	Contains a list of security claims above those required by this OCF Compliance version or Security Profile. See 9.4.2.2.6
OCF CPL Attributes	OPTIONAL	Non-critical	Contains the list of OCF Attributes used to perform OCF Certified Product List lookups

9.4.2.2.4 OCF Compliance X.509v3 Extension

The OCF Compliance Extension defines required parameters to correctly identify the type of Device, its manufacturer, its OCF Version, and the Security Profile compliance of the device.

The extension carries an "ocfVersion" field which provides the specific base version of the OCF documents the device implements. The "ocfVersion" field shall contain a sequence of three integers ("major", "minor", and "build"). For example, if an entity is certified to be compliant with OCF specifications 1.3.2, then the "major", "minor", and "build" fields of the "ocfVersion" will be set to "1", "3", and "2" respectively. The "ocfVersion" may be used by Security Profiles to denote compliance to a specified base version of the OCF documents.

The "securityProfile" field shall carry the ocfSecurityProfile OID(s) (clause 14.8.3) of one or more supported Security Profiles associated with the certificate in string form (UTF-8). All Security Profiles associated with the certificate should be identified by this field.

The extension shall also carry two string fields (UTF-8): "DeviceName" and "deviceManufacturer". The fields carry human-readable descriptions of the Device's name and manufacturer, respectively.

The ASN.1 definition of the OCFCCompliance extension (OID – 1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.1.0) is defined as follows:

```
id-OCF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    private(4) enterprise(1) OCF(51414) }

id-ocfX509Extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 1 }
```

```

1913
1914     id-ocfCompliance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ocfX509Extensions 0 }
1915
1916 ocfVersion ::= SEQUENCE {
1917     major    INTEGER,
1918             --Major version number
1919     minor    INTEGER,
1920             --Minor version number
1921     build    INTEGER,
1922             --Build/Micro version number
1923 }
1924
1925 ocfCompliance ::= SEQUENCE {
1926     version          ocfVersion,
1927                     --Device/OCF version
1928     securityProfile  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ocfSecurityProfileOID,
1929                     --Sequence of OCF Security Profile OID strings
1930                     --Clause 14.8.2 defines valid ocfSecurityProfileOIDs
1931     deviceName       UTF8String,
1932                     --Name of the device
1933     deviceManufacturer UTF8String,
1934                     --Human-Readable Manufacturer
1935                     --of the device
1936 }

```

1937 **9.4.2.2.5 Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) X.509v3 Extension**

1938 The goal of the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) extension is to provide a means for devices
1939 to signal to the network the access and network functionality they require to properly function.
1940 Access controls can be more easily achieved and deployed at scale when the MUD extension is
1941 used.

1942 The MUD X.509 v3 extension is specified in IETF RFC 8520 with the full ASN.1 definition in section
1943 11.

1944 **9.4.2.2.6 OCF Security Claims X.509v3 Extension**

1945 The OCF Security Claims Extension defines a list of OIDs representing security claims that the
1946 manufacturer/integrator is making as to the security posture of the device above those required by
1947 the OCF Compliance version or that of the OCF Security Profile being indicated by the device.

1948 The purpose of this extension is to allow for programmatic evaluation of assertions made about
1949 security to enable some platforms/policies/administrators to better understand what is being
1950 onboarded or challenged.

1951 The ASN.1 definition of the OCF Security Claims extension (OID – 1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.1.1) is defined
1952 as follows:

```

1953 id-OCF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
1954                                private(4) enterprise(1) OCF(51414) }
1955
1956 id-ocfX509Extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 1 }
1957
1958 id-ocfSecurityClaims OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ocfX509Extensions 1 }
1959
1960     claim-secure-boot          ::= ocfSecurityClaimsOID { id-ocfSecurityClaims 0 }
1961     --Device claims that the boot process follows a procedure trusted
1962     --by the firmware and the BIOS
1963
1964     claim-hw-backed-cred-storage ::= ocfSecurityClaimsOID { id-ocfSecurityClaims 1 }
1965     --Device claims that credentials are stored in a specialized hardware
1966     --protection environment such as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) or

```


2017 The Authority Key Identifier (AKI) extension provides a means of identifying the public key
2018 corresponding to the private key used to sign a certificate. This document makes the following
2019 modifications to the referenced definition of this extension:

2020 The "authorityCertIssuer" or "authorityCertSerialNumber" fields of the "AuthorityKeyIdentifier"
2021 sequence are not permitted; only "keyIdentifier" is allowed. This results in the following
2022 grammar definition:

2023 id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 }

2024
2025 AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
2026 keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier }
2027

2028 KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING

2029 – Subject Key Identifier (4.2.1.2)

2030 The Subject Key Identifier (SKI) extension provides a means of identifying certificates that
2031 contain a particular public key.

2032 This document makes the following modification to the referenced definition of this extension:

2033 Subject Key Identifiers SHOULD be derived from the public key contained in the certificate's
2034 "SubjectPublicKeyInfo" field or a method that generates unique values. This document
2035 RECOMMENDS the 256-bit SHA-2 hash of the value of the BIT STRING "subjectPublicKey"
2036 (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits). Devices verifying certificate chains must
2037 not assume any particular method of computing key identifiers, however, and must only base
2038 matching AKI's and SKI's in certification path constructions on key identifiers seen in certificates.

2039 – Subject Alternative Name

2040 If the EKU extension is present, and has the value XXXXXX, indicating that this is a role
2041 certificate, the Subject Alternative Name (subjectAltName) extension shall be present and
2042 interpreted as described below. When no EKU is present, or has another value, the
2043 "subjectAltName" extension SHOULD be absent. The "subjectAltName" extension is used to
2044 encode one or more Role ID values in role certificates, binding the roles to the subject public
2045 key. The "subjectAltName" extension is defined in IETF RFC 5280 (See 4.2.1.6):

2046 id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 }

2047
2048 SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames

2049
2050 GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName

2051
2052 GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
2053 otherName [0] OtherName,
2054 rfc5322Name [1] IA5String,
2055 dNSName [2] IA5String,
2056 x400Address [3] ORAddress,
2057 directoryName [4] Name,
2058 ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
2059 uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
2060 iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
2061 registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

2062
2063 EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {
2064 nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
2065 partyName [1] DirectoryString }

2066
2067 Each "GeneralName" in the "GeneralNames" SEQUENCE which encodes a role shall be a
2068 "directoryName", which is of type Name. Name is an X.501 Distinguished Name. Each Name
2069 shall contain exactly one CN (Common Name) component, and zero or one OU (Organizational
2070 Unit) components. The OU component, if present, shall specify the authority that defined the

2071 semantics of the role. If the OU component is absent, the certificate issuer has defined the role.
 2072 The CN component shall encode the role ID. Other "GeneralName" types in the SEQUENCE
 2073 may be present, but shall not be interpreted as roles. Therefore, if the certificate issuer includes
 2074 non-role names in the "subjectAltName" extension, the extension should not be marked critical.

2075 The role, and authority need to be encoded as ASN.1 "PrintableString" type, the restricted
 2076 character set [0-9a-z-A-z '()+, -./:=?].

2077 – Key Usage (4.2.1.3)

2078 The key usage extension defines the purpose (e.g., encipherment, signature, certificate signing)
 2079 of the key contained in the certificate. The usage restriction might be employed when a key that
 2080 could be used for more than one operation is to be restricted.

2081 This document does not modify the referenced definition of this extension.

2082 – Basic Constraints (4.2.1.9)

2083 The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA and the
 2084 maximum depth of valid certification paths that include this certificate. Without this extension,
 2085 a certificate cannot be an issuer of other certificates.

2086 This document does not modify the referenced definition of this extension.

2087 – Extended Key Usage (4.2.1.12)

2088

2089 Extended Key Usage describes allowed purposes for which the certified public key may can be
 2090 used. When a Device receives a certificate, it determines the purpose based on the context of
 2091 the interaction in which the certificate is presented, and verifies the certificate can be used for
 2092 that purpose.

2093 This document makes the following modifications to the referenced definition of this extension:

2094 CAs SHOULD mark this extension as critical.

2095 CAs MUST NOT issue certificates with the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID (2.5.29.37.0).

2096

2097 The list of OCF-specific purposes and the assigned OIDs to represent them are:

2098 – Identity certificate 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.6

2099 – Role certificate 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7

2100 **9.4.2.4 Cipher Suite for Authentication, Confidentiality and Integrity**

2101 OCF compliant entities shall support TLS version 1.2. Compliant entities shall support
 2102 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 cipher suite as defined in IETF RFC 7251 and may
 2103 support additional ciphers as defined in the TLS v1.2 specifications.

2104 **9.4.2.5 Encoding of Certificate**

2105 See 9.4.2 for details.

2106 **9.4.3 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile [Deprecated]**

2107 This clause is intentionally left blank.

2108 **9.4.4 Resource Model**

2109 Device certificates and private keys are kept in "cred" Resource.

2110 The "cred" Resource contains the certificate information pertaining to the Device. The "PublicData"
 2111 Property holds the device certificate and CA certificate chain. "PrivateData" Property holds the
 2112 Device private key paired to the certificate. (See 13.3 for additional detail regarding the
 2113 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource).

9.4.5 Certificate Provisioning

The CMS (e.g. a hub or a smart phone) issues certificates for new Devices.

The CA in the CMS retrieves a Device's public key and proof of possession of the private key, generates a Device's certificate signed by this CA certificate, and then the CMS transfers them to the Device including its CA certificate chain. Optionally, the CMS can also transfer one or more role certificates, which shall have the format described in clause 9.4.2. The "subjectPublicKey" of each role certificate shall match the "subjectPublicKey" in the Device certificate.

In the sequence in Figure 17, the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is defined by PKCS#10 in IETF RFC 2986, and is included here by reference.

The sequence flow of a certificate transfer for a Client-directed model is described in Figure 17.

- 1) The CMS retrieves a CSR from the Device that requests a certificate. In this CSR, the Device shall place its requested UUID into the subject and its public key in the "SubjectPublicKeyInfo". The Device determines the public key to present; this may be an already-provisioned key it has selected for use with authentication, or if none is present, it may generate a new key pair internally and provide the public part. The key pair shall be compatible with the allowed ciphersuites listed in 9.4.2.4 and 11.3.4, since the certificate will be restricted for use in OCF authentication.
- 2) Alternatively, the CMS generates and provisions a private key and corresponding certificate directly to the Device.
- 3) The CMS transfers the issued certificate and CA chain to the designated Device using the same credid, to maintain the association with the private key. The credential type ("oic.sec.cred") used to transfer certificates in Figure 17 is also used to transfer role certificates, by including multiple credentials in the POST from CMS to Device. Identity certificates shall be stored with the credusage Property set to "oic.sec.cred.cert" and role certificates shall be stored with the credusage Property set to "oic.sec.cred.rolecert".




Figure 17 – Client-directed Certificate Transfer

9.4.6 CRL Provisioning [Deprecated]

This clause is intentionally left blank.

10 Device Authentication

10.1 Device Authentication General

When a Client is accessing a restricted Resource on a Server, the Server shall authenticate the Client. Clients shall authenticate Servers while requesting access. Clients may also assert one or more roles that the server can use in access control decisions. Roles may be asserted when the Device authentication is done with certificates.

10.2 Device Authentication with Symmetric Key Credentials

When using symmetric keys to authenticate, the Server Device shall include the ServerKeyExchange message and set `psk_identity_hint` to the Server's Device UUID. The Client shall validate that it has a credential with the Subject UUID set to the Server's Device UUID, and a credential type of PSK. If it does not, the Client shall respond with an `unknown_psk_identity` error or other suitable error.

If the Client finds a suitable PSK credential, it shall reply with a ClientKeyExchange message that includes a `psk_identity` set to the Client's Device UUID. The Server shall verify that it has a credential with the matching Subject UUID and type. If it does not, the Server shall respond with an `unknown_psk_identity` or other suitable error code. If it does, then it shall continue with the DTLS protocol, and both Client and Server shall compute the resulting premaster secret.

10.3 Device Authentication with Raw Asymmetric Key Credentials

When using raw asymmetric keys to authenticate, the Client and the Server shall include a suitable public key from a credential that is bound to their Device. Each Device shall verify that the provided public key matches the `PublicData` field of a credential they have, and use the corresponding Subject UUID of the credential to identify the peer Device.

10.4 Device Authentication with Certificates

10.4.1 Device Authentication with Certificates General

When using certificates to authenticate, the Client and Server shall each include their certificate chain, as stored in the appropriate credential, as part of the selected authentication cipher suite. Each Device shall validate the certificate chain presented by the peer Device. Each certificate signature shall be verified until a public key is found within the `"/oic/sec/cred"` Resource with the `"oic.sec.cred.trustca"` credusage. Credential Resource found in `"/oic/sec/cred"` is used to terminate certificate path validation. Also, the validity period and revocation status should be checked for all above certificates.

A Device retrieves the Subject UUID from the Common Name component of the Subject Name property of the End-Entity certificate which has the following format: `"uuid: X"`, where X is provisioned by the CMS to match the `"deviceuuid"` Property of the `"/oic/sec/doxm"` Resource. The Device treats all requests arriving over a connection authenticated by this End-Entity certificate as having originated from the Device with this Subject UUID. The Device shall use this Subject UUID to match against the `"subjectuuid"` Property of the provisioned ACL entries to perform access control checks.

Devices must follow the certificate path validation algorithm in clause 6 of IETF RFC 5280. In particular:

- For all non-End-Entity certificates, Devices shall verify that the basic constraints extension is present, and that the `cA` boolean in the extension is `TRUE`. If either is false, the certificate chain MUST be rejected. If the `pathLenConstraint` field is present, Devices will confirm the number of certificates between this certificate and the End-Entity certificate is less than or equal to `pathLenConstraint`. In particular, if `pathLenConstraint` is zero, only an End-Entity certificate can be issued by this certificate. If the `pathLenConstraint` field is absent, there is no limit to the chain length.

- 2191 – For all non-End-Entity certificates, Devices shall verify that the key usage extension is present,
2192 and that the keyCertSign bit is asserted.
- 2193 – Devices may use the Authority Key Identifier extension to quickly locate the issuing certificate.
2194 Devices MUST NOT reject a certificate for lacking this extension, and must instead attempt
2195 validation with the public keys of possible issuer certificates whose subject name equals the
2196 issuer name of this certificate.
- 2197 – The End-Entity certificate of the chain shall be verified to contain an Extended Key Usage (EKU)
2198 suitable to the purpose for which it is being presented. An End-Entity certificate which contains
2199 no EKU extension is not valid for any purpose and must be rejected. Any certificate which
2200 contains the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID (2.5.29.37.0) must be rejected, even if other valid
2201 EKUs are also present.
- 2202 – Devices MUST verify "transitive EKU" for certificate chains. Issuer certificates (any certificate
2203 that is not an End-Entity) in the chain MUST all be valid for the purpose for which the certificate
2204 chain is being presented. An issuer certificate is valid for a purpose if it contains an EKU
2205 extension and the EKU OID for that purpose is listed in the extension, OR it does not have an
2206 EKU extension. An issuer certificate SHOULD contain an EKU extension and a complete list of
2207 EKUs for the purposes for which it is authorized to issue certificates. An issuer certificate
2208 without an EKU extension is valid for all purposes; this differs from End-Entity certificates
2209 without an EKU extension.
- 2210 The list of purposes and their associated OIDs are defined in 9.4.2.3.

2211 If the Device does not recognize an extension, it must examine the "critical" field. If the field is
2212 TRUE, the Device MUST reject the certificate. If the field is FALSE, the Device MUST treat the
2213 certificate as if the extension were absent and proceed accordingly. This applies to all certificates
2214 in a chain.

2215 NOTE Certificate revocation mechanisms are currently out of scope of this version of the document.

2216 **10.4.2 Role Assertion with Certificates**

2217 This clause describes role assertion by a client to a server using a certificate role credential.

2218 Following authentication with a certificate, an OCF Client shall assert Roles by updating the
2219 Server's "/oic/sec/roles" Resource with all the Role certificates it possesses, unless the device
2220 manufacturer provides a vendor-specific mechanism for End User to select which roles to assert.
2221 The Role credentials shall be certificate credentials and shall include a certificate chain. The Server
2222 shall validate each certificate chain as specified in clause 10.3. Additionally, the public key in the
2223 End-Entity certificate used for Device authentication shall be identical to the public key in all Role
2224 (End-Entity) certificates. Also, the common name component of the subject name for both Role
2225 certificates and identity certificates shall include a string of format "uuid:X" where X matches the
2226 "deviceuuid" Property of the "oic.sec.doxm" Resource.

2227 Furthermore, a Client is prohibited from adding Role certificates for other Clients. The Server shall
2228 reject Clients' request to add Role certificates if either (1) the request was received over an un-
2229 secured connection or (2) the request was received over a secured connection but the public key
2230 in the Role certificate does not match the public key in the identity certificate, which was used to
2231 establish the secured connection.

2232 The Roles asserted are encoded in the subjectAltName extension in the certificate. The
2233 "subjectAltName" field can have multiple values, allowing a single certificate to encode multiple
2234 Roles that apply to the Client. The Server shall also check that the EKU extension of the Role
2235 certificate(s) contains the value 1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7 (see clause 9.4.2.2) indicating the certificate
2236 may be used to assert Roles. Figure 18 describes how a Client Device asserts Roles to a Server.

Asserting Certificate Role Credentials




Figure 18 – Asserting a role with a certificate role credential.

Additional comments for Figure 18

- 1) The response shall contain "204 No Content" to indicate success or 4xx to indicate an error. If the server does not support certificate credentials, it should return "501 Not Implemented"
- 2) Roles asserted by the client may be kept for a duration chosen by the server. The duration shall not exceed the validity period of the role certificate.
- 3) Servers should choose a nonzero duration to avoid the cost of frequent re-assertion of a role by a client. It is recommended that servers use the validity period of the certificate as a duration, effectively allowing the CMS to decide the duration.
- 4) The format of the data sent in the create call shall be a list of credentials ("oic.sec.cred", see Table 19). They shall have "credtype" 8 (indicating certificates) and "PrivateData" field shall not be present. For fields that are duplicated in the "oic.sec.cred" object and the certificate, the value in the certificate shall be used for validation. For example, if the "Period" field is set in the credential, the server shall treat the validity period in the certificate as authoritative. Similar for the roleid data (authority, role).
- 5) Certificates shall be encoded as in Figure 17 (PEM-encoded certificate chain).
- 6) Clients may GET the "/oic/sec/roles" resource to determine the roles that have been previously asserted. An array of credential objects shall be returned. If there are no valid certificates corresponding to the currently connected and authenticated Client's identity, then an empty array (i.e. []) shall be returned.

10.4.3 OCF PKI Roots

This clause intentionally left empty.

10.4.4 PKI Trust Store

Each Device using a certificate chained to an OCF Root CA trust anchor SHALL securely store the OCF Root CA certificates in the "oic/sec/cred" resource and SHOULD physically store this resource in a hardened memory location where the certificates cannot be tampered with.

2264 **10.4.5 Path Validation and extension processing**

2265 Devices SHALL follow the certificate path validation algorithm in clause 6 of IETF RFC 5280. In
2266 addition, the following are best practices and SHALL be adhered to by any OCF-compliant
2267 application handling digital certificates

2268 – Validity Period checking

2269 OCF-compliant applications SHALL conform to IETF RFC 5280 clauses 4.1.2.5, 4.1.2.5.1, and
2270 4.1.2.5.2 when processing the notBefore and notAfter fields in X.509 certificates. In addition,
2271 for all certificates, the notAfter value SHALL NOT exceed the notAfter value of the issuing CA.

2272 – Revocation checking

2273 Relying applications SHOULD check the revocation status for all certificates.

2274 – basicConstraints

2275 For all Root and Intermediate Certificate Authority (CA) certificates, Devices SHALL verify that
2276 the basicConstraints extension is present, flagged critical, and that the cA boolean value in the
2277 extension is TRUE. If any of these are false, the certificate chain SHALL be rejected.

2278 If the pathLenConstraint field is present, Devices will confirm the number of certificates between
2279 this certificate and the End-Entity certificate is less than or equal to pathLenConstraint. In
2280 particular, if pathLenConstraint is zero, only an End-Entity certificate can be issued by this
2281 certificate. If the pathLenConstraint field is absent, there is no limit to the chain length.

2282 For End-Entity certificates, if the basicConstraints extension is present, it SHALL be flagged
2283 critical, SHALL have a cA boolean value of FALSE, and SHALL NOT contain a
2284 pathLenConstraint ASN.1 sequence. An End-Entity certificate SHALL be rejected if a
2285 pathLenConstraint ASN.1 sequence is either present with an Integer value, or present with a
2286 null value.

2287 In order to facilitate future flexibility in OCF-compliant PKI implementations, all OCF-compliant
2288 Root CA certificates SHALL NOT contain a pathLenConstraint. This allows additional tiers of
2289 Intermediate CAs to be implemented in the future without changing the Root CA trust anchors,
2290 should such a requirement emerge.

2291 – keyUsage

2292 For all certificates, Devices shall verify that the key usage extension is present and flagged
2293 critical.

2294 For Root and Intermediate CA certificates, ONLY the keyCertSign(5) and crlSign(6) bits SHALL
2295 be asserted.

2296 For End-Entity certificates, ONLY the digitalSignature(0) and keyAgreement(4) bits SHALL be
2297 asserted.

2298 – extendedKeyUsage:

2299 Any End-Entity certificate containing the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID ("2.5.29.37.0") SHALL be
2300 rejected.

2301 OIDs for serverAuthentication ("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1") and clientAuthentication ("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2")
2302 are required for compatibility with various TLS implementations.

2303 At this time, an End-Entity certificate cannot be used for both Identity ("1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.6")
2304 and Role ("1.3.6.1.4.1.44924.1.7") purposes. Therefore, exactly one of the two OIDs SHALL be
2305 present and End-Entity certificates with EKU extensions containing both OIDs SHALL be
2306 rejected.

2307 – certificatePolicies

2308 End-Entity certificates which chain to an OCF Root CA SHOULD contain at least one
2309 PolicyIdentifierId set to the OCF Certificate Policy OID – ("1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.1.2")

2310 corresponding to the version of the OCF Certificate Policy under which it was issued. Additional
2311 manufacturer-specific CP OIDs may also be populated.

2312 **10.5 Device Authentication with OCF Cloud – moved to OCF Cloud Security document**

2313 This clause is intentionally left blank.

2314

2315 **11 Message Integrity and Confidentiality**

2316 **11.1 Preamble**

2317 Secured communications between Clients and Servers are protected against eavesdropping,
2318 tampering, or message replay, using security mechanisms that provide message confidentiality and
2319 integrity.

2320 **11.2 Session Protection with DTLS**

2321 **11.2.1 DTLS Protection General**

2322 Devices shall support DTLS for secured communications as defined in IETF RFC 6347. Devices
2323 using TCP shall support TLS v1.2 for secured communications as defined in IETF RFC 5246. See
2324 11.3 for a list of required and optional cipher suites for message communication.

2325 OCF Devices MUST support (D)TLS version 1.2 or greater and MUST NOT support versions 1.1
2326 or lower.

2327 Multicast session semantics are not yet defined in this version of the security document.

2328 **11.2.2 Unicast Session Semantics**

2329 For unicast messages between a Client and a Server, both Devices shall authenticate each other.
2330 See clause 10 for details on Device Authentication.

2331 Secured unicast messages between a Client and a Server shall employ a cipher suite from 11.3.
2332 The sending Device shall encrypt and authenticate messages as defined by the selected cipher
2333 suite and the receiving Device shall verify and decrypt the messages before processing them.

2334 **11.2.3 Cloud Session Semantics – moved to OCF Cloud Security document**

2335 This clause is intentionally left blank.

2336 **11.3 Cipher Suites**

2337 **11.3.1 Cipher Suites General**

2338 The cipher suites allowed for use can vary depending on the context. This clause lists the cipher
2339 suites allowed during ownership transfer and normal operation. The following RFCs provide
2340 additional information about the cipher suites used in OCF.

2341 IETF RFC 4279: Specifies use of pre-shared keys (PSK) in (D)TLS

2342 IETF RFC 4492: Specifies use of elliptic curve cryptography in (D)TLS

2343 IETF RFC 5489: Specifies use of cipher suites that use elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) and
2344 PSKs

2345 IETF RFC 6655 and IETF RFC 7251: Specifies AES-CCM mode cipher suites, with ECDHE

2346 **11.3.2 Cipher Suites for Device Ownership Transfer**

2347 **11.3.2.1 Just Works Method Cipher Suites**

2348 The Just Works OTM may use the following (D)TLS cipher suites.

2349 TLS_ECDH_ANON_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256

2350 All Devices supporting Just Works OTM shall implement:

2351 TLS_ECDH_ANON_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (with the value 0xFF00)

2352 **11.3.2.2 Random PIN Method Cipher Suites**

2353 The Random PIN Based OTM may use the following (D)TLS cipher suites.

2354 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256

2355 All Devices supporting Random Pin Based OTM shall implement:

2356 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256

2357 **11.3.2.3 Certificate Method Cipher Suites**

2358 The Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM may use the following (D)TLS cipher suites.

2359 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,

2360 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,

2361 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,

2362 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM

2363 Using the following curve:

2364 secp256r1 (See IETF RFC 4492)

2365 All Devices supporting Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM shall implement:

2366 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8

2367 Devices supporting Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM should implement:

2368 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,

2369 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,

2370 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM

2371 **11.3.3 Cipher Suites for Symmetric Keys**

2372 The following cipher suites are defined for (D)TLS communication using PSKs:

2373 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,

2374 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, (* 8 OCTET Authentication tag *)

2375 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,

2376 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, (* 16 OCTET Authentication tag *)

2377 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM,

2378 All CCM based cipher suites also use HMAC-SHA-256 for authentication.

2379 All Devices shall implement the following:

2380 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,

2381

2382 Devices should implement the following:

2383 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,

2384 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,

2385 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,

2386 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM,

2387 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM

2388 **11.3.4 Cipher Suites for Asymmetric Credentials**

2389 The following cipher suites are defined for (D)TLS communication with asymmetric keys or
2390 certificates:

2391 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,

2392 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,

2393 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,

2394 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM

2395 Using the following curve:

2396 secp256r1 (See IETF RFC 4492)

2397 All Devices supporting Asymmetric Credentials shall implement:

2398 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8

2399 All Devices supporting Asymmetric Credentials should implement:

2400 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,

2401 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,

2402 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM

2403 **11.3.5 Cipher suites for OCF Cloud Credentials – moved to OCF Cloud Security document**

2404 This clause is intentionally left blank.

2405

12 Access Control

12.1 ACL Generation and Management

This clause intentionally left empty.

12.2 ACL Evaluation and Enforcement

12.2.1 ACL Evaluation and Enforcement General

The Server enforces access control over application Resources before exposing them to the requestor. The Security Layer in the Server authenticates the requestor when access is received via the secure port. Authenticated requestors, known as the "subject" can be used to match ACL entries that specify the requestor's identity, role or may match authenticated requestors using a subject wildcard.

If the request arrives over the unsecured port, the only ACL policies allowed are those that use a subject wildcard match of anonymous requestors.

Access is denied if a requested Resource is not matched by an ACL entry.

NOTE There are documented exceptions pertaining to Device onboarding where access to Security Virtual Resources may be granted prior to provisioning of ACL Resources.

The second generation ACL (i.e. `/oic/sec/acl2`) contains an array of Access Control Entries (ACE2) that employ a Resource matching algorithm that uses an array of Resource references to match Resources to which the ACE2 access policy applies. Matching consists of comparing the values of the ACE2 "resources" Property (see clause 13) to the requested Resource. Resources are matched in two ways:

- 1) host reference (`"href"`)
- 2) resource wildcard (`"wc"`).

12.2.2 Host Reference Matching

When present in an ACE2 matching element, the Host Reference (`href`) Property shall be used for Resource matching.

- The `href` Property shall be used to find an exact match of the Resource name if present.

12.2.3 Resource Wildcard Matching

When present, a wildcard (`"wc"`) expression shall be used to match multiple Resources using a wildcard Property contained in the `"oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref"` structure.

A wildcard expression may be used to match multiple Resources using a wildcard Property contained in the `"oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref"` structure. The wildcard matching strings are defined in Table 14.

Table 14 – ACE2 Wildcard Matching Strings Description

String	Description
<code>"+"</code>	Shall match all Discoverable Non-Configuration Resources which expose at least one Secure OCF Endpoint.
<code>"_"</code>	Shall match all Discoverable Non-Configuration Resources which expose at least one Unsecure OCF Endpoint.
<code>"**"</code>	Shall match all Non-Configuration Resources.

NOTE Discoverable resources appear in the `/oic/res` Resource, while non-discoverable resources may appear in other collection resources but do not appear in the `/res` collection.

12.2.4 Multiple Criteria Matching

If the ACE2 "resources" Property contains multiple entries, then a logical OR shall be applied for each array element. For example, if a first array element of the "resources" Property contains "href"="/a/light" and the second array element of the "resources" Property contains "href"="/a/led", then Resources that match either of the two "href" criteria shall be included in the set of matched Resources.

Example 1 JSON for Resource matching

```
{
  //Matches Resources named "/x/door1" or "/x/door2"
  "resources":[
    {
      "href":"/x/door1"
    },
    {
      "href":"/x/door2"
    },
  ]
}
```

Example 2 JSON for Resource matching

```
{
  // Matches all Resources
  "resources":[
    {
      "wc":"*"
    }
  ]
}
```

12.2.5 Subject Matching using Wildcards

When the ACE subject is specified as the wildcard string "*" any requestor is matched. The OCF server may authenticate the OCF client, but is not required to.

Examples: JSON for subject wildcard matching

```
//matches all subjects that have authenticated and confidentiality protections in place.
"subject" : {
  "conntype" : "auth-crypt"
}

//matches all subjects that have NOT authenticated and have NO confidentiality protections in place.
"subject" : {
  "conntype" : "anon-clear"
}
```

12.2.6 Subject Matching using Roles

When the ACE subject is specified as a role, a requestor shall be matched if either:

- 1) The requestor authenticated with a symmetric key credential, and the role is present in the "roleid" Property of the credential's entry in the "credential" Resource, or

2484 2) The requestor authenticated with a certificate, and a valid role certificate is present in the roles
2485 resource with the requestor's certificate's public key at the time of evaluation. Validating role
2486 certificates is defined in 10.3.1.

2487 **12.2.7 ACL Evaluation**

2488 **12.2.7.1 ACE2 matching algorithm**

2489 The OCF Server shall apply an ACE2 matching algorithm that matches in the following sequence:

- 2490 1) The local "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource contributes its ACE2 entries for matching.
- 2491 2) Access shall be granted when all these criteria are met:
- 2492 a) The requestor is matched by the ACE2 "subject" Property.
 - 2493 b) The requested Resource is matched by the ACE2 "resources" Property and the requested
2494 Resource shall exist on the local Server.
 - 2495 c) The "period" Property constraint shall be satisfied.
 - 2496 d) The "permission" Property constraint shall be applied.

2497 If multiple ACE2 entries match the Resource request, the union of permissions, for all matching
2498 ACEs, defines the effective permission granted. E.g. If Perm1=CR---; Perm2=--UDN; Then UNION
2499 (Perm1, Perm2)=CRUDN.

2500 The Server shall enforce access based on the effective permissions granted.

2501 Batch requests to Resource containing Links require additional considerations when accessing the
2502 linked Resources. ACL considerations for batch request to the Atomic Measurement Resource
2503 Type are provided in clause 12.2.7.2. ACL considerations for batch request to the Collection
2504 Resource Type are provided in clause 12.2.7.3.

2505 Clause 12.2.7.4 provides ACL considerations when a new Resource is created on a Server in
2506 response to a CREATE request.

2507 **12.2.7.2 (Currently blank)**

2508 This clause intentionally left empty.

2509 **12.2.7.3 ACL considerations for a batch OCF Interface request to a Collection**

2510 This clause addresses the additional authorization processes which take place when a Server
2511 receives a batch OCF Interface request from a Client to a Collection hosted on that Server,
2512 assuming there is an ACE matching the Collection which permits the original Client request. For
2513 the purposes of this clause, the Server hosting this Collection is called the "Collection host". The
2514 additional authorization process is dependent on whether the linked Resource is hosted on the
2515 Collection host or the linked Resource is hosted on another Server:

- 2516 – For each generated request to a linked Resource hosted on the Collection host, the Collection
2517 host shall apply the ACE2 matching algorithm in clause 12.2.7.1 to determine whether the linked
2518 Resource is permitted to process the generated request, with the following clarifications:
 - 2519 – The requestor in clause 12.2.7.1 shall be the Client which sent the original Client request.
 - 2520 – The requested Resource in clause 12.2.7.1 shall be the linked Resource, which shall be
2521 matched using at least one of:
 - 2522 – a Resource Wildcard matching the linked Resource, or
 - 2523 – an exact match of the local path of the linked Resource with a "href" Property in the
2524 "resources" array in the ACE2.
 - 2525 – an exact match of the full URI of the linked Resource with a "href" Property in the
2526 "resources" array in the ACE2.

2527 NOTE The full URI of a linked Resource is obtained by concatenating the "anchor" Property of the Link, if present, and
2528 the "href" Property of the Link. The local path can then be determined from the full URI.

2529 If the linked Resource is not permitted to process the generated request, then the Collection host
2530 shall treat such cases as a linked Resource which cannot process the request when composing the
2531 aggregated response to the original Client Request, as specified for the batch OCF Interface in the
2532 ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

2533 **12.2.7.4 ACL Considerations on creation of a new Resource**

2534 When a new Resource is created on a Server in response to a CREATE request, there might be
2535 no ACEs permitting access to the newly created Resource. The present clause describes how the
2536 Server autonomously modifies the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource to provide some initial authorizations
2537 for accessing the newly created Resource. The purpose of this autonomous modification is to avoid
2538 relying on the AMS update the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource after every new Resource is created.

2539 Subsequent to a Server creating a Collection inside another Collection in response to a CREATE
2540 request from a Client, and prior to sending a response to the Client:

- 2541 – If there is an ACE with "subject" containing the UUID of the Client, and "permissions" exactly
2542 matching the CREATE, RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE operations, then the Server shall
2543 autonomously add an "href" entry to "resources" with the URI of the newly created Collection.
- 2544 – Otherwise, the Server shall autonomously add an ACE with "subject" containing the UUID
2545 of the Client, "resources" containing an "href" entry with the URI of the newly created
2546 Collection, and "permissions" exactly matching the CREATE, RETRIEVE, UPDATE and
2547 DELETE operations.

2548 Subsequent to a Server creating a non-Collection Resource inside another Collection in response
2549 to a CREATE request from a Client, and prior to sending a response to the Client:

- 2550 – If there is an ACE with "subject" containing the UUID of the Client, and "permissions" exactly
2551 matching the RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE operations, then the Server shall
2552 autonomously add an "href" entry to "resources" with the URI of the newly created Resource.
- 2553 – Otherwise, the Server shall autonomously add an ACE with "subject" containing the UUID
2554 of the Client, "resources" containing an "href" entry with the URI of the newly created, and
2555 "permissions" exactly matching the RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE operations.

2556

13 Security Resources

13.1 Security Resources General

OCF Security Resources are shown in Figure 19.

"/oic/sec/cred" Resource and Properties are shown in Figure 20.

"/oic/sec/acl2" Resource and Properties are shown in Figure 21.




Figure 19 – OCF Security Resources




Figure 20 – "/oic/sec/cred" Resource and Properties




Figure 21 – "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource and Properties




Figure 22 – "/oic/sec/ael" Resource and Properties

13.2 Device Owner Transfer Resource

13.2.1 Device Owner Transfer Resource General

The "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource contains the set of supported Device OTMs.

Resource discovery processing respects the CRUDN constraints supplied as part of the security Resource definitions contained in this document.

"/oic/sec/doxm" Resource is defined in Table 15.

Table 15 – Definition of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/doxm	Device OTMs	oic.r.doxm	oic.if.baselin e, oic.if.rw	Resource for supporting Device owner transfer	Configuration

Table 16 defines the Properties of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource.

Table 16 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandato ry	Device State	Access Mode	Description
OTM	oxms	oic.sec.doxm type	array	Yes		R	Value identifying the owner-transfer-method and the organization that defined the method.
OTM Selection	oxmsel	oic.sec.doxm type	UINT16	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to (4) "oic.sec.oxm.self"
					RFOTM	RW	DOTS shall set to its selected DOTS and both parties execute the DOTS. After secure owner transfer session is established DOTS shall update the

							oxmsel again making it permanent. If the DOTS fails the Server shall transition device state to RESET.
					RFPRO	R	n/a
					RFNOP	R	n/a
					SRESET	R	n/a
Supported Credential Types	sct	oic.sec.credtype	bitmask	Yes		R	Identifies the types of credentials the Device supports. The Server sets this value at framework initialization after determining security capabilities. The Device always supports symmetric pair-wise key and asymmetric signing key with certificate (bit positions 0x1 and 0x8 respectively). Other credential types are optional as per clause 9.3
Device Ownership Status	owned	Boolean	T F	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to FALSE.
					RFOTM	RW	DOTS shall set to TRUE after secure owner transfer session is established.
					RFPRO	R	n/a
					RFNOP	R	TRUE
					SRESET	R	TRUE
Device UUID	deviceuuid	String	oic.sec.didtype	Yes	RESET	R	No stipulation.
					RFOTM	RW	DOTS updates to a value it has selected after secure owner transfer session is established.
					RFPRO	R	n/a
					RFNOP	R	n/a
					SRESET	R	n/a
Device Owner Id	devowneruuid	String	uuid	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to the nil uuid value (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
					RFOTM	RW	DOTS shall set value after secure owner transfer session is established.
					RFPRO	R	n/a
					RFNOP	R	n/a
					SRESET	R	n/a
Resource Owner Id	rowneruuid	String	uuid	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to the nil uuid value (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
					RFOTM	RW	The DOTS shall configure the rowneruuid Property when a successful owner transfer session is established.
					RFPRO	R	n/a
					RFNOP	R	n/a
					SRESET	RW	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property) should verify and if needed, update the resource owner Property when a mutually authenticated secure session is established. If the rowneruuid does not refer to a valid DOTS device identifier

							the Server shall transition to RESET Device state.
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

2577 Table 17 defines the Properties of the "oic.sec.didtype".

2578 **Table 17 – Properties of the "oic.sec.didtype" type**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandatory	Device State	Access Mode	Description
Device ID	uuid	String	uuid	Yes	RW	-	A uuid value

2579 The "oxms" Property contains a list of OTM where the entries appear in the order of preference.
2580 This Property contains the higher priority methods appearing before the lower priority methods.
2581 The DOTS queries this list at the time of onboarding and selects the most appropriate method.

2582 OTMs consist of two parts, a URI identifying the vendor or organization and the specific method.

```

2583 <DoxmType> ::= <NSS>
2584 <NSS> ::= <Identifier> | { {<NID> "."} <NameSpaceQualifier> "." } <Method>
2585 <NID> ::= <Vendor-or-Organization>
2586 <Identifier> ::= INTEGER
2587 <NameSpaceQualifier> ::= String
2588 <Method> ::= String
2589 <Vendor-Organization> ::= String

```

2590 When an OTM successfully completes, the "owned" Property is set to "1" (TRUE). Consequently,
2591 subsequent attempts to take ownership of the Device will fail.

2592 There are four device identifiers:

- 2593 1) "deviceuuid" Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource - random DOTS-provisioned value unique
2594 for a given security domain, used as a device identity for access control, mapped internally to
2595 a device-owned credential.
- 2596 2) "di" Property of "/oic/d" Resource - mirroring the value of "deviceuuid" Property of
2597 "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource.
- 2598 3) "piid" Property of "/oic/d" Resource - defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.
- 2599 4) "pi" Property of "/oic/p" Resource - defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

2600 **13.2.2 OCF defined OTMs**

2601 Table 18 defines the Properties of the "oic.sec.doxmtype".

Table 18 – Properties of the "oic.sec.doxmtype" type

Value Type Name	Value Type URN (optional)	Enumeration Value (mandatory)	Description
OCFJustWorks	oic.sec.doxm.jw	0	The just-works method relies on anonymous Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol to allow a DOTS to assert ownership of the new Device. The first DOTS to make the assertion is accepted as the Device owner. The just-works method results in a shared secret that is used to authenticate the Device to the DOTS and likewise authenticates the DOTS to the Device. The Device permits the DOTS to take ownership of the Device, after which a second attempt to take ownership by a different DOTS will fail ^a .
OCFSharedPin	oic.sec.doxm.rdp	1	The new Device randomly generates a PIN that is communicated via an Out Of Band Communication Channel to a DOTS. An in-band Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol establishes that both endpoints possess the PIN. Possession of the PIN by the DOTS signals the new Device that device ownership can be asserted.
OCFMfgCert	oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert	2	The new Device is presumed to have been manufactured with an embedded asymmetric private key that is used to sign a Diffie-Hellman exchange at Device onboarding. The manufacturer certificate should contain Platform hardening information and other security assurances assertions.
OCF Reserved	<Reserved>	3	Reserved
OCFSelf	oic.sec.doxm.self	4	The manufacturer shall set the "/doxm.oxmsel" value to (4). The Server shall reset this value to (4) upon entering RESET Device state.
OCF Reserved	<Reserved>	5~0xFEFF	Reserved for OCF use
Vendor-defined Value Type Name	<Reserved>	0xFF00~0xFFFF	Reserved for vendor-specific OTM use
a The just-works method is subject to a man-in-the-middle attacker. Precautions should be taken to provide physical security when this method is used.			

2603 13.3 Credential Resource

2604 13.3.1 Credential Resource General

2605 The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource maintains credentials used to authenticate the Server to Clients and
 2606 support services as well as credentials used to verify Clients and support services.

2607 Multiple credential types are anticipated by the OCF framework, including pair-wise pre-shared
 2608 keys, asymmetric keys, certificates and others. The credential Resource uses a Subject UUID to
 2609 distinguish the Clients and support services it recognizes by verifying an authentication challenge.

2610 In order to provide an interface which allows management of the "creds" Array Property, the
 2611 RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE operations on the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall behave as
 2612 follows:

- 2613 1) A RETRIEVE shall return the full Resource representation, except that any write-only Properties
 2614 shall be omitted (e.g. private key data).
- 2615 2) An UPDATE shall replace or add to the Properties included in the representation sent with the
 2616 UPDATE request, as follows:
 - 2617 a) If an UPDATE representation includes the "creds" array Property, then:

- 2618 i) Supplied "creds" with a "credid" that matches an existing "credid" shall replace
2619 completely the corresponding "cred" in the existing "creds" array.
- 2620 ii) Supplied "creds" without a "credid" shall be appended to the existing "creds" array, and
2621 a unique (to the "cred" Resource) "credid" shall be created and assigned to the new
2622 "cred" by the Server. The "credid" of a deleted "cred" should not be reused, to improve
2623 the determinism of the interface and reduce opportunity for race conditions.
- 2624 iii) Supplied "creds" with a "credid" that does not match an existing "credid" shall be
2625 appended to the existing "creds" array, using the supplied "credid".
- 2626 iv) The rows in Table 20 corresponding to the "creds" array Property dictate the Device
2627 States in which an UPDATE of the "creds" array Property is always rejected. If OCF
2628 Device is in a Device State where the Access Mode in this row contains "R", then the
2629 OCF Device shall reject all UPDATES of the "creds" array Property.
- 2630 3) A DELETE without query parameters shall remove the entire "creds" array, but shall not remove
2631 the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource.
- 2632 4) A DELETE with one or more "credid" query parameters shall remove the "cred"(s) with the
2633 corresponding "credid"(s) from the "creds" array.
- 2634 5) The rows in Table 20 corresponding to the "creds" array Property dictate the Device States in
2635 which a DELETE is always rejected. If OCF Device is in a Device State where the Access Mode
2636 in this row contains "R", then the OCF Device shall reject all DELETES.
- 2637 NOTE The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource's use of the DELETE operation is not in accordance with the OCF Interfaces defined
2638 in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.
- 2639 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource is defined in Table 19.

2640 **Table 19 – Definition of the "/oic /sec/cred" Resource**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/cred	Credentials	oic.r.cred	oic.if.baseline, oic.if.rw	Resource containing credentials for Device authentication, verification and data protection	Security

2641 Table 20 defines the Properties of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource.

Table 20 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandatory	Device State	Access Mode	Description
Credentials	creds	oic.sec.cred	array	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to manufacturer defaults.
					RFOTM	RW	Set by DOTS after successful OTM
					RFPRO	RW	Set by the CMS (referenced via the rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/cred" Resource) after successful authentication. Access to NCRs is prohibited.
					RFNOP	R	Access to NCRs is permitted after a matching ACE is found.
					SRESET	RW	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource or the rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource) should evaluate the integrity of and may update creds entries when a secure session is established and the Server and DOTS are authenticated.
Resource Owner ID	rowneruuid	String	uuid	Yes	RESET	R	Server shall set to the nil uuid value (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
					RFOTM	RW	The DOTS shall configure the rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/cred" Resource when a successful owner transfer session is established.
					RFPRO	R	n/a
					RFNOP	R	n/a
					SRESET	RW	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource or the rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource) should verify and if needed, update the resource owner Property when a mutually authenticated secure session is established. If the "rowneruuid" Property does not refer to a valid DOTS the Server shall transition to RESET Device state.

2643 All secure Device accesses shall have a "/oic/sec/cred" Resource that protects the end-to-end
 2644 interaction.

2645 The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall be updateable by the service named in its rowneruuid Property.

2646 ACLs naming "/oic/sec/cred" Resource should further restrict access beyond CRUDN access
 2647 modes.

2648 Table 21 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.creds".

Table 21 – Properties of the "oic.sec.creds" Property

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandatory	Access Mode	Device State	Description
Credential ID	credid	UINT16	0 – 64K-1	Yes	RW		Short credential ID for local references from other Resource
Subject UUID	subjectuuid	String	uuid	Yes	RW		A uuid that identifies the subject to which this credential applies or "" if any identity is acceptable
Role ID	roleid	oic.sec.roletype	-	No	RW		Identifies the role(s) the subject is authorized to assert.
Credential Type	credtype	oic.sec.credtype	bitmask	Yes	RW		Represents this credential's type. 0 – Used for testing 1 – Symmetric pair-wise key 2 – Symmetric group key 4 – Asymmetric signing key 8 – Asymmetric signing key with certificate 16 – PIN or password 32 – Asymmetric encryption key
Credential Usage	credusage	oic.sec.credusage	String	No	RW		Used to resolve undecidability of the credential. Provides indication for how/where the cred is used "oic.sec.cred.trustca": certificate trust anchor "oic.sec.cred.cert": identity certificate "oic.sec.cred.rolecert": role certificate "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca": manufacturer certificate trust anchor "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert": manufacturer certificate
Public Data	publicdata	oic.sec.pubdatatype	-	No	RW		Public credential information 1:2: ticket, public SKDC values 4, 32: Public key value 8: A chain of one or more certificate
Private Data	privatedata	oic.sec.privdatatype	-	No	-	RESET	Server shall set to manufacturer default
					RW	RFOTM	Set by DOTS after successful OTM
					W	RFPRO	Set by authenticated DOTS or CMS
					-	RFNOP	Not writable during normal operation.
					W	SRESET	DOTS may modify to enable transition to RFPRO.
Optional Data	optionaldata	oic.sec.optdatatype	-	No	RW		Credential revocation status information 1, 2, 4, 32: revocation status information 8: Revocation information
Period	period	String	-	No	RW		Period as defined by IETF RFC 5545. The credential should not be used if the current time is outside the Period window.
Credential Refresh Method	crms	oic.sec.crmtype	array	No	RW		Credentials with a Period Property are refreshed using the credential refresh method (crm) according to the type definitions for "oic.sec.crm".

2650 Table 22 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.credusagetype".

2651 **Table 22: Properties of the "oic.sec.credusagetype" Property**

Value Type Name	Value Type URN (mandatory)
Trust Anchor	oic.sec.cred.trustca
Certificate	oic.sec.cred.cert
Role Certificate	oic.sec.cred.rolecert
Manufacturer Trust CA	oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca
Manufacturer CA	oic.sec.cred.mfgcert

2652 Table 23 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.pubdatatype".

2653 **Table 23 – Properties of the "oic.sec.pubdatatype" Property**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Encoding format	encoding	String	N/A	RW	No	A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in the pubdata "oic.sec.encoding.pem" – Encoding for PEM-encoded certificate or chain
Data	data	String	N/A	RW	No	The encoded value

2654 Table 24 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.privdatatype".

2655 **Table 24 – Properties of the "oic.sec.privdatatype" Property**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Encoding format	encoding	String	N/A	RW	Yes	A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in the privdata "oic.sec.encoding.pem" – Encoding for PEM-encoded private key "oic.sec.encoding.base64" – Encoding of Base64 encoded PSK "oic.sec.encoding.handle" – Data is contained in a storage sub-system referenced using a handle "oic.sec.encoding.raw" – Raw hex encoded data
Data	data	String	N/A	W	No	The encoded value This value shall not be RETRIEVE-able.
Handle	handle	UINT16	N/A	RW	No	Handle to a key storage resource

2656 Table 25 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.optdatatype".

2657

Table 25 – Properties of the "oic.sec.optdatatype" Property

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Revocation status	revstat	Boolean	T F	RW	Yes	Revocation status flag True – revoked False – not revoked
Encoding format	encoding	String	N/A	RW	No	A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in the optdata "oic.sec.encoding.pem" – Encoding for PEM-encoded certificate or chain
Data	data	String	N/A	RW	No	The encoded structure

2658 Table 26 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.roletype".

2659

Table 26 – Definition of the "oic.sec.roletype" type.

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Authority	authority	String	N/A	R	No	A name for the authority that defined the role. If not present, the credential issuer defined the role. If present, must be expressible as an ASN.1 PrintableString.
Role	role	String	N/A -	R	Yes	An identifier for the role. Must be expressible as an ASN.1 PrintableString.

2660 **13.3.2 Properties of the Credential Resource**2661 **13.3.2.1 Credential ID**

2662 Credential ID ("credid") is a local reference to an entry in a "creds" Property array of the
 2663 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource. The SRM generates it. The "credid" Property shall be used to
 2664 disambiguate array elements of the "creds" Property.

2665 **13.3.2.2 Subject UUID**

2666 The "subjectuuid" Property identifies the Device to which an entry in a "creds" Property array of the
 2667 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall be used to establish a secure session, verify an authentication
 2668 challenge-response or to authenticate an authentication challenge.

2669 A "subjectuuid" Property that matches the Server's own "deviceuuid" Property, distinguishes the
 2670 array entries in the "creds" Property that pertain to this Device.

2671 The "subjectuuid" Property shall be used to identify a group to which a group key is used to protect
 2672 shared data.

2673 When certificate chain is used during secure connection establishment, the "subjectuuid" Property
 2674 shall also be used to verify the identity of the responder. The presented certificate chain shall be
 2675 accepted, if there is a matching Credential entry on the Device that satisfies all of the following:

- 2676 – Public Data of the entry contains trust anchor (root) of the presented chain.
- 2677 – Subject UUID of the entry matches UUID in the Common Name field of the End-Entity certificate
 2678 in the presented chain. If Subject UUID of the entry is set as a wildcard "*", this condition is
 2679 automatically satisfied.
- 2680 – Credential Usage of the entry is "oic.sec.cred.trustca".

2681 **13.3.2.3 Role ID**

2682 The "roleid" Property identifies a role that has been granted to the credential.

2683 **13.3.2.4 Credential Type**

2684 The "credtype" Property is used to interpret several of the other Property values whose contents
2685 can differ depending on credential type. These Properties include "publicdata", "privatedata" and
2686 "optionaldata". The "credtype" Property value of "0" ("no security mode") is reserved for testing and
2687 debugging circumstances. Production deployments shall not allow provisioning of credentials of
2688 type "0". The SRM should introduce checking code that prevents its use in production deployments.

2689 **13.3.2.5 Public Data**

2690 The "publicdata" Property contains information that provides additional context surrounding the
2691 issuance of the credential. For example, it might contain information included in a certificate or
2692 response data from a CMS. It might contain wrapped data.

2693 **13.3.2.6 Private Data**

2694 The "privatedata" Property contains secret information that is used to authenticate a Device, protect
2695 data or verify an authentication challenge-response.

2696 The "privatedata" Property shall not be disclosed outside of the SRM's trusted computing perimeter.
2697 A secure element (SE) or trusted execution environment (TEE) should be used to implement the
2698 SRM's trusted computing perimeter. The privatedata contents may be referenced using a handle;
2699 for example, if used with a secure storage sub-system.

2700 **13.3.2.7 Optional Data**

2701 The "optionaldata" Property contains information that is optionally supplied, but facilitates key
2702 management, scalability or performance optimization.

2703 **13.3.2.8 Period**

2704 The "period" Property identifies the validity period for the credential. If no validity period is specified,
2705 the credential lifetime is undetermined. Constrained devices that do not implement a date-time
2706 capability shall obtain current date-time information from its CMS.

2707 **13.3.2.9 Credential Refresh Method Type Definition [Deprecated]**

2708 This clause is intentionally left blank.

2709 **13.3.2.10 Credential Usage**

2710 Credential Usage indicates to the Device the circumstances in which a credential should be used.
2711 Five values are defined:

- 2712 – "oic.sec.cred.trustca": This certificate is a trust anchor for the purposes of certificate chain
2713 validation, as defined in 10.4. OCF Server SHALL remove any "/oic/sec/cred" entries with an
2714 "oic.sec.cred.trustca" credusage upon transitioning to RFOTM. OCF Servers SHALL use
2715 "/oic/sec/cred" entries that have an "oic.sec.cred.trustca" Value of "credusage" Property only
2716 as trust anchors for post-onboarding (D)TLS session establishment in RFNOP state; these
2717 entries are not to be used for onboarding (D)TLS sessions.
- 2718 – "oic.sec.cred.cert": This "credusage" is used for certificates for which the Device possesses the
2719 private key and uses it for identity authentication in a secure session, as defined in clause 10.4.
- 2720 – "oic.sec.cred.rolecert": This "credusage" is used for certificates for which the Device possesses
2721 the private key and uses to assert one or more roles, as defined in clause 10.4.2.
- 2722 – "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca": This certificate is a trust anchor for the purposes of the Manufacturer
2723 Certificate Based OTM as defined in clause 7.3.6. OCF Servers SHALL use "/oic/sec/cred"

entries that have an "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca" Value of "credusage" Property only as trust anchors for onboarding (D)TLS session establishment; these entries are not to be used for post-onboarding (D)TLS sessions.

- "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert": This certificate is used for certificates for which the Device possesses the private key and uses it for authentication in the Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM as defined in clause 7.3.6.

13.3.2.11 Resource Owner

The Resource Owner Property allows credential provisioning to occur soon after Device onboarding before access to support services has been established. It identifies the entity authorized to manage the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource in response to Device recovery situations.

13.3.3 Key Formatting

13.3.3.1 Symmetric Key Formatting

Symmetric keys shall have the format described in Table 27 and Table 28.

Table 27 – 128-bit symmetric key

Name	Value	Type	Description
Length	16	OCTET	Specifies the number of 8-bit octets following Length
Key	opaque	OCTET Array	16-byte array of octets. When used as input to a PSK function Length is omitted.

Table 28 – 256-bit symmetric key

Name	Value	Type	Description
Length	32	OCTET	Specifies the number of 8-bit octets following Length
Key	opaque	OCTET Array	32-byte array of octets. When used as input to a PSK function Length is omitted.

13.3.3.2 Asymmetric Keys

Asymmetric key formatting is not available in this revision of the document.

13.3.3.3 Asymmetric Keys with Certificate

Key formatting is defined by certificate definition.

13.3.3.4 Passwords

Password formatting is not available in this revision of the document.

13.3.4 Credential Refresh Method Details [Deprecated]

This clause is intentionally left blank.

13.4 Certificate Revocation List

13.4.1 CRL Resource Definition [Deprecated]

This clause is intentionally left blank.

13.5 ACL Resources

13.5.1 ACL Resources General

All Resource hosted by a Server are required to match an ACL policy. ACL policies can be expressed using "/oic/sec/acl2". The subject (e.g. "deviceuuid" of the Client) requesting access to

a Resource shall be authenticated prior to applying the ACL check. Resources that are available to multiple Clients can be matched using a wildcard subject. All Resources accessible via the unsecured communication endpoint shall be matched using a wildcard subject.

13.5.2 OCF Access Control List (ACL) BNF defines ACL structures.

ACL structure in Backus-Naur Form (BNF) notation is defined in Table 29:

Table 29 – BNF Definition of OCF ACL

<ACL>	<ACE> {<ACE>}
<ACE>	<SubjectId> <ResourceRef> <Permission> {<Validity>}
<SubjectId>	<DeviceId> <Wildcard> <RoleId>
<DeviceId>	<UUID>
<RoleId>	<Character> <RoleName><Character>
<RoleName>	" " <Authority><Character>
<Authority>	<UUID>
<ResourceRef>	' (' <OIC_LINK> {',' {<OIC_LINK>} '})'
<Permission>	('C' '-') ('R' '-') ('U' '-') ('D' '-') ('N' '-')
<Validity>	<Period> {<Recurrence>}
<Wildcard>	'*'
<URI>	IETF RFC 3986
<UUID>	IETF RFC 4122
<Period>	IETF RFC 5545 Period
<Recurrence>	IETF RFC 5545 Recurrence
<OIC_LINK>	ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018 defined in JSON Schema
<Character>	<Any UTF8 printable character, excluding NUL>

The <DeviceId> token means the requestor must possess a credential that uses <UUID> as its identity in order to match the requestor to the <ACE> policy.

The <RoleId> token means the requestor must possess a role credential with <Character> as its role in order to match the requestor to the <ACE> policy.

The <Wildcard> token "*" means any requestor is matched to the <ACE> policy, with or without authentication.

When a <SubjectId> is matched to an <ACE> policy the <ResourceRef> is used to match the <ACE> policy to Resources.

The <OIC_LINK> token contains values used to query existence of hosted Resources.

The <Permission> token specifies the privilege granted by the <ACE> policy given the <SubjectId> and <ResourceRef> matching does not produce the empty set match.

Permissions are defined in terms of CREATE ("C"), RETRIEVE ("R"), UPDATE ("U"), DELETE ("D"), NOTIFY ("N") and NIL ("-"). NIL is substituted for a permissions character that signifies the respective permission is not granted.

The empty set match result defaults to a condition where no access rights are granted.

If the <Validity> token exists, the <Permission> granted is constrained to the time <Period>. <Validity> may further be segmented into a <Recurrence> pattern where access may alternatively be granted and rescinded according to the pattern.

2779 **13.5.3 ACL Resource**

2780 An "acl2" is a list of type "ace2".

2781 In order to provide an interface which allows management of array elements of the "aclist2"
2782 Property associated with a "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource. The RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE
2783 operations on the " /oic/sec/acl2" Resource SHALL behave as follows:

- 2784 1) A RETRIEVE shall return the full Resource representation.
- 2785 2) An UPDATE shall replace or add to the Properties included in the representation sent with the
2786 UPDATE request, as follows:
- 2787 a) If an UPDATE representation includes the array Property, then:
- 2788 i) Supplied ACEs with an "aceid" that matches an existing "aceid" shall replace completely
2789 the corresponding ACE in the existing "aces2" array.
- 2790 ii) Supplied ACEs without an "aceid" shall be appended to the existing "aces2" array, and
2791 a unique (to the acl2 Resource) "aceid" shall be created and assigned to the new ACE
2792 by the Server. The "aceid" of a deleted ACE should not be reused, to improve the
2793 determinism of the interface and reduce opportunity for race conditions.
- 2794 iii) Supplied ACEs with an "aceid" that does not match an existing "aceid" shall be
2795 appended to the existing "aces2" array, using the supplied "aceid".
- 2796 iv) The rows in Table 32 corresponding to the "aclist2" array Property dictate the Device
2797 States in which an UPDATE of the "aclist2" array Property is always rejected. If OCF
2798 Device is in a Device State where the Access Mode in this row contains "R", then the
2799 OCF Device shall reject all UPDATES of the "aclist2" array Property.
- 2800 3) A DELETE without query parameters shall remove the entire "aces2" array, but shall not remove
2801 the "oic/sec/ace2" Resource.
- 2802 4) A DELETE with one or more "aceid" query parameters shall remove the ACE(s) with the
2803 corresponding "aceid"(s) from the "aces2" array.
- 2804 5) The rows in Table 32 corresponding to the "aclist2" array Property dictate the Device States in
2805 which a DELETE is always rejected. If OCF Device is in a Device State where the Access Mode
2806 in this row contains "R", then the OCF Device shall reject all DELETES.

2807 NOTE The "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource's use of the DELETE operation is not in accordance with the OCF Interfaces
2808 defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

2809 Evaluation of local ACL Resource completes when all ACL Resource have been queried and no
2810 entry can be found for the requested Resource for the requestor – e.g. "/oic/sec/acl2" does not
2811 match the subject and the requested Resource.

2812 Table 30 defines the values of "oic.sec.crudntype".

2813

Table 30 – Value Definition of the "oic.sec.crudntype" Property

Value	Access Policy	Description	RemarksNotes
bx0000,0000 (0)	No permissions	No permissions	N/A
bx0000,0001 (1)	C	CREATE	N/A
bx0000,0010 (2)	R	RETREIVE, OBSERVE, DISCOVER	The "R" permission bit covers both the Read permission and the Observe permission.
bx0000,0100 (4)	U	WRITE, UPDATE	N/A
bx0000,1000 (8)	D	DELETE	N/A
bx0001,0000 (16)	N	NOTIFY	The "N" permission bit is ignored in OCF 1.0, since "R" covers the Observe permission. It is documented for future versions

2814 "oic/sec/acl2" Resource is defined in Table 19.

2815

Table 31 – Definition of the "oic/sec/acl2" Resource

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/acl2	ACL2	oic.r.acl2	oic.if.baseli ne, oic.if.rw	Resource for managing access	Security

2816 Table 32 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.acl2".

Table 32 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource

Property Name	Value Type	Mandatory	Device State	Access Mode	Description
aclist2	array of oic.sec.ace2	Yes	N/A		The aclist2 Property is an array of ACE records of type "oic.sec.ace2". The Server uses this list to apply access control to its local resources.
N/A	N/A	N/A	RESET	R	Server shall set to manufacturer defaults.
			RFOTM	RW	Set by DOTS after successful OTM
			RFPRO	RW	The AMS (referenced via rowneruuid property) shall update the aclist entries after mutually authenticated secure session is established. Access to NCRs is prohibited.
			RFNOP	R	Access to NCRs is permitted after a matching ACE2 is found.
			SRESET	RW	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm Resource") should evaluate the integrity of and may update aclist entries when a secure session is established and the Server and DOTS are authenticated.
rowneruuid	uuid	Yes	N/A		The resource owner Property (rowneruuid) is used by the Server to reference a service provider trusted by the Server. Server shall verify the service provider is authorized to perform the requested action
			RESET	R	Server shall set to the nil uuid value (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
			RFOTM	RW	The DOTS should configure the rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource when a successful owner transfer session is established.
			RFPRO	R	n/a
			RFNOP	R	n/a
			SRESET	RW	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property or rowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource) should verify and if needed, update the resource owner Property when a mutually authenticated secure session is established. If the rowneruuid Property does not refer to a valid DOTS the Server shall transition to RESET device state.

2820

Table 33 – "oic.sec.ace2" data type definition.

Property Name	Value Type	Mandatory	Description
subject	oic.sec.roletype, oic.sec.didtype, oic.sec.conntype	Yes	The Client is the subject of the ACE when the roles, Device UUID, or connection type matches.
resources	array of oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref	Yes	The application's resources to which a security policy applies
permission	oic.sec.crudntype.bitmask	Yes	Bitmask encoding of CRUDN permission
validity	array of oic.sec.time-pattern	No	An array of a tuple of period and recurrence. Each item in this array contains a string representing a period using the IETF RFC 5545 Period, and a string array representing a recurrence rule using the IETF RFC 5545 Recurrence.
aceid	integer	Yes	An aceid is unique with respect to the array entries in the aclist2 Property.

2821 Table 34 defines the Properties of "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref".

2822

Table 34 – "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref" data type definition.

Property Name	Value Type	Mandatory	Description
href	uri	No	A URI referring to a resource to which the containing ACE applies
wc	string	No	Refer to Table 14.

2823 Table 35 defines the values of "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref".

2824

Table 35 – Value definition "oic.sec.conntype" Property

Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Description
conntype	string	enum ["auth-crypt", "anon-clear"]	This Property allows an ACE to be matched based on the connection or message protection type
		auth-crypt	ACE applies if the Client is authenticated and the data channel or message is encrypted and integrity protected
		anon-clear	ACE applies if the Client is not authenticated and the data channel or message is not encrypted but may be integrity protected

2825 Local ACL Resources supply policy to a Resource access enforcement point within an OCF stack
 2826 instance. The OCF framework gates Client access to Server Resources. It evaluates the subject's
 2827 request using policies contained in ACL resources.

2828 Resources named in the ACL policy can be fully qualified or partially qualified. Fully qualified
 2829 Resource references include the device identifier in the href Property that identifies the remote
 2830 Resource Server that hosts the Resource. Partially qualified references mean that the local
 2831 Resource Server hosts the Resource. If a fully qualified resource reference is given, the
 2832 Intermediary enforcing access shall have a secure channel to the Resource Server and the
 2833 Resource Server shall verify the Intermediary is authorized to act on its behalf as a Resource
 2834 access enforcement point.

2835 Resource Servers should include references to Device and ACL Resources where access
2836 enforcement is to be applied. However, access enforcement logic shall not depend on these
2837 references for access control processing as access to Server Resources will have already been
2838 granted.

2839 Local ACL Resources identify a Resource Owner service that is authorized to instantiate and modify
2840 this Resource. This prevents non-terminating dependency on some other ACL Resource.
2841 Nevertheless, it should be desirable to grant access rights to ACL Resources using an ACL
2842 Resource.

2843 An ACE2 entry is considered "currently valid" if the validity period of the ACE2 entry includes the
2844 time of the request. The validity period in the ACE2 may be a recurring time period (e.g., daily from
2845 1:00-2:00). Matching the resource(s) specified in a request to the "resource" Property of the ACE2
2846 is defined in clause 12.2. For example, one way they can match is if the Resource URI in the
2847 request exactly matches one of the resource references in the ACE2 entries.

2848 A request will match an ACE2 if any of the following are true:

2849 1) The ACE2 "subject" Property is of type "oic.sec.didtype" has a UUID value that matches the
2850 "deviceuuid" Property associated with the secure session;

2851 AND the Resource of the request matches one of the "resources" Property of the ACE2
2852 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";

2853 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.

2854 2) The ACE2 "subject" Property is of type "oic.sec.conntype" and has the wildcard value that
2855 matches the currently established connection type;

2856 AND the resource of the request matches one of the "resources" Property of the ACE2
2857 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";

2858 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.

2859 3) When Client authentication uses a certificate credential;

2860 AND one of the "roleid" values contained in the role certificate matches the "roleid" Property of
2861 the ACE2 "oic.sec.roletype";

2862 AND the role certificate public key matches the public key of the certificate used to establish
2863 the current secure session;

2864 AND the resource of the request matches one of the array elements of the "resources" Property
2865 of the ACE2 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";

2866 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.

2867 4) When Client authentication uses a certificate credential;

2868 AND the CoAP payload query string of the request specifies a role, which is member of the set
2869 of roles contained in the role certificate;

2870 AND the roleid values contained in the role certificate matches the "roleid" Property of the ACE2
2871 "oic.sec.roletype";

2872 AND the role certificate public key matches the public key of the certificate used to establish
2873 the current secure session;

2874 AND the resource of the request matches one of the "resources" Property of the ACE2
2875 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";

2876 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.

2877 5) When Client authentication uses a symmetric key credential;

2878 AND one of the "roleid" values associated with the symmetric key credential used in the secure
2879 session, matches the "roleid" Property of the ACE2 "oic.sec.roletype";

2880 AND the resource of the request matches one of the array elements of the "resources" Property
 2881 of the ACE2 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";
 2882 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.
 2883 6) When Client authentication uses a symmetric key credential;
 2884 AND the CoAP payload query string of the request specifies a role, which is contained in the
 2885 "oic.r.cred.creds.roleid" Property of the current secure session;
 2886 AND CoAP payload query string of the request specifies a role that matches the "roleid"
 2887 Property of the ACE2 "oic.sec.roletype";
 2888 AND the resource of the request matches one of the array elements of the "resources" Property
 2889 of the ACE2 "oic.sec.ace2.resource-ref";
 2890 AND the ACE2 is currently valid.

2891 A request is granted if ANY of the 'matching' ACE2 entries contain the permission to allow the
 2892 request. Otherwise, the request is denied.

2893 There is no way for an ACE2 entry to explicitly deny permission to a resource. Therefore, if one
 2894 Device with a given role should have slightly different permissions than another Device with the
 2895 same role, they must be provisioned with different roles.

2896 The Server is required to verify that any hosted Resource has authorized access by the Client
 2897 requesting access. The "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource is co-located on the Resource host so that the
 2898 Resource request processing should be applied securely and efficiently. See Annex A for example.

2899 **13.6 Access Manager ACL Resource [Deprecated]**

2900 This clause is intentionally left blank.

2901 **13.7 Signed ACL Resource [Deprecated]**

2902 This clause is intentionally left blank.

2903 **13.8 Provisioning Status Resource**

2904 The "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource maintains the Device provisioning status. Device provisioning should
 2905 be Client-directed or Server-directed. Client-directed provisioning relies on a Client device to
 2906 determine what, how and when Server Resources should be instantiated and updated. Server-
 2907 directed provisioning relies on the Server to seek provisioning when conditions dictate. Furthermore,
 2908 the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource should be provisioned at ownership transfer with credentials
 2909 necessary to open a secure connection with appropriate support service.

2910 "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource is defined in Table 36.

2911 **Table 36 – Definition of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/pstat	Provisioning Status	oic.r.pstat	oic.if.baseline, oic.if.rw	Resource for managing Device provisioning status	Configuration

2912 Table 37 defines the Properties of "/oic/sec/pstat".

Table 37 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandatory	Access Mode	Device State	Description
Device Onboarding State	dos	oic.sec.dostype	N/A	Yes	RW		Device Onboarding State
Is Device Operational	isop	Boolean	T F	Yes	R	RESET	Server shall set to FALSE
					R	RFOTM	Server shall set to FALSE
					R	RFPRO	Server shall set to FALSE
					R	RFNOP	Server shall set to TRUE
					R	SRESET	Server shall set to FALSE
Current Mode	cm	oic.sec.dpmttype	bitmask	Yes	R		Current Mode
Target Mode	tm	oic.sec.dpmttype	bitmask	Yes	RW		Target Mode
Operational Mode	om	oic.sec.pomtype	bitmask	Yes	R	RESET	Server shall set to manufacturer default.
					RW	RFOTM	Set by DOTS after successful OTM
					RW	RFPRO	Set by CMS, AMS, DOTS after successful authentication
					RW	RFNOP	Set by CMS, AMS, DOTS after successful authentication
					RW	SRESET	Set by DOTS.
Supported Mode	sm	oic.sec.pomtype	bitmask	Yes	R	All states	Supported provisioning services operation modes
Device UUID	deviceuuid	String	uuid	Yes	RW	All states	[DEPRECATED] A uuid that identifies the Device to which the status applies
Resource Owner ID	rowneruuid	String	uuid	Yes	R	RESET	Server shall set to the nil uuid value (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
					RW	RFOTM	The DOTS should configure the rowneruuid Property when a successful owner transfer session is established.
					R	RFPRO	n/a
					R	RFNOP	n/a
					RW	SRESET	The DOTS (referenced via devowneruuid Property of "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource) should verify and if needed, update the resource owner Property when a mutually authenticated secure session is established. If the rowneruuid does not refer to a valid DOTS the Server shall transition to RESET Device state.

Table 38 – Properties of the ".oic.sec.dostype" Property

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Mandatory	Access Mode	Device State	Description
Device Onboarding State	s	UINT16	enum (0=RESET, 1=RFOTM, 2=RFPRO, 3=RFNOP, 4=SRESET	Y	R	RESET	The Device is in a hard reset state.
					RW	RFOTM	Set by DOTS after successful OTM to RFPRO.
					RW	RFPRO	Set by CMS, AMS, DOTS after successful authentication
					RW	RFNOP	Set by CMS, AMS, DOTS after successful authentication
					RW	SRESET	Set by CMS, AMS, DOTS after successful authentication
Pending state	p	Boolean	T F	Y	R	All States	FALSE (0) – "s" state changes are complete. Since Device is not able to respond when the value is TRUE, other values of this property are DEPRECATED.

2917 In all Device states:

- 2918 – The Device permits an authenticated and authorised Client to change the Device state of a
2919 Device by updating the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource to
2920 the desired value. The allowed Device state transitions are defined in Figure 16.
- 2921 – Prior to updating the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource, the
2922 Client configures the Device to meet entry conditions for the new Device state. The SVR
2923 definitions define the entity (Client or Server) expected to perform the specific SVR
2924 configuration change to meet the entry conditions. Once the Client has configured the aspects
2925 for which the Client is responsible, it can update the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the
2926 "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource. The Server then makes any changes for which the Server is
2927 responsible, including updating required SVR values, and set the "s" Property of the "dos"
2928 Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource to the new value.

2929 When Device state is RESET:

- 2930 – All SVR content is removed and reset to manufacturer default values.
- 2931 – The default manufacturer Device state is RESET.
- 2932 – NCRs are reset to manufacturer default values.
- 2933 – NCRs shall not be accessible.
- 2934 – After successfully processing RESET the SRM transitions to RFOTM by setting the "s" Property
2935 of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource to 1 (RFOTM).

2936 When Device state is RFOTM:

- 2937 – NCRs shall not be accessible.
- 2938 – Before OTM is successful, the the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat"
2939 Resource is read-only by unauthenticated requestors
- 2940 – After the OTM is successful, the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat"
2941 Resource is read-write by authorized requestors.
- 2942 – The negotiated Device OC is used to create an authenticated session over which the DOTS
2943 directs the Device state to transition to RFPRO.

- 2944 – If an authenticated session cannot be established the ownership transfer session should be
2945 disconnected and SRM sets back the Device state to RESET state.
- 2946 – Ownership transfer session, especially Random PIN OTM, should not exceed 60 seconds. If
2947 the SRM asserts the OTM failed, the ownership transfer session should be disconnected, and
2948 the Device should transition to RESET ("/pstat.dos.s"=0 (RESET)).
- 2949 – The DOTS UPDATES the "devowneruuid" Property in the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource to a non-
2950 nil UUID value. The DOTS (or other authorized client) can update it multiple times while in
2951 RFOTM. It is not updatable while in other device states except when the Device state returns
2952 to RFOTM through RESET.
- 2953 – The DOTS can have additional provisioning tasks to perform while in RFOTM. When done, the
2954 DOTS UPDATES the "owned" Property in the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource to "true".
- 2955 – After successful OTM, the DOTS triggers the transition to RFPRO state and the "s" Property of
2956 the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource is set to 2 (RFPRO).
- 2957 When Device state is RFPRO:
 - 2958 – The "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource is read-only by
2959 unauthorized requestors and read-write by authorized requestors.
 - 2960 – NCRs shall not be accessible, except for Easy Setup Resources, if supported.
 - 2961 – An authorized Client may provision SVRs as needed for normal functioning in RFNOP.
 - 2962 – An authorized Client may perform consistency checks on SVRs to determine which shall be re-
2963 provisioned.
 - 2964 – Failure to successfully provision SVRs may trigger a state change to RESET. For example, if
2965 the Device has already transitioned from SRESET but consistency checks continue to fail.
 - 2966 – The authorized Client sets the "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource
2967 to 3 (RFNOP).
- 2968 When Device state is RFNOP:
 - 2969 – The "s" Property of the "dos" Property of the "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource is read-only by
2970 unauthorized requestors and read-write by authorized requestors.
 - 2971 – NCRs, SVRs and core Resources are accessible following normal access processing.
 - 2972 – When additional provisioning is necessary, the Device may be transitioned to RFPRO by an
2973 authorized Client. Only the Device owner should transition to SRESET or RESET.
- 2974 When Device state is SRESET:
 - 2975 – NCRs shall not be accessible. The integrity of NCRs may be suspect but the SRM doesn't
2976 attempt to access or reference them.
 - 2977 – SVR integrity is not guaranteed, but access to some SVR Properties is necessary. These
2978 include "devowneruuid" Property of the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource,
2979 "creds":[{...,"subjectuuid":<devowneruuid>,...}] Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource and
2980 "pstat.dos.s" "/oic/sec/pstat" Resource.
 - 2981 – The certificates that identify and authorize the Device owner are sufficient to re-create
2982 minimalist "/oic/sec/cred" and "/oic/sec/doxm" Resources enabling Device owner control of
2983 SRESET. If the SRM can't establish these Resources, then it will transition to RESET state.
 - 2984 – An authorized Client performs SVR consistency checks. The authorized Client can provision
2985 SVRs as needed to ensure they are available for continued provisioning in RFPRO or for normal
2986 functioning in RFNOP.
 - 2987 – The authorized Device owner can avoid entering RESET state and RFOTM by UPDATING
2988 "pstat.dos.s" with RFPRO or RFNOP values.

2989 – ACLs on SVR are presumed to be invalid. Access authorization is granted according to Device
2990 owner privileges only.

2991 – The SRM asserts a Client-directed operational mode (e.g. "/pstat.om"=4).

2992 The provisioning mode type is a 16-bit mask enumerating the various Device provisioning modes.
2993 "{ProvisioningMode}" should be used in this document to refer to an instance of a provisioning
2994 mode without selecting any particular value.

2995 "oic.sec.dpmttype" is defined in Table 39.

2996 **Table 39 – Definition of the "oic.sec.dpmttype" Property**

Type Name	Type URN	Description
Device Provisioning Mode	oic.sec.dpmttype	Device provisioning mode is a 16-bit bitmask describing various provisioning modes

2997 Table 40 and Table 41 define the values of "oic.sec.dpmttype".

2998 **Table 40 – Value Definition of the "oic.sec.dpmttype" Property (Low-Byte)**

Value	Device Mode	Description
bx0000,0001 (1)	Deprecated	
bx0000,0010 (2)	Deprecated	
bx0000,0100 (4)	Deprecated	
bx0000,1000 (8)	Deprecated	
bx0001,0000 (16)	Deprecated	
bx0010,0000 (32)	Deprecated	
bx0100,0000 (64)	Initiate Software Version Validation	Software version validation requested/pending (1) Software version validation complete (0) Requires software download to verify integrity of software package
bx1000,0000 (128)	Initiate Secure Software Update	Secure software update requested/pending (1) Secure software update complete (0)

2999 **Table 41 – Value Definition of the "oic.sec.dpmttype" Property (High-Byte)**

Value	Device Mode	Description
bx0000,0001 (1)	Initiate Software Availability Check	Checks if new software is available on remote endpoint. Does not require to download software. Methods used are out of bound.
Bits 2-8	<Reserved>	Reserved for later use

3000 The provisioning operation mode type is an 8-bit mask enumerating the various provisioning
3001 operation modes.

3002 "oic.sec.pomtype" is defined in Table 42.

3003 **Table 42 – Definition of the "oic.sec.pomtype" Property**

Type Name	Type URN	Description
Device Provisioning OperationMode	oic.sec.pomtype	Device provisioning operation mode is a 8-bit bitmask describing various provisioning operation modes

3004 Table 43 defines the values of "oic.sec.pomtype".

3005

Table 43 – Value Definition of the "oic.sec.pomtype" Property

Value	Operation Mode	Description
bx0000,0001 (1)	Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning services	Deprecated
bx0000,0010 (2)	Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service	Deprecated
bx0000,0100 (4)	Client-directed provisioning	Device supports provisioning service control of this Device's provisioning operations. This bit is always TRUE.
bx0000,1000(8) – bx1000,0000(128)	<Reserved>	Reserved for later use
bx1111,11xx	<Reserved>	Reserved for later use

3006 **13.9 Certificate Signing Request Resource**

3007 The "/oic/sec/csr" Resource is used by a Device to provide its desired identity, public key to be
 3008 certified, and a proof of possession of the corresponding private key in the form of a IETF RFC
 3009 2986 PKCS#10 Certification Request. If the Device supports certificates (i.e. the "sct" Property of
 3010 "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource has a 1 in the 0x8 bit position), the Device shall have a "/oic/sec/csr"
 3011 Resource.

3012 "/oic/sec/csr" Resource is defined in Table 44.

3013 **Table 44 – Definition of the "/oic/sec/csr" Resource**

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/csr	Certificate Signing Request	oic.r.csr	oic.if.baseline, oic.if.rw	The CSR resource contains a Certificate Signing Request for the Device's public key.	Configuration

3014 Table 45 defines the Properties of "/oic/sec/csr".

3015 **Table 45 – Properties of the "oic.r.csr" Resource**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Certificate Signing Request	csr	String	R	Yes	Contains the signed CSR encoded according to the encoding Property
Encoding	encoding	String	R	Yes	A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in the csr Property "oic.sec.encoding.pem" – Encoding for PEM-encoded certificate signing request

3016 The Device chooses which public key to use, and may optionally generate a new key pair for this
 3017 purpose.

3018 In the CSR, the Common Name component of the Subject Name shall contain a string of the format
 3019 "uuid:X" where X is the Device's requested UUID in the format defined by IETF RFC 4122. The
 3020 Common Name, and other components of the Subject Name, may contain other data. If the Device
 3021 chooses to include additional information in the Common Name component, it shall delimit it from
 3022 the UUID field by white space, a comma, or a semicolon.

3023 If the Device does not have a pre-provisioned key pair to use, but is capable and willing to generate
3024 a new key pair, the Device may begin generation of a key pair as a result of a RETRIEVE of this
3025 resource. If the Device cannot immediately respond to the RETRIEVE request due to time required
3026 to generate a key pair, the Device shall return an "operation pending" error. This indicates to the
3027 Client that the Device is not yet ready to respond, but will be able at a later time. The Client should
3028 retry the request after a short delay.

3029 **13.10 Roles Resource**

3030 The "roles" Resource maintains roles that have been asserted with role certificates, as described
3031 in clause 10.4.2. Asserted roles have an associated public key, i.e., the public key in the role
3032 certificate. Servers shall only grant access to the roles information associated with the public key
3033 of the Client. The roles Resource should be viewed as an extension of the (D)TLS session state.
3034 See 10.4.2 for how role certificates are validated.

3035 The roles Resource shall be created by the Server upon establishment of a secure (D)TLS session
3036 with a Client, if it is not already created. The roles Resource shall only expose a secured OCF
3037 Endpoint in the "/oic/res" response. A Server shall retain the roles Resource at least as long as the
3038 (D)TLS session exists. A Server shall retain each certificate in the roles Resource at least until the
3039 certificate expires or the (D)TLS session ends, whichever is sooner. The requirements of clause
3040 10.3 and 10.4.2 to validate a certificate's time validity at the point of use always apply. A Server
3041 should regularly inspect the contents of the roles resource and purge contents based on a policy it
3042 determines based on its resource constraints. For example, expired certificates, and certificates
3043 from Clients that have not been heard from for some arbitrary period of time could be candidates
3044 for purging.

3045 The OCF namespace ("oic.role.*") is restricted to OCF-defined roles. "oic.role.owner" is an OCF-
3046 defined Role that is intended to provide Resource Owner privileges to multiple Clients in a scalable
3047 way. Servers shall grant access to perform all supported operations in the current Device state
3048 (see clause 8) on all supported SVRs regardless of ACL configuration the Clients asserting
3049 "oic.role.owner" Role. Servers shall reject assertion of any Role, which starts with "oic.role.", but
3050 is not one of the following Roles:

3051 – "oic.role.owner"

3052 The "roles" Resource is implicitly created by the Server upon establishment of a (D)TLS session.
3053 In more detail, the RETRIEVE, UPDATE and DELETE operations on the roles Resource shall
3054 behave as follows. Unlisted operations are implementation specific and not reliable.

- 3055 1) A RETRIEVE request shall return all previously asserted roles associated with the currently
3056 connected and authenticated Client's identity. RETRIEVE requests with a "credid" query
3057 parameter is not supported; all previously asserted roles associated with the currently
3058 connected and authenticated Client's identity are returned.
- 3059 2) An UPDATE request that includes the "roles" Property shall replace or add to the Properties
3060 included in the array as follows:
- 3061 a) If either the "publicdata" or the "optionaldata" are different than the existing entries in the
3062 "roles" array, the entry shall be added to the "roles" array with a new, unique "credid" value.
- 3063 b) If both the "publicdata" and the "optionaldata" match an existing entry in the "roles" array,
3064 the entry shall be considered to be the same. The Server shall reply with a 2.04 Changed
3065 response and a duplicate entry shall not be added to the array.
- 3066 c) The "credid" Property is optional in an UPDATE request and if included, it may be ignored
3067 by the Server. The Server shall assign a unique "credid" value for every entry of the "roles"
3068 array.

3) A DELETE request without a "credid" query parameter shall remove all entries from the "/oic/sec/roles" resource array corresponding to the currently connected and authenticated Client's identity.

4) A DELETE request with a "credid" query parameter shall remove only the entries of the "/oic/sec/roles" resource array corresponding to the currently connected and authenticated Client's identity and where the corresponding "credid" matches the entry.

NOTE The "/oic/sec/roles" Resource's use of the DELETE operation is not in accordance with the OCF Interfaces defined in ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018.

See clause 8 for restrictions on the states in which this Resource may be modified.

"/oic/sec/roles" Resource is defined in Table 46.

Table 46 – Definition of the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/roles	Roles	oic.r.roles	oic.if.baseline, oic.if.rw	Resource containing roles that have previously been asserted to this Server	Security

Table 47 defines the Properties of "/oic/sec/roles".

Table 47 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Roles	roles	oic.sec.cred	array	RW	Yes	List of roles previously asserted to this Server

Because "/oic/sec/roles" shares the "oic.sec.cred" schema with "/oic/sec/cred", "subjectuid" is a required Property. However, "subjectuid" is not used in a role certificate. Therefore, a Device may ignore the "subjectuid" Property if the Property is contained in an UPDATE request to the "/oic/sec/roles" Resource.

13.11 Auditable Events List Resource

13.11.1 Auditable Events List Resource General

The "/oic/sec/ael" Resource maintains a list of logged Auditable Events. Every OCF Device logs AEEs filtered according to the values of the "categoryfilter" and "priorityfilter" Properties of "/oic/sec/ael" Resource. All Devices shall have a "/oic/sec/ael" Resource to maintain AEEs. The new AEE shall be added to the "events" Property of "/oic/sec/ael" Resource as the last entry in the array. A Device shall store all AEEs of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource in non-volatile memory. A Device shall be able to store at least 1 AEE.

The "categoryfilter" Property determines what categories of AEEs are to be logged. The "categoryfilter" Property is an integer value which is a composition of bitmasks. A Device shall log all AEEs filtered by this value. If the "categoryfilter" is either set to 0xff or is not set, then the Device shall log AEEs of all categories. Refer to Table 49 for more details.

The "priorityfilter" Property determines the lowest priority of AEE to be logged. A smaller value means higher priority. The AEEs whose "priority" Property values are equal to or smaller than this value shall be logged. If the "priorityfilter" Property is either set to the highest priority or is not set, then the Device shall log all AEEs. No matter what value is set to "priorityfilter", an AEE of CRIT (== 0) "priority" shall always be logged. Refer to Table 49 for more details.

When an AEE is added, the "usedspace" Property shall be updated to reflect the total storage used by all logged events. When the reserved storage for AEEs is full, the oldest AEE shall be purged.

A Device logs a new AEE as follows:

```

3105 5) If a new AEE is not filtered by "categoryfilter" and "priorityfilter", then it is dropped.
3106     /* c-like pseudo code */
3107     If ((categoryfilter & new_aee->category) && (priorityfilter >= new_aee->priority))
3108     {
3109         addAEE(new_aee);
3110     }
3111     else
3112     {
3113         free(new_aee);
3114     }
3115
3116 6) If the value of "usedspace" Property is equal to, or the sum of the "usedspace" Property value
3117    and the size of the new AEE is bigger than the value of the "maxspace" Property of "/oic/sec/ael"
3118    Resource, then:
3119
3120    a) Remove the oldest AEE continuously while the sum of the "usedspace" Property value and
3121       the size of the new AEE is bigger than the "maxspace" Property value.
3122
3123     /* c-like pseudo code */
3124     Int addAEE(AEEtype *new_aee)
3125     {
3126         While ((usespace + new_aee->size) > maxspace)
3127         {
3128             /* purgeAEE() returns the size of purged AEE */
3129             sizeofPurgedAEE = purgeAEE();
3130             usedspace -= sizeofPurgedAEE;
3131         }
3132         ...
3133         ...
3134     }
3135
3136 7) Add the new AEE to the "events" array Property of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource as the last entry
3137    in the array.
3138
3139 8) Increase the value of the "usedspace" Property by the size of the new AEE.
3140
3141 In order to provide a mechanism which allows management of the "events" array Property, the
3142 RETRIEVE and UPDATE operations on the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource shall behave as follows:
3143
3144 9) A RETRIEVE operation shall return the full Resource representation.
3145
3146 10) An UPDATE operation may set the "categoryfilter" and/or "priorityfilter" Properties.
3147
3148 The "/oic/sec/ael" Resource is defined in Table 48.

```

Table 48 – Definition of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
/oic/sec/ael	Auditable Event List	oic.r.ael	oic.if.baseline, oic.if.rw	Resource for storing AEEs	Security

3143

3144 Table 49 defines the Properties of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource.

Table 49 – Properties of the "/oic/sec/ael" Resource

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Man dato ry	Device State	Acc ess Mo de	Description
AEE list	"events"	"array"	Array of "oic.sec.aee" entries	Yes	RESET	R	The Device clears
					RFOTM	R	This list stores AEEs whose "category" Property value is filtered by "categoryfilter" Property and "priority" Property value is equal or less than the value of "priorityfilter" Property.
					RFPRO		
					RFNOP		
					SRESET		
current used storage size	"usedspace"	"integer"	>= 0 (default: 0)	Yes	RESET	R	The Device sets to 0
					RFOTM	R	Current used space for logged AEEs. The Device updates this Property whenever new AEEs are logged.
					RFPRO		
					RFNOP		
					SRESET		
maximum allowed storage size for AEEs	"maxspace"	"integer"	> 0	Yes		R	This means the maximum allowable storage size for AEEs that can be stored in "events" list. The Manufacturer chooses this value.
unit for storage size	"unit"	"string"	enum ["Kbyte", "Byte"] (default: "Byte")	No		R	The unit for "usedspace" and "maxspace" Properties. The Manufacturer chooses this value.
Categories of AEE to be logged	"categoryfilter"	"integer"	bitmask (default: 0xff)	No	RESET	R	The Device sets to the manufacturer default value
					RFOTM	RW	This value decides what categories of AEEs are to be logged. Meaning of each bit: • 0x01 (Access Control) • 0x02 (Onboarding) • 0x04 (Device) • 0x08 (Authentication) • 0x10 (SVR Modification) • 0x20 (Cloud) • 0x40 (Communication) • 0x80 (Reserved) e.g.) if "categoryfilter" == 0xff: log all events of all categories e.g.) if "categoryfilter" == 0x03: log all events of 'AC' (== 0x01) and 'OB' (==0x02) categories
					RFPRO		
					RFNOP	R	
					SRESET	RW	
Minimum priority of AEEs to be logged	"priorityfilter"	"integer"	enum [0, 1, 2, 3, 4] (default: 4)	No	RESET	R	Device sets to manufacturer default value
					RFOTM	RW	The AEEs whose "priority" values are equal to or smaller than this value are

					RFPRO		logged. A smaller value means a higher priority. Meaning of each value: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 0 (CRIT) • 1 (ERR) • 2 (WARN) • 3 (INFO) • 4 (DEBUG) e.g.) if "priorityfilter" is set to DEBUG (==4) all AEEs will be logged e.g.) if "priorityfilter" is set to 1, CRIT (==0) and ERR (==1) SEEs will be logged
					RFNOP	R	
					SRESET	RW	

3146 Table 50 defines the Properties of the "oic.sec.aee" type.

3147 **Table 50 – "oic.sec.aee" data type definition**

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Device State	Description
Auditable Event Identifier	"aaid"	"string"	N/A	R	Yes	-	Identity of the logged event
Value of "rt"	"devicetype"	"array"	Array of strings	R	No	-	The "rt" value of "/oic/d" of the Server which logged this AEE.
Device ID	"di"	"uuid"	N/A	R	No	-	The Device ID of the Server which logged this AEE.
Category of AEE	"category"	"integer"	enum [1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128]	R	Yes	-	The category of this AEE: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 0x01 (Access Control) • 0x02 (Onboarding) • 0x04 (Device) • 0x08 (Authentication) • 0x10 (SVR Modification) • 0x20 (Cloud) • 0x40 (Communication) • 0x80 (Reserved)
Priority of AEE	"priority"	"integer"	enum [0, 1, 2, 3, 4]	R	Yes	-	The priority of this AEE: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 0 (CRIT) • 1 (ERR) • 2 (WARN) • 3 (INFO) • 4 (DEBUG)
Time stamp	"timestamp"	"string"	date-time (RFC3339 section 5.6)	R	Yes	-	The time when the AEE occurred
Event message	"message"	"string"	N/A	R	No	-	The description of the logged AEE.
Auxiliary info	"auxiliaryinfo"	"array"	Array of strings	R	No	-	Supplementary information for the "message" Property

							e.g.) URI of specific Resource in ACE2
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

3148 OCF-defined AEEs are listed in Table XX, and each such AEE has its own values for the "category"
3149 and "priority" Properties.

3150 The "timestamp" Property follows a full-date and partial-time format of RFC3339. Every new AEE
3151 shall have a later timestamp than the latest previously logged AEE.

3152 The "auxiliaryinfo" Property provides supplementary info which is not covered by the description in
3153 "message" Property. For example, the URI of specific Resource in ACE2 could be "auxiliaryinfo"
3154 for "Access Denied" AEE. Please see Table XX "List of Auditable Events".**Account Resource –**
3155 **moved to OCF Cloud Security document**

3156 This clause is intentionally left blank.

3157 **13.13 Account Session Resource – moved to OCF Cloud Security document**

3158 This clause is intentionally left blank.

3159 **13.14 Account Token Refresh Resource – moved to OCF Cloud Security document**

3160 This clause is intentionally left blank.

3161 **13.15 Security Virtual Resources (SVRs) and Access Policy**

3162 The SVRs expose the security-related Properties of the Device.

3163 Granting access requests (RETRIEVE, UPDATE, DELETE, etc.) for these SVRs to unauthenticated
3164 (anonymous) Clients could create privacy or security concerns.

3165 For example, when the Device onboarding State is RFOTM, it is necessary to grant requests for
3166 the "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource to anonymous requesters, so that the Device can be discovered and
3167 onboarded by an OBT. Subsequently, it might be preferable to deny requests for the
3168 "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource to anonymous requesters, to preserve privacy.

3169 **13.16 SVRs, Discoverability and OCF Endpoints**

3170 All implemented SVRs shall be "discoverable" (reference ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018, Policy Parameter
3171 clause 7.8.2.1.2).

3172 All implemented discoverable SVRs shall expose a Secure OCF Endpoint (e.g. CoAPS) (reference
3173 ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018, clause 10).

3174 The "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource shall expose an Unsecure OCF Endpoint (e.g. CoAP) in RFOTM
3175 (reference ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018, clause 10).

3176 **13.17 Additional Privacy Consideration for Core Resources**

3177 Unique immutable identifiers are a privacy consideration due to their potential for being used as a
3178 tracking mechanism. These include the following Resources and Properties:

3179 – "/oic/d" Resource containing the "piid" Property.

3180 – "/oic/p" Resource containing the "pi" Property.

3181 These identifiers are unique values that are visible at various times throughout the Device lifecycle
3182 by anonymous requestors. This implies any Client Device, including those with malicious intent,
3183 are able to reliably obtain identifiers useful for building a log of activity correlated with a specific
3184 Platform and Device.

3185 The "di" Property in the "/oic/d" Resource shall mirror that of the "deviceuuid" Property of the
3186 "/oic/sec/doxm" Resource. The DOTS should provision an ACL policy that restricts access to the
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3187 "/oic/d" resource such that only authenticated Clients are able to obtain the "di" Property of "/oic/d"
3188 Resource. See clause 13.1 for deviceuuid Property lifecycle requirements.

3189 Servers should expose a temporary, non-repeated, "piid" Property of "/oic/d" Resource Value upon
3190 entering RESET Device state. Servers shall expose a persistent value via the "piid" Property of
3191 "/oic/d" Property when the DOTS sets "devowneruuid" Property to a non-nil-UUID value. The DOTS
3192 should provision an ACL policy on the "/oic/d" Resource such that only authenticated Clients are
3193 able to obtain the "piid" Property of "/oic/d" Resource

3194 Servers should expose a temporary, non-repeated, "pi" Property value upon entering RESET
3195 Device state. Servers shall expose a persistent value via the "pi" Property of the "/oic/p" Resource
3196 when the DOTS sets "devowneruuid" Property to a non-nil-UUID value. The DOTS should provision
3197 an ACL policy on the "/oic/p" Resource such that only authenticated Clients are able to obtain the
3198 "pi" Property.

3199 Table 51 depicts Core Resource Properties Access Modes given various Device States.

3200 **Table 51 – Core Resource Properties Access Modes given various Device States**

Resource Type	Property title	Property name	Value type	Access Mode		Behaviour
oic.wk.p	Platform ID	pi	oic.types-schema.uuid	All States	R	Server exposes a temporary random UUID when in RESET state.
oic.wk.d	Permanent Immutable ID	piid	oic.types-schema.uuid	All States	R	Server exposes a temporary random UUID when in RESET state.
oic.wk.d	Device Identifier	di	oic.types-schema.uuid	All states	R	/d di mirrors the value contained in "/doxm" "deviceuuid" in all device states.

3201 **13.18 Easy Setup Resource Device State**

3202 This clause only applies to a new Device that uses Easy Setup for ownership transfer as defined
3203 in OCF Wi-Fi Easy Setup. Easy Setup has no impact to new Devices that have a different way of
3204 connecting to the network i.e. DOTS and AMS don't use a Soft AP to connect to non-Easy Setup
3205 Devices.

3206 Figure 23 shows an example of Soft AP and Easy Setup Resource in different Device states.




Figure 23 – Example of Soft AP and Easy Setup Resource in different Device states

Device enters RFOTM Device state, Soft AP may be accessible in RFOTM and RFPRO Device's state.

While it is reasonable for a user to expect that power cycling a new Device will turn on the Soft AP for Easy Setup during the initial setup, since that is potentially how it behaved on first boot, it is a security risk to make this the default behaviour of a device that remains unenrolled beyond a reasonable period after first boot.

Therefore, the Soft AP for Easy Setup has several requirements to improve security:

- Time availability of Easy Setup Soft AP should be minimised, and shall not exceed 30 minutes after Device factory reset RESET or first power boot, or when user initiates the Soft AP for Easy Setup.
- If a new Device tried and failed to complete Easy Setup Enrolment immediately following the first boot, or after a factory reset, it may turn the Easy Setup Soft AP back on automatically for another 30 minutes upon being power cycled, provided that the power cycle occurs within 3 hours of first boot or the most recent factory reset. If the user has initiated the Easy Setup Soft AP directly without a factory reset, it is not necessary to turn it back on if it was on immediately prior to power cycle, because the user obviously knows how to initiate the process manually.
- After 3 hours from first boot or factory reset without successfully enrolling the device, the Soft AP should not turn back on for Easy Setup until another factory reset occurs, or the user initiates the Easy Setup Soft AP directly.
- Easy Setup Soft AP may stay enabled during RFNOP, until the Mediator instructs the new Device to connect to the Enroller.
- The Easy Setup Soft AP shall be disabled when the new Device successfully connects to the Enroller.
- Once a new Device has successfully connected to the Enroller, it shall not turn the Easy Setup Soft AP back on for Easy Setup Enrolment again unless the Device is factory reset, or the user initiates the Easy Setup Soft AP directly.
- Just Works OTM shall not be enabled on Devices which support Easy Setup.
- The Soft AP shall be secured (e.g. shall not expose an open AP).

3237 – The Soft AP shall support a passphrase for connection by the Mediator, and the passphrase
3238 shall be between 8 and 64 ASCII printable characters. The passphrase may be printed on
3239 a label, sticker, packaging etc., and may be entered by the user into the Mediator device.

3240 – The Soft AP should not use a common passphrase across multiple Devices. Instead, the
3241 passphrase may be sufficiently unique per device, to prevent guessing of the passphrase by an
3242 attacker with knowledge of the Device type, model, manufacturer, or any other information
3243 discoverable through Device's exposed interfaces.

3244 The Enrollee shall support WPA2 security (i.e. shall list WPA2 in the "swat" Property of the
3245 "/example/WiFiConfResURI" Resource), for potential selection by the Mediator in connecting the
3246 Enrollee to the Enroller. The Mediator should select the best security available on the Enroller, for
3247 use in connecting the Enrollee to the Enroller.

3248 The Enrollee may not expose any interfaces (e.g. web server, debug port, NCRs, etc.) over the
3249 Soft AP, other than SVRs, and Resources required for Wi-Fi Easy Setup.

3250 The "/example/EasySetupResURI" Resource should not be discoverable in RFOTM or SRESET
3251 state. After ownership transfer process is completed with the DOTS, and the Device enters in
3252 RFPRO Device state, the "/example/EasySetupResURI" may be Discoverable.

3253 The OTM CoAPS session may be used by Mediator for connection over Soft AP for ownership
3254 transfer and initial Easy Setup provisioning. SoftAP or regular network connection may be used by
3255 AMS for "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource provisioning in RFPRO state. The CoAPS session authentication
3256 and encryption is already defined in the Security spec.

3257 In RFPRO state, AMS is expected to configure ACL2 Resource on the Device with ACE2 for
3258 following Resources to be only configurable by the Mediator with permission to UPDATE or
3259 RETRIEVE access:

- 3260 – "/example/EasySetupResURI"
- 3261 – "/example/WifiConfResURI"
- 3262 – "/example/DevConfResURI"

3263 An ACE2 granting RETRIEVE or UPDATE access to the Easy Setup Resource

```

3264 {
3265     "subject": { "uuid": "<insert-UUID-of-Mediator>" },
3266     "resources": [
3267         { "href": "/example/EasySetupResURI" },
3268         { "href": "/example/WiFiConfResURI" },
3269         { "href": "/example/DevConfResURI" },
3270     ],
3271     "permission": 6 // RETRIEVE (2) or UPDATE and RETRIEVE(6)
3272 }

```

3273 ACE2 may be re-configured after Easy Setup process. These ACE2s should be installed prior to
3274 the Mediator performing any RETRIEVE/UPDATE operations on these Resources.

3275 In RFPRO or RFNOP, the Mediator should discover /EasySetupResURI Resources and UPDATE
3276 these Resources. The Mediator may UPDATE /EasySetupResURI resources in RFNOP Device
3277 state.

3278 A Mediator shall be hosted on an OCF Device.

13.20 List of Auditable Events

Whenever a Device detects an occurrence of any of the Auditable Events in Table XX, then the Device shall log an AEE using the corresponding "category", "priority" and "auxiliaryinfo" Properties defined in Table 52. The "auxiliaryinfo" Property shall contain the entries in the "auxiliaryinfo" column of Table 52 in the order specified in the table with each bullet contained in a separate array entry. The "auxiliaryinfo" Property may contain additional entries for further information following the entries for mandatory information. The "aeid" Property shall include the corresponding Auditable Event Identifier from Table 52.

Table 52 – List of mandatory Auditable Events and corresponding Property values

Auditable Event Identifier ("aeid")	Auditable Event Description	Example "message"	"category"	"priority"	"auxiliaryinfo"
AC-1	A Device received a request from an authenticated Client with valid URI path, valid interface and valid operation for that resource, but for which access was denied.	"Access Denied"	0x01 (Access Control)	2 (WARN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Client IP address & port in format [xxxx:...:xxxx]:xxxx Client UUID in UUID format (e.g. "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000") Resource URI (e.g. "/oic/sec/ael") Requested CRUDN operation (e.g. "CREATE") Server security state (e.g. "RFNOP") Asserted roles by Client (e.g. "oic.role.owner"), or "No roles asserted" if there are none
AUTH-1	The Device encountered an error during a DTLS handshaking procedure due to a credential validation failure.	"DTLS handshake failed due to a credential validation failure"	0x08 (Authentication)	1 (ERR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Client IP address & port in format [xxxx:...:xxxx]:xxxx
COMM-1	The Device received a CoAP request which contained unexpected /unsupported CoAP header parameters or unexpected/unsupported CoAP options.	"Unexpected CoAP Command"	0x40 (COMM)	2 (WARN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Client IP address & port in format [xxxx:...:xxxx]:xxxx Hex-encoded CoAP header in format [xx:xx:xx:xx] Hex-encoded CoAP options except payload (empty if not present)

Whenever a Device detects an occurrence of any of the Auditable Events in Table 53, then the Device should log an AEE using the corresponding "category", "priority" and "auxiliaryinfo" Properties defined in Table 53. The "auxiliaryinfo" Property shall contain the entries in the "auxiliaryinfo" column of Table 53 in the order specified in the table with each bullet contained in a separate array entry. The "auxiliaryinfo" Property may contain additional entries for further information following the entries for mandatory information. The "aeid" Property shall include the corresponding Auditable Event Identifier from Table 53.

Table 53 – List of recommended Auditable Events and corresponding Property values

Auditable Event Identifier	Auditable Event Description	Example "message"	"category"	"priority"	"auxiliaryinfo"
SVR-1	The Device's attempted to use one of its	"My credential is expired"	0x10 (SVR Modification)	2 (WARN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> credid

	credentials, and detected that the credential is expired				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Credential expiration value
SVR-2	The Device could not validate the role certificate being asserted	"Role assertion failed"	0x10 (SVR Modification)	2 (WARN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Client IP address & port in format [xxxx:...:xxxx]:xxx x

3296

3297 **14 Security Hardening Guidelines/ Execution Environment Security**

3298 **14.1 Preamble**

3299 This is an informative clause. Many TGs in OCF have security considerations for their protocols
3300 and environments. These security considerations are addressed through security mechanisms
3301 specified in the security documents for OCF. However, effectiveness of these mechanisms depends
3302 on security robustness of the underlying hardware and software Platform. This clause defines the
3303 components required for execution environment security.

3304 **14.2 Execution Environment Elements**

3305 **14.2.1 Execution Environment Elements General**

3306 Execution environment within a computing Device has many components. To perform security
3307 functions in a robustness manner, each of these components has to be secured as a separate
3308 dimension. For instance, an execution environment performing AES cannot be considered secure
3309 if the input path entering keys into the execution engine is not secured, even though the partitions
3310 of the CPU, performing the AES encryption, operate in isolation from other processes. Different
3311 dimensions referred to as elements of the execution environment are listed below. To qualify as a
3312 secure execution environment (SEE), the corresponding SEE element must qualify as secure.

- 3313 – (Secure) Storage
- 3314 – (Secure) Execution engine
- 3315 – (Trusted) Input/output paths
- 3316 – (Secure) Time Source/clock
- 3317 – (Random) number generator
- 3318 – (Approved) cryptographic algorithms
- 3319 – Hardware Tamper (protection)

3320 NOTE Software security practices (such as those covered by OWASP) are outside scope of this document, as
3321 development of secure code is a practice to be followed by the open source development community. This document will
3322 however address the underlying Platform assistance required for executing software. Examples are secure boot and
3323 secure software upgrade.

3324 Each of the elements above are described in the clauses 14.2.2, 14.2.3, 14.2.4, 14.2.5, 14.2.6,
3325 14.2.7.

3326 **14.2.2 Secure Storage**

3327 **14.2.2.1 Secure Storage General**

3328 Secure storage refers to the physical method of housing sensitive or confidential data ("Sensitive
3329 Data"). Such data could include but not be limited to symmetric or asymmetric private keys,
3330 certificate data, OCF Security Domain access credentials, or personal user information. Sensitive
3331 Data requires that its integrity be maintained, whereas Critical Sensitive Data requires that both its
3332 integrity and confidentiality be maintained.

3333 It is strongly recommended that IoT Device makers provide reasonable protection for Sensitive
3334 Data so that it cannot be accessed by unauthorized Devices, groups or individuals for either
3335 malicious or benign purposes. In addition, since Sensitive Data is often used for authentication and
3336 encryption, it must maintain its integrity against intentional or accidental alteration.

3337 A partial list of Sensitive Data is outlined in Table 54:

Table 54 – Examples of Sensitive Data

Data	Integrity protection	Confidentiality protection
Owner PSK (Symmetric Keys)	Yes	Yes
Service provisioning keys	Yes	Yes
Asymmetric Private Keys	Yes	Yes
Certificate Data and Signed Hashes	Yes	Not required
Public Keys	Yes	Not required
Access credentials (e.g. SSID, passwords, etc.)	Yes	Yes
ECDH/ECDH Dynamic Shared Key	Yes	Yes
Root CA Public Keys	Yes	Not required
Device and Platform IDs	Yes	Not required
Easy Setup Resources	Yes	Yes
Access Token	Yes	Yes

Exact method of protection for secure storage is implementation specific, but typically combinations of hardware and software methods are used.

14.2.2.2 Hardware Secure Storage

Hardware secure storage is recommended for use with critical Sensitive Data such as symmetric and asymmetric private keys, access credentials, and personal private data. Hardware secure storage most often involves semiconductor-based non-volatile memory ("NVRAM") and includes countermeasures for protecting against unauthorized access to Critical Sensitive Data.

Hardware-based secure storage not only stores Sensitive Data in NVRAM, but also provides protection mechanisms to prevent the retrieval of Sensitive Data through physical and/or electronic attacks. It is not necessary to prevent the attacks themselves, but an attempted attack should not result in an unauthorized entity successfully retrieving Sensitive Data.

Protection mechanisms should provide JIL Moderate protection against access to Sensitive Data from attacks that include but are not limited to:

- 1) Physical decapping of chip packages to optically read NVRAM contents
- 2) Physical probing of decapped chip packages to electronically read NVRAM contents
- 3) Probing of power lines or RF emissions to monitor voltage fluctuations to discern the bit patterns of Critical Sensitive Data
- 4) Use of malicious software or firmware to read memory contents at rest or in transit within a microcontroller
- 5) Injection of faults that induce improper Device operation or loss or alteration of Sensitive Data

14.2.2.3 Software Storage

It is generally NOT recommended to rely solely on software and unsecured memory to store Sensitive Data even if it is encrypted. Critical Sensitive Data such as authentication and encryption keys should be housed in hardware secure storage whenever possible.

Sensitive Data stored in volatile and non-volatile memory shall be encrypted using acceptable algorithms to prevent access by unauthorized parties through methods described in 14.2.2.2.

14.2.2.4 Additional Security Guidelines and Best Practices

Some general practices that can help ensure that Sensitive Data is not compromised by various forms of security attacks:

- 1) FIPS Random Number Generator ("RNG") – Insufficient randomness or entropy in the RNG used for authentication challenges can substantially degrade security strength. For this reason, it is recommended that a FIPS 800-90A-compliant RNG with a certified noise source be used for all authentication challenges.
- 2) Secure download and boot – To prevent the loading and execution of malicious software, where it is practical, it is recommended that Secure Download and Secure Boot methods that authenticate a binary's source as well as its contents be used.
- 3) Deprecated algorithms – Algorithms included but not limited to the list below are considered unsecure and shall not be used for any security-related function:
 - a) SHA-1
 - b) MD5
 - c) RC4
 - d) RSA 1024
- 4) Encrypted transmission between blocks or components – Even if critical Sensitive Data is stored in Secure Storage, any use of that data that requires its transmission out of that Secure Storage should be encrypted to prevent eavesdropping by malicious software within an MCU/MPU.
- 5) It is recommended to avoid using wildcard in Subject Id ("*"), when setting up "/oic/sec/cred" Resource entries, since this opens up an identity spoofing opportunity.
- 6) Device vendor understands that it is the Device vendor's responsibility to ensure the Device meets security requirements for its intended uses. As an example, IoTivity is a reference implementation intended to be used as a basis for a product, but IoTivity has not undergone 3rd party security review, penetration testing, etc. Any Device based on IoTivity should undergo appropriate penetration testing and security review prior to sale or deployment.
- 7) Device vendor agrees to publish the expected support lifetime for the Device to OCF and to consumers. Changes should be made to a public and accessible website. Expectations should be clear as to what will be supported and for how long the Device vendor expects to support security updates to the software, operating system, drivers, networking, firmware and hardware of the device.
- 8) Device vendor has not implemented test or debug interfaces on the Device which are operable or which can be enabled which might present an attack vector on the Device which circumvents the interface-level security or access policies of the Device.
- 9) Device vendor understands that if an application running on the Device has access to cryptographic elements such as the private keys or Ownership Credential, then those elements have become vulnerable. If the Device vendor is implementing a Bridge, an OBT, or a Device with access to the Internet beyond the local network, the execution of critical functions should take place within a Trusted or Secure Execution Environment (TEE/SEE).
- 10) Any PINs or fixed passphrases used for onboarding, Wi-Fi Easy Setup, SoftAP management or access, or other security-critical function, should be sufficiently unique (do not duplicate passphrases. The creation of these passphrases or PINS should not be algorithmically deterministic nor should they use insufficient entropy in their creation.
- 11) Ensure that there are no remaining "VENDOR_TODO" items in the source code.

12) If the implementation of this document uses the "Just Works" onboarding method, understand that there is a man-in-the-middle vulnerability during the onboarding process where a malicious party could intercept messages between the device being onboarded and the OBT and could persist, acting as an intermediary with access to message traffic, during the lifetime of that onboarded device. The recommended best practice would be to use an alternate ownership transfer method (OTM) instead of "Just Works".

13) It is recommended that at least one static and dynamic analysis tool¹ be applied to any proposed major production release of the software before its release, and any vulnerabilities resolved.

14.2.3 Secure execution engine

Execution engine is the part of computing Platform that processes security functions, such as cryptographic algorithms or security protocols (e.g. DTLS). Securing the execution engine requires the following

- Isolation of execution of sensitive processes from unauthorized parties/ processes. This includes isolation of CPU caches, and all of execution elements that needed to be considered as part of trusted (crypto) boundary.
- Isolation of data paths into and out of execution engine. For instance, both unencrypted but sensitive data prior to encryption or after decryption, or cryptographic keys used for cryptographic algorithms, such as decryption or signing. See clause 14.2.4 for more details.

14.2.4 Trusted input/output paths

Paths/ ports used for data entry into or export out of trusted/ crypto-boundary needs to be protected. This includes paths into and out secure execution engine and secure memory.

Path protection can be both hardware based (e.g. use of a privileged bus) or software based (using encryption over an untrusted bus).

14.2.5 Secure clock

Many security functions depend on time-sensitive credentials. Examples are time stamped Kerberos tickets, OAuth tokens, X.509 certificates, OSCP response, software upgrades, etc. Lack of secure source of clock can mean an attacker can modify the system clock and fool the validation mechanism. Thus an SEE needs to provide a secure source of time that is protected from tampering. Trustworthiness from security robustness standpoint is not the same as accuracy. Protocols such as NTP can provide rather accurate time sources from the network, but are not immune to attacks. A secure time source on the other hand can be off by seconds or minutes depending on the time-sensitivity of the corresponding security mechanism. Secure time source can be external as long as it is signed by a trusted source and the signature validation in the local Device is a trusted process (e.g. backed by secure boot).

14.2.6 Approved algorithms

An important aspect of security of the entire ecosystem is the robustness of publicly vetted and peer-reviewed (e.g. NIST-approved) cryptographic algorithms. Security is not achieved by obscurity of the cryptographic algorithm. To ensure both interoperability and security, not only widely accepted cryptographic algorithms must be used, but also a list of approved cryptographic functions must be specified explicitly. As new algorithms are NIST approved or old algorithms are deprecated, the list of approved algorithms must be maintained by OCF. All other algorithms (even if they deemed stronger by some parties) must be considered non-approved.

The set of algorithms to be considered for approval are algorithms for

- Hash functions

¹ A general discussion of analysis tools can be found here: <https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/se-static/>

- 3455 – Signature algorithms
 - 3456 – Encryption algorithms
 - 3457 – Key exchange algorithms
 - 3458 – Pseudo Random functions (PRF) used for key derivation
- 3459 This list will be included in this or a separate security robustness rules document and must be
3460 followed for all security specifications within OCF.

3461 **14.2.7 Hardware tamper protection**

3462 Various levels of hardware tamper protection exist. We borrow FIPS 140-2 terminology (not
3463 requirements) regarding tamper protection for cryptographic module

- 3464 – Production-grade (lowest level): this means components that include conformal sealing coating
3465 applied over the module's circuitry to protect against environmental or other physical damage.
3466 This does not however require zeroization of secret material during physical maintenance. This
3467 definition is borrowed from FIPS 140-2 security level 1.
- 3468 – Tamper evident/proof (mid-level), This means the Device shows evidence (through covers,
3469 enclosures, or seals) of an attempted physical tampering. This definition is borrowed from FIPS
3470 140-2 security level 2.
- 3471 – Tamper resistance (highest level), this means there is a response to physical tempering that
3472 typically includes zeroization of sensitive material on the module. This definition is borrowed
3473 from FIPS 140-2 security level 3.

3474 It is difficult of specify quantitative certification test cases for accreditation of these levels. Content
3475 protection regimes usually talk about different tools (widely available, specialized and professional
3476 tools) used to circumvent the hardware protections put in place by manufacturing. If needed, OCF
3477 can follow that model, if and when OCF engage in distributing sensitive key material (e.g. PKI) to
3478 its members.

3479 **14.3 Secure Boot**

3480 **14.3.1 Concept of software module authentication**

3481 In order to ensure that all components of a Device are operating properly and have not been
3482 tampered with, it is best to ensure that the Device is booted properly. There may be multiple stages
3483 of boot. The end result is an application running on top an operating system that takes advantage
3484 of memory, CPU and peripherals through drivers.

3485 The general concept is that each software module is invoked only after cryptographic integrity
3486 verification is complete. The integrity verification relies on the software module having been hashed
3487 (e.g. SHA_1, SHA_256) and then signed with a cryptographic signature algorithm with (e.g. RSA),
3488 with a key that only a signing authority has access to.

3489 Figure 24 depicts software module authentication.




Figure 24 – Software Module Authentication

After the data is signed with the signer’s signing key (a private key), the verification key (the public key corresponding to the private signing key) is provided for later verification. For lower level software modules, such as bootloaders, the signatures and verification keys are inserted inside tamper proof memory, such as one-time programmable memory or TPM. For higher level software modules, such as application software, the signing is typically performed according to the PKCS#7 format IETF RFC 2315, where the signedData format includes both indications for signature algorithm, hash algorithm as well as the signature verification key (or certificate). Secure boot does not require use of PKCS#7 format.

Figure 25 depicts verification software module.




Figure 25 – Verification Software Module

As shown in Figure 26. the verification module first decrypts the signature with the verification key (public key of the signer). The verification module also calculates a hash of the data and then compares the decrypted signature (the original) with the hash of data (actual) and if the two values match, the software module is authentic.




Figure 26 – Software Module Authenticity

14.3.2 Secure Boot process

Depending on the Device implementation, there may be several boot stages. Typically, in a PC/Linux type environment, the first step is to find and run the BIOS code (first-stage bootloader) to find out where the boot code is and then run the boot code (second-stage boot loader). The second stage bootloader is typically the process that loads the operating system (Kernel) and transfers the execution to the where the Kernel code is. Once the Kernel starts, it may load external Kernel modules and drivers.

When performing a secure boot, it is required that the integrity of each boot loader is verified before executing the boot loader stage. As mentioned, while the signature and verification key for the lowest level bootloader is typically stored in tamper-proof memory, the signature and verification key for higher levels should be embedded (but attached in an easily accessible manner) in the data structures software.

14.3.3 Robustness Requirements

14.3.3.1 Robustness General

To qualify as high robustness secure boot process, the signature and hash algorithms shall be one of the approved algorithms, the signature values and the keys used for verification shall be stored in secure storage and the algorithms shall run inside a secure execution environment and the keys shall be provided the SEE over trusted path.

14.3.3.2 Next steps

Develop a list of approved algorithms and data formats

14.4 Attestation

14.5 Software Update

14.5.1 Overview

The Device lifecycle does not end at the point when a Device is shipped from the manufacturer; the distribution, retailing, purchase, installation/onboarding, regular operation, maintenance and end-of-life stages for the Device remain outstanding. It is possible for the Device to require update

during any of these stages, although the most likely times are during onboarding, regular operation and maintenance. The manufacturer shall have a defined policy available to OCF Security Domain Owner (e.g. via a website link) covering handling of any device vulnerabilities, including the software update information (e.g. if and how such updates are provided). This policy shall also cover any post end-of-life or end-of-service vulnerabilities. The aspects of the software include, but are not limited to, firmware, operating system, networking stack, application code, drivers, etc.

14.5.2 Recognition of Current Differences

Different manufacturers approach software update utilizing a collection of tools and strategies: over-the-air or wired USB connections, full or partial replacement of existing software, signed and verified code, attestation of the delivery package, verification of the source of the code, package structures for the software, etc.

It is recommended that manufacturers review their processes and technologies for compliance with industry best-practices that a thorough security review of these takes place and that periodic review continue after the initial architecture has been established.

This document applies to software updates as recommended to be implemented by OCF Devices; it does not have any bearing on the above-mentioned alternative proprietary software update mechanisms. The described steps are being triggered by an OCF Client, the actual implementation of the steps and how the software package is downloaded and upgraded is vendor specific.

The triggers that can be invoked from OCF clients can perform:

- 1) Check if new software is available
- 2) Download and verify the integrity of the software package
- 3) Install the verified software package

The triggers are not sequenced, each trigger can be invoked individually.

The state of the transitions of software update is in Figure 27.




Figure 27 – State transitioning diagram for software download

Table 55 – Description of the software update bits

Bit	TM property	CM property
Bit 9	Initiate Software Availability Check	New Software Available
Bit 7	Initiate Software Version Validation	Valid Software Available
Bit 8	Initiate Secure Software Update	Upgrading

14.5.2.1 Checking availability of new software

Setting the Initiate Software Availability Check bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" Property (see Table 37 of clause 13.8) indicates a request to initiate the process to check if new software is available, e.g. the process whereby the Device checks if a newer software version is available on the external endpoint. Once the Device has determined if a newer software version is available, it sets the Initiate Software Availability Check bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.cm" Property to 1 (TRUE), indicating that new software is available or to 0 (FALSE) if no newer software version is available. See also Table 55 where the bits in property TM indicates that the action is initiated and the CM bits are indicating the result of the action. The Device receiving this trigger is not downloading and not validating the software to determine if new software is available. The version check is determined by the current software version and the software version on the external endpoint. The determination if a software package is newer is vendor defined.

14.5.3 Software Version Validation

Setting the Initiate Software Version Validation bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" Property (see Table 37 of 13.8) indicates a request to initiate the software version validation process, the process whereby the Device validates the software (including firmware, operating system, Device drivers, networking stack, etc.) against a trusted source to see if, at the conclusion of the check, the software update process will need to be triggered (see clause 14.5.4). When the Initiate Software Version Validation bit of "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" is set to 1 (TRUE) by a sufficiently privileged Client, the Device sets the "/oic/sec/pstat.cm" Initiate Software Version Validation bit to 0 and initiates a software version check. Once the Device has determined if a valid software is available, it sets the Initiate Software Version Validation bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.cm" Property to 1 (TRUE) if an update is available or 0 (FALSE) if no update is available. To signal completion of the Software Version Validation process, the Device sets the Initiate Software Version Validation bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" Property back to 0 (FALSE). If the Initiate Software Version Validation bit of "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" is set to 0 (FALSE) by a Client, it has no effect on the validation process. The Software Version Validation process can download the software from the external endpoint to verify the integrity of the software package.

14.5.4 Software Update

Setting the Initiate Secure Software Update bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" Property (see Table 37 of clause 13.8) indicates a request to initiate the software update process. When the Initiate Secure Software Update bit of "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" is set to 1 (TRUE) by a sufficiently privileged Client, the Device sets the "/oic/sec/pstat.cm" Initiate Software Version Validation bit to 0 and initiates a software update process. Once the Device has completed the software update process, it sets the Initiate Secure Software Update bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.cm" Property to 1 (TRUE) if/when the software was successfully updated or 0 (FALSE) if no update was performed. To signal completion of the Secure Software Update process, the Device sets the Initiate Secure Software Update bit in the "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" Property back to 0 (FALSE). If the Initiate Secure Software Update bit of "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" is set to 0 (FALSE) by a Client, it has no effect on the update process.

14.5.4.1 State of Device after software update

The state of all resources implemented in the Device should be the same as after boot, meaning that the software update is not resetting user data and retaining a correct state.

User data of a Device is defined as:

- Retain the SVR states, e.g. the on boarded state, registered clients.
- Retain all created resources
- Retain all stored data of a resource
- For example the preferences stored for the brewing resource ("/oic.r.brewing").

14.5.5 Recommended Usage

The Initiate Secure Software Update bit of "/oic/sec/pstat.tm" should only be set by a Client after the Initiate Software Version Validation check is complete.

The process of updating Device software may involve state changes that affect the Device Operational State ("/oic/sec/pstat.dos"). Devices with an interest in the Device(s) being updated should monitor "/oic/sec/pstat.dos" and be prepared for pending software update(s) to affect Device state(s) prior to completion of the update.

The Device itself may indicate that it is autonomously initiating a software version check/update or that a check/update is complete by setting the "pstat.tm" and "pstat.cm" Initiate Software Version Validation and Secure Software Update bits when starting or completing the version check or update process. As is the case with a Client-initiated update, Clients can be notified that an autonomous version check or software update is pending and/or complete by observing pstat resource changes.

The "oic.r.softwareupdate" Resource Type specifies additional features to control the software update process see core specification.

14.6 Non-OCF Endpoint interoperability

14.7 Security Levels

Security Levels are a way to differentiate Devices based on their security criteria. This need for differentiation is based on the requirements from different verticals such as industrial and health care and may extend into smart home. This differentiation is distinct from Device classification (e.g. IETF RFC 7228)

These categories of security differentiation may include, but is not limited to:

- 1) Security Hardening
- 2) Identity Attestation
- 3) Certificate/Trust
- 4) Onboarding Technique
- 5) Regulatory Compliance
 - a) Data at rest
 - b) Data in transit
- 6) Cipher Suites – Crypto Algorithms & Curves
- 7) Key Length
- 8) Secure Boot/Update

In the future security levels can be used to define interoperability.

The following applies to the OCF Security Specification 1.1:

The current document does not define any other level beyond Security Level 0. All Devices will be designated as Level 0. Future versions may define additional levels.

Additional comments:

- The definition of a given security level will remain unchanged between versions of the document.
- Devices that meet a given level may, or may not, be capable of upgrading to a higher level.
- Devices may be evaluated and re-classified at a higher level if it meets the requirements of the higher level (e.g. if a Device is manufactured under the 1.1 version of the document, and a later

3648 document version defines a security level 1, the Device could be evaluated and classified as
3649 level 1 if it meets level 1 requirements).

3650 – The security levels may need to be visible to the end user.

3651 **14.8 Security Profiles**

3652 **14.8.1 Security Profiles General**

3653 Security Profiles are a way to differentiate OCF Devices based on their security criteria. This need
3654 for differentiation is based on the requirements from different verticals such as industrial and health
3655 care and may extend into smart home. This differentiation is distinct from device classification (e.g.
3656 IETF RFC 7228)

3657 These categories of security differentiation may include, but is not limited to:

3658 1) Security Hardening and assurances criteria

3659 2) Identity Attestation

3660 3) Certificate/Trust

3661 4) Onboarding Technique

3662 5) Regulatory Compliance

3663 a) Data at rest

3664 b) Data in transit

3665 6) Cipher Suites – Crypto Algorithms & Curves

3666 7) Key Length

3667 8) Secure Boot/Update

3668 Each Security Profile definition must specify the version or versions of the OCF Security
3669 Specification(s) that form a baseline set of normative requirements. The profile definition may
3670 include security requirements that supersede baseline requirements (not to relax security
3671 requirements).

3672 Security Profiles have the following properties:

3673 – A given profile definition is not specific to the version of the document that defines it. For
3674 example, the profile may remain constant for subsequent OCF Security Specification versions.

3675 – A specific OCF Device and platform combination may be used to satisfy the security profile.

3676 – Profiles may have overlapping criteria; hence it may be possible to satisfy multiple profiles
3677 simultaneously.

3678 – An OCF Device that satisfied a profile initially may be re-evaluated at a later time and found to
3679 satisfy a different profile (e.g. if a device is manufactured under the 1.1 version of the document,
3680 and a later document version defines a security profile Black, the device could be evaluated
3681 and classified as profile Black if it meets profile Black requirements).

3682 – A machine-readable representation of compliance results specifically describing profiles
3683 satisfied may be used to facilitate OCF Device onboarding. (e.g. a manufacturer certificate or
3684 manifest may contain security profiles attributes).

3685 **14.8.2 Identification of Security Profiles (Normative)**

3686 **14.8.2.1 Security Profiles in Prior Documents**

3687 OCF Devices conforming to versions of the OCF Security Specifications where Security Profiles
3688 Resource was not defined may be presumed to satisfy the "sp-baseline-v0" profile (defined in
3689 14.8.3.3) or may be regarded as unspecified. If Security Profile is unspecified, the Client may use
3690 the OCF Security Specification version to characterize expected security behaviour.

14.8.2.2 Security Profile Resource Definition

The `/oic/sec/sp` Resource is used by the OCF Device to show which OCF Security Profiles the OCF Device is capable of supporting and which are authorized for use by the OCF Security Domain owner. Properties of the Resource identify which OCF Security Profile is currently operational. The `ocfSecurityProfileOID` value type shall represent OID values and may reference an entry in the form of strings (UTF-8).

`/oic/sec/sp` Resource is defined in Table 56.

Table 56 – Definition of the `/oic/sec/sp` Resource

Fixed URI	Resource Type Title	Resource Type ID ("rt" value)	OCF Interfaces	Description	Related Functional Interaction
<code>/oic/sec/sp</code>	Security Profile Resource Definition	<code>oic.r.sp</code>	<code>oic.if.baselin</code> <code>e, oic.if.rw</code>	Resource specifying supported and current security profile(s)	Discoverable

Table 57 defines the Properties of `/oic/sec/sp` Resource.

Table 57 – Properties of the `/oic/sec/sp` Resource

Property Title	Property Name	Value Type	Value Rule	Access Mode	Mandatory	Description
Supported Security Profiles	<code>supportedprofiles</code>	<code>ocfSecurityProfileOID</code>	array	RW	Yes	Array of supported Security Profiles (e.g. ["1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0", "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0"])
SecurityProfile	<code>currentprofile</code>	<code>ocfSecurityProfileOID</code>	N/A	RW	Yes	Currently active Security Profile (e.g. "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0")

The following OIDs are defined to uniquely identify Security Profiles. Future Security Profiles or changes to existing Security Profiles may result in a new `ocfSecurityProfileOID`.

```
id-OCF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
                                private(4) enterprise(1) OCF(51414) }
```

```
id-ocfSecurity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 0 }
```

```
id-ocfSecurityProfile ::= { id-ocfSecurity 0 }
```

```
sp-unspecified ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 0 }
```

```
--The Security Profile is not specified
```

```
sp-baseline ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 1 }
```

```
--This specifies the OCF Baseline Security Profile(s)
```

```
sp-black ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 2 }
```

```
--This specifies the OCF Black Security Profile(s)
```

```
sp-blue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 3 }
```

```
--This specified the OCF Blue Security Profile(s)
```

```
sp-purple ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 4 }
```

```
--This specifies the OCF Purple Security Profile(s)
```

```
--versioned Security Profiles
```

```
sp-unspecified-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID (id-sp-unspecified 0)
```

```
--v0 of unspecified security profile, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.0.0"
```

```
sp-baseline-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-baseline 0}
```

```
--v0 of baseline security profile, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0"
```

```
sp-black-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-black 0}
```

```
--v0 of black security profile, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0"
```

```
sp-blue-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-blue 0}
```

```
--v0 of blue security profile, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0"
```

```
3730     sp-purple-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-purple 0}
3731     --v0 of purple security profile, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.4.0"
3732
3733     ocfSecurityProfileOID ::= UTF8String
3734
```

3735 **14.8.3 Security Profiles**

3736 **14.8.3.1 Security Profiles General**

3737 The Security Profiles Resource shall be pre-populated with manufacturer default values (Refer to
3738 the Security Profile clauses for additional details).

3739 The OCF Conformance criteria may require vendor attestation that establishes the expected
3740 environment in which the OCF Device is hosted (Refer to the Security Profile clauses for specific
3741 requirements).

3742 **14.8.3.2 Security Profile Unspecified (sp-unspecified-v0)**

3743 The Security Profile "sp-unspecified-v0" is reserved for future use.

3744 **14.8.3.3 Security Profile Baseline v0 (sp-baseline-v0)**

3745 The Security Profile "sp-baseline-v0" is defined for all OCF Security Specification versions where
3746 the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource is defined. All Devices shall include the "sp-baseline-v0" OID in the
3747 "supportedprofiles" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource.

3748 It indicates the OCF Device satisfies the normative security requirements for this document.

3749 When a device supports the baseline profile, the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-
3750 baseline-v0, represented by the OID string "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0", and may contain other
3751 profiles.

3752 When a manufacturer makes sp-baseline-v0 the default, by setting the "currentprofile" Property to
3753 "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0", the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-baseline-v0.

3754 **14.8.3.4 Security Profile Black (sp-black-v0)**

3755 **14.8.3.4.1 Black Profile General**

3756 The need for Security Profile Black v0 is to support devices and manufacturers who wish to certify
3757 their devices meeting this specific set of security criteria. A Device may satisfy the Black
3758 requirements as well as requirements of other profiles, the Black Security Profile is not necessarily
3759 mutually exclusive with other Security Profiles unless those requirements conflict with the explicit
3760 requirements of the Black Security Profile.

3761 **14.8.3.4.2 Devices Targeted for Security Profile Black v0**

3762 Security Profile Black devices could include any device a manufacturer wishes to certify at this
3763 profile, but healthcare devices and industrial devices with additional security requirements are the
3764 initial target. Additionally, manufacturers of devices at the edge of the network (or fog), or devices
3765 with exceptional profiles of trust bestowed upon them, may wish to certify at this profile; these types
3766 of devices may include, but are not limited to the following:

- 3767 – Bridges (Mapping devices between ecosystems handling virtual devices from different
3768 ecosystems)
- 3769 – Resource Directories (Devices trusted to manage OCF Security Domain resources)
- 3770 – Remote Access (Devices which have external access but can also act within the OCF Security
3771 Domain)
- 3772 – Healthcare Devices (Devices with specific requirements for enhanced security and privacy)

3773 – Industrial Devices (Devices with advanced management, security and attestation requirements)

3774 **14.8.3.4.3 Requirements for Certification at Security Profile Black (Normative)**

3775 Every device with "currentprofile" Property of the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource designating a Security
3776 Profile of "sp-black-v0", as defined in clause 14.8.2, must support each of the following:

3777 – Onboarding via OCF Rooted Certificate Chain, including PKI chain validation

3778 – Support for AES 128 encryption for data at rest and in transit.

3779 – Hardening minimums: manufacturer assertion of secure credential storage

3780 – In – in enumerated item #10 "The "/oic/sec/cred" Resource should contain credential(s) if
3781 required by the selected OTM" is changed to require the credential be stored: "The
3782 "/oic/sec/cred" Resource shall contain credential(s)."

3783 – The OCF Device shall include an X.509v3 OCF Compliance Extension (clause 9.4.2.2.4) in its
3784 certificate and the extension's 'securityProfile' field shall contain sp-black-v0 represented by
3785 the ocfSecurityProfileOID string, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0".

3786 When a device supports the black profile, the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-black-
3787 v0, represented by the OID string "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0", and may contain other profiles.

3788 When a manufacturer makes sp-black-v0 the default, by setting the "currentprofile" Property to
3789 "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0", the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-black-v0.

3790 The OCF Rooted Certificate Chain and PKI Is defined by and structured within a framework
3791 described in the supporting documents:

3792 – Certificate Profile (See 9.4.2)

3793 – Certificate Policy (see Certificate Policy document:
3794 <https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF%20Certificate%20Policy.pdf>)

3795 **14.8.3.5 Security Profile Blue v0 (sp-blue-v0)**

3796 **14.8.3.5.1 Blue Profile General**

3797 The Security Profile Blue is used when manufacturers issue platform certificates for platforms
3798 containing manufacturer-embedded keys. Compatibility with interoperable trusted platforms is
3799 anticipated using certificate extensions defined by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). OCF
3800 Security Domain owners evaluate manufacturer supplied certificates and attributed data to
3801 determine an appropriate OCF Security Profile that is configured for OCF Devices at onboarding.
3802 OCF Devices may satisfy multiple OCF Security Profiles. The OCF Security Domain owner may
3803 configure deployments using the Security Profile as OCF Security Domain partitioning criteria.

3804 Certificates issued to Blue Profile Devices shall be issued by a CA conforming to the CA Vetting
3805 Criteria defined by OCF.

3806 **14.8.3.5.2 Platforms and Devices for Security Profile Blue v0**

3807 The OCF Security Profile Blue anticipates an ecosystem where platform vendors may differ from
3808 OCF Device vendor and where platform vendors may implement trusted platforms that may conform
3809 to industry standards defining trusted platforms. The OCF Security Profile Blue specifies
3810 mechanisms for linking platforms with OCF Device(s) and for referencing quality assurance criteria
3811 produced by OCF conformance operations. The OCF Security Domain owner evaluates these data
3812 when an OCF Device is onboarded into the OCF Security Domain. Based on this evaluation the
3813 OCF Security Domain owner determines which Security Profile may be applied during OCF Device
3814 operation. All OCF Device types may be considered for evaluation using the OCF Security Profile
3815 Blue.

14.8.3.5.3 Requirements for Certification at Security Profile Blue v0

The OCF Device satisfies the Blue profile v0 (sp-blue-v0) when all of the security normative for this document version are satisfied and the following additional criteria are satisfied.

OCF Blue profile defines the following OCF Device quality assurances:

- The OCF Conformance criteria shall require vendor attestation that the conformant OCF Device was hosted on one or more platforms that satisfies OCF Blue platform security assurances and platform security and privacy functionality requirements.
- The OCF Device achieving OCF Blue Security Profile compliance will be registered by OCF and published by OCF in a machine readable format.
- The OCF Blue Security Profile compliance registry may be digitally signed by an OCF owned signing key.
- The OCF Device shall include an X.509v3 OCF Compliance Extension (clause 9.4.2.2.4) in its certificate and the extension's 'securityProfile' field shall contain sp-blue-v0 represented by the ocfSecurityProfileOID string, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0".
- The OCF Device shall include an X.509v3 OCF CPL Attributes Extension (clause 9.4.2.2.7) in its certificate.
- The DOTS is expected to perform a lookup of the certification status of the OCF Device using the OCF CPL Attributes Extension values and verify that the sp-blue-v0 OID is listed in the extension's "securityprofiles" field.

OCF Blue profile defines the following OCF Device security functionality:

- OCF Device(s) shall be hosted on a platform where a cryptographic and secure storage functions are hardened by the platform.
- OCF Device(s) hosted on a platform shall expose accompanying manufacturer credentials using the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource where the "credusage" Property contains the value "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert".
- OCF Device(s) that are hosted on a TCG-defined trusted platform should use an IEEE802.1AR IDevID and should verify the "TCG Endorsement Key Credential". All TCG-defined manufacturer credentials may be identified by the "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert" value of the "credusage" Property of the "/oic/sec/cred" Resource. They may be used in response to selection of the "oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert" owner transfer method.
- OCF Device(s) shall use AES128 equivalent minimum protection for transmitted data. (See NIST SP 800-57).
- OCF Device(s) shall use AES128 equivalent minimum protection for stored data. (See NIST SP 800-57).
- OCF Device(s) should use AES256 equivalent minimum protection for stored data. (See NIST SP 800-57).
- OCF Device(s) should protect the "/oic/sec/cred" resource using the platform provided secure storage.
- OCF Device(s) shall protect trust anchors (aka policy defining trusted CAs and pinned certificates) using platform provided secure storage.
- OCF Device(s) should check certificate revocation status for locally issued certificates.
- The DOTS is expected to check certificate revocation status for all certificates in manufacturer certificate path(s) if available. If a certificate is revoked, certificate validation fails and the connection is refused. The DOTS may disregard revocation status results if unavailable.

OCF Blue profile defines the following platform security assurances:

3861 – Platforms implementing cryptographic service provider (CSP) functionality and secure storage
3862 functionality should be evaluated with a minimum FIPS140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL
3863 Level 2.

3864 – Platforms implementing trusted platform functionality should be evaluated with a minimum
3865 Common Criteria EAL Level 1.

3866 OCF Blue profile defines the following platform security and privacy functionality:

3867 – The Platform shall implement cryptographic service provider (CSP) functionality.

3868 – Platform CSP functionality shall include cryptographic algorithms, random number generation,
3869 secure time.

3870 – The Platform shall implement AES128 equivalent protection for transmitted data. (See NIST SP
3871 800-57).

3872 – The Platform shall implement AES128 and AES256 equivalent protection for stored data. (See
3873 NIST SP 800-57).

3874 – Platforms hosting OCF Device(s) should implement a platform identifier following IEEE802.1AR
3875 or Trusted Computing Group(TCG) specifications.

3876 – Platforms based on Trusted Computing Group (TCG) platform definition that host OCF Device(s)
3877 should supply TCG-defined manufacture certificates; also known as "TCG Endorsement Key
3878 Credential" (which complies with IETF RFC 5280) and "TCG Platform Credential" (which
3879 complies with IETF RFC 5755).

3880 When a device supports the blue profile, the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-blue-v0,
3881 represented by the OID string "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0", and may contain other profiles.

3882 When a manufacturer makes sp-blue-v0 the default, by setting the "currentprofile" Property to
3883 "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.3.0", the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-blue-v0.

3884 During onboarding, while the device state is RFOTM, the DOTS may update the "currentprofile"
3885 Property to one of the other values found in the "supportedprofiles" Property.

3886 **14.8.3.6 Security Profile Purple v0 (sp-purple-v0)**

3887 Every device with the "/oic/sec/sp" Resource designating "sp-purple-v0", as defined in clause
3888 14.8.2 must support following minimum requirements

3889 – Hardening minimums: secure credential storage, software integrity validation, secure update.

3890 – If a Certificate is used, the OCF Device shall include an X.509v3 OCF Compliance Extension
3891 (clause 9.4.2.2.4) in its certificate and the extension's 'securityProfile' field shall contain sp-
3892 purple-v0 represented by the ocfSecurityProfileOID string, "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.4.0"

3893 – The OCF Device shall include a X.509v3 OCF CPLAttributes Extension (clause 9.4.2.2.7) in its
3894 End-Entity Certificate when manufacturer certificate is used.

3895 Security Profile Purple has following optional security hardening requirements that the device can
3896 additionally support.

3897 – Hardening additions: secure boot, hardware backed secure storage

3898 – The OCF Device shall include a X.509v3 OCF SecurityClaims Extension (clause 9.4.2.2.6) in its
3899 End-Entity Certificate and it shall include corresponding OIDs to the hardening additions
3900 implemented and attested by the vendor. If there is no additional support for hardening
3901 requirements, X.509v3 OCF SecurityClaims Extension shall be omitted.

3902 For software integrity validation, OCF Device(s) shall provide the integrity validation mechanism
3903 for security critical executables such as cryptographic modules or secure service applications, and
3904 they should be validated before the execution. The key used for validating the integrity must be
3905 pinned at the least to the validating software module.

3906 For secure update, OCF Device(s) shall be able to update its firmware in a secure manner.

3907 For secure boot, OCF Device(s) shall implement the BIOS code (first-stage bootloader on ROM) to
3908 be executed by the processor on power-on, and secure boot parameters to be provisioned by
3909 tamper-proof memory. Also OCF Device(s) shall provide software module authentication for the
3910 security critical executables and stop the boot process if any integrity of them is compromised.

3911 For hardware backed secure storage, OCF Device(s) shall store sensitive data in non-volatile
3912 memory ("NVRAM") and prevent the retrieval of sensitive data through physical and/or electronic
3913 attacks.

3914 More details on security hardening guidelines for software integrity validation, secure boot, secure
3915 update, and hardware backed secure storage are described in 14.3, 14.5 and 14.2.2.2.

3916 Certificates issued to Purple Profile Devices shall be issued by a CA conforming to the CA Vetting
3917 Criteria defined by OCF.

3918 When a device supports the purple profile, the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-purple-
3919 v0, represented by the OID string "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.4.0", and may contain other profiles.

3920 When a manufacturer makes sp-purple-v0 the default, by setting the "currentprofile" Property to
3921 "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.4.0", the "supportedprofiles" Property shall contain sp-purple-v0.

3922 **15 Device Type Specific Requirements**

3923 **15.1 Bridging Security**

3924 **15.1.1 Universal Requirements for Bridging to another Ecosystem**

3925 The Bridge shall go through OCF ownership transfer as any other onboarder would.

3926 The software of a Bridge shall be field updatable. (This requirement need not be tested but can be
3927 certified via a vendor declaration.)

3928 Each VOD shall be onboarded by an OCF OBT. Each Virtual Bridged Device should be provisioned
3929 as appropriate in the Bridged Protocol. In other words, VODs and Virtual Bridged Devices are
3930 treated the same way as physical Devices. They are entities that have to be provisioned in their
3931 network.

3932 Each VOD shall implement the behaviour required by ISO/IEC 30118-1:2018 and this document.
3933 Each VOD shall perform authentication, access control, and encryption according to the security
3934 settings it received from the OCF OBT. Each Virtual Bridged Device shall implement the security
3935 requirements of the Bridged Protocol.

3936 In addition, in order to be considered secure from an OCF perspective, the Bridge Platform shall
3937 use appropriate ecosystem-specific security options for communication between the Virtual Bridged
3938 Devices instantiated by the Bridge and Bridged Devices. This security shall include mutual
3939 authentication, and encryption and integrity protection of messages in the bridged ecosystem.

3940 A VOD may authenticate itself to the DOTS using the Manufacturer Certificate Based OTM (see
3941 clause 7.3.6) with the Manufacturer Certificate and corresponding private key of the Bridge which
3942 instantiated that VOD.

3943 A VOD may authenticate itself to the OCF Cloud using the Manufacturer Certificate and
3944 corresponding private key of the Bridge which instantiated that VOD.

3945 A Bridge and the VODs created by that Bridge shall operate as independent Devices, with the
3946 following exceptions:

- 3947 – If a Bridge creates a VOD while the Bridge is in an Unowned State, then the VOD shall be
3948 created in an Unowned State.
- 3949 – An Unowned VOD shall not accept DTLS connection attempts nor TLS connection attempts nor
3950 any other requests, including discovery requests, while the Bridge (that created that VOD) is
3951 Unowned.
- 3952 – At any time when a Bridge is transitioning from Owned to Unowned State, all Unowned VODs
3953 (created by that Bridge prior to the transition) shall drop any existing TLS and/or DTLS
3954 connections.
- 3955 – At any time when a Bridge is transitioning from Unowned to Owned State, the Bridge shall
3956 trigger all Unowned VODs (created by that Bridge prior to the transition) to become accessible
3957 in RFOTM state, with internal state as if the VOD has just transitioned from RESET to RFOTM.
- 3958 – If a Bridge creates a VOD while the Bridge is in an Owned State, then the VOD shall become
3959 accessible in RFOTM state, with internal state as if the VOD has just transitioned from RESET
3960 to RFOTM.

3961 Table 58 intends to clarify this behaviour.

3962
3963

Table 58 – Dependencies of VOD Behaviour on Bridge state, as clarification of accompanying text

Bridge state	Additional dependencies on VOD behaviour	
	VOD is Unowned (either just created, or created previously)	VOD is Owned
From unboxing Bridge until just prior to the end of transition of Bridge from Unowned to Owned	No accepting DTLS connection attempts nor TLS connection attempts nor any other requests, including discovery requests	Not applicable
At end of transition from Unowned to Owned	VOD becomes accessible in RFOTM following Bridge's transition. Internal state as if just transitioned from RESET.	As per normal Device
Owned	As per normal Device	As per normal Device
At Start of transition from Owned to Unowned	Drop any established TLS/DTLS connections, even if already partway through Device ownership	As per normal Device
Start of transition from Owned to Unowned, until just prior to the end of transition from Unowned to Owned.	No accepting DTLS connection attempts nor TLS connection attempts nor any other requests, including discovery requests	As per normal Device

3964 The "vods" Property of the "oic.r.vodlist" Resource on a Bridge reflects the details of all currently
3965 Owned VODs which have been created by that Bridge since the most recent hardware reset (if any)
3966 of the Bridge Platform (which removes all the created VODs), regardless of whether the VODs have
3967 the same owner as the Bridge or not. The entries in the "vods" Property are added and removed
3968 according to the following criteria:

- 3969 – Whenever a VOD created by a Bridge transitions from being Unowned to being Owned, then
3970 an entry for that VOD shall be added to the "vods" Property of the "oic.r.vodlist" Resource of
3971 that Bridge.
- 3972 – Whenever a VOD created by a Bridge transitions from being Owned to being Unowned, then
3973 entry for that VOD shall be removed from the "vods" Property of the "oic.r.vodlist" Resource of
3974 that Bridge. If that Bridge is currently in Unowned state, then the "oic.r.vodlist" Resource is not
3975 accessible, and the entry for that VOD shall be removed from the "vods" Property before or
3976 during the transition of that Bridge to the Owned state.
- 3977 – All other modifications of the list are not allowed.

3978 A Bridge shall only expose a secure OCF Endpoint for the "oic.r.vodlist" Resource.

3979 **15.1.2 Additional Security Requirements specific to Bridged Protocols**

3980 **15.1.2.1 Additional Security Requirements specific to the AllJoyn Protocol**

3981 For AllJoyn translator, an authenticated and authorized Client shall be able to block the
3982 communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't communicate securely with
3983 the Bridge, by using the Bridge Device's "oic.r.securemode" Resource specified in ISO/IEC 30118-
3984 3:2018

3985 **15.1.2.2 Additional Security Requirements specific to the Bluetooth LE Protocol**

3986 A Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't
3987 communicate securely with the Bridge.

3988 **15.1.2.3 Additional Security Requirements specific to the oneM2M Protocols**

3989 The Bridge shall implement oneM2M application access control as defined in the oneM2M Release
3990 3 Specifications.

3991 An Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't
3992 communicate securely with the Bridge.

3993 **15.1.2.4 Additional Security Requirements specific to the U+ Protocol**
3994 A Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't
3995 communicate securely with the Bridge.

3996 **15.1.2.5 Additional Security Requirements specific to the Z-Wave Protocol**
3997 A Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't
3998 communicate securely with the Bridge.

3999 **15.1.2.6 Additional Security Requirements specific to the Zigbee Protocol**
4000 A Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't
4001 communicate securely with the Bridge.

4002 **15.1.2.7 Additional Security Requirements specific to the EnOcean Radio Protocol**
4003 A Bridge shall block the communication of all OCF Devices with all Bridged Devices that don't
4004 communicate securely with the Bridge.

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Annex A (informative) Access Control Examples

Example OCF ACL Resource

Figure A-1 shows how a "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource could be configured to enforce an example access policy on the Server.

```
{
  "aclist2": [
    {
      // Subject with ID ...01 should access two named Resources with access mode "CRUDN" (Create, Retrieve, Update,
      Delete and Notify)
      "subject": {"uuid": "XXXX-...-XX01"},
      "resources": [
        {"href": "/oic/sh/light/1"},
        {"href": "/oic/sh/temp/0"}
      ],
      "permission": 31, // 31 dec = 0b0001 1111 which maps to ---N DURC
      "validity": [
        // The period starting at 18:00:00 UTC, on January 1, 2015 and
        // ending at 07:00:00 UTC on January 2, 2015
        "period": ["20150101T180000Z/20150102T070000Z"],
        // Repeats the {period} every week until the last day of Jan. 2015.
        "recurrence": ["RRULE:FREQ=WEEKLY;UNTIL=20150131T070000Z"]
      ],
      "aceid": 1
    }
  ],
  // An ACL provisioning and management service should be identified as
  // the resource owner
  "rowneruuid": "0685B960-736F-46F7-BEC0-9E6CBD61ADC1"
}
```

Figure A-1 – Example "/oic/sec/acl2" Resource

Annex B
(Informative)
Execution Environment Security Profiles

Given that IoT verticals and Devices will not be of uniform capabilities, a one-size-fits all security robustness requirements meeting all IOT applications and services will not serve the needs of OCF, and security profiles of varying degree of robustness (trustworthiness), cost and complexity have to be defined. To address a large ecosystem of vendors, the profiles can only be defined as requirements and the exact solutions meeting those requirements are specific to the vendors' open or proprietary implementations, and thus in most part outside scope of this document.

To align with the rest of OCF documents, where Device classifications follow IETF RFC 7228 (Terminology for constrained node networks) methodology, we limit the number of security profiles to a maximum of 3 (see Table B.1). However, our understanding is OCF capabilities criteria for each of 3 classes will be more fit to the current IoT chip market than that of IETF.

Given the extremely low level of resources at class 0, our expectation is that class 0 Devices are either capable of no security functionality or easily breakable security that depend on environmental (e.g. availability of human) factors to perform security functions. This means the class 0 will not be equipped with an SEE.

Table B.1 – OCF Security Profile

Platform class	SEE	Robustness level
0	No	N/A
1	Yes	Low
2	Yes	High

NOTE This analysis acknowledges that these Platform classifications do not take into consideration of possibility of security co-processor or other hardware security capability that augments classification criteria (namely CPU speed, memory, storage).

Annex C (normative) Resource Type definitions

C.1 List of Resource Type definitions

Table C.1 contains the list of defined security resources in this document.

Table C.1 – Alphabetized list of security resources

Friendly Name (informative)	Resource Type (rt)	Clause
Access Control List 2	oic.r.acl2	C.2
Auditable Event List	oic.r.ael	C.9
Certificate Signing Request	oic.r.csr	C.4
Credential	oic.r.cred	C.3
Device owner transfer method	oic.r.doxm	C.5
Device Provisioning Status	oic.r.pstat	C.6
Roles	oic.r.roles	C.7
Security Profile	oic.r.sp	C.8
Account	oic.r.account	Moved to OCF Cloud Security document
Account Session	oic.r.session	Moved to OCF Cloud Security document
Account Token Refresh	oic.r.tokenrefresh	Moved to OCF Cloud Security document

C.2 Access Control List-2

C.2.1 Introduction

This Resource specifies the local access control list.
When used without query parameters, all the ACE entries are returned.
When used with a query parameter, only the ACEs matching the specified parameter are returned.

C.2.2 Well-known URI

/oic/sec/acl2

C.2.3 Resource type

The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.acl2".

C.2.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```
{
  "swagger": "2.0",
  "info": {
    "title": "Access Control List-2",
    "version": "20190111",
    "license": {
      "name": "OCF Data Model License",
      "url":
        "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
        CENSE.md",
      "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
```

```

4108 reserved."
4109 },
4110 "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
4111 },
4112 "schemes": ["http"],
4113 "consumes": ["application/json"],
4114 "produces": ["application/json"],
4115 "paths": {
4116   "/oic/sec/acl2" : {
4117     "get": {
4118       "description": "This Resource specifies the local access control list.\nWhen used without
4119 query parameters, all the ACE entries are returned.\nWhen used with a query parameter, only the ACEs
4120 matching the specified\nparameter are returned.\n",
4121       "parameters": [
4122         {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"},
4123         {"$ref": "#/parameters/ace-filtered"}
4124       ],
4125       "responses": {
4126         "200": {
4127           "description": "",
4128           "x-example":
4129             {
4130               "rt" : ["oic.r.acl2"],
4131               "aclist2": [
4132                 {
4133                   "aceid": 1,
4134                   "subject": {
4135                     "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
4136                     "role": "SOME_STRING"
4137                   },
4138                   "resources": [
4139                     {
4140                       "href": "/light"
4141                     },
4142                     {
4143                       "href": "/door"
4144                     }
4145                   ],
4146                   "permission": 24
4147                 },
4148                 {
4149                   "aceid": 2,
4150                   "subject": {
4151                     "uuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
4152                   },
4153                   "resources": [
4154                     {
4155                       "href": "/light"
4156                     },
4157                     {
4158                       "href": "/door"
4159                     }
4160                   ],
4161                   "permission": 24
4162                 },
4163                 {
4164                   "aceid": 3,
4165                   "subject": {"conntype": "anon-clear"},
4166                   "resources": [
4167                     {
4168                       "href": "/light"
4169                     },
4170                     {
4171                       "href": "/door"
4172                     }
4173                   ],
4174                   "permission": 16,
4175                   "validity": [
4176                     {
4177                       "period": "20160101T180000Z/20170102T070000Z",
4178                       "recurrence": [ "DSTART:XXXXX",

```



```

4179 "RRULE:FREQ=DAILY;UNTIL=20180131T140000Z;BYMONTH=1" ]
4180     },
4181     {
4182         "period": "20160101T180000Z/PT5H30M",
4183         "recurrence": [ "RRULE:FREQ=DAILY;UNTIL=20180131T140000Z;BYMONTH=1" ]
4184     }
4185 ]
4186 }
4187 ],
4188 "rowneruuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014"
4189 },
4190 "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Acl2" }
4191 },
4192 "400": {
4193     "description": "The request is invalid."
4194 }
4195 }
4196 },
4197 "post": {
4198     "description": "Updates the ACL Resource with the provided ACEs.\n\nACEs provided in the
4199 update with aceids not currently in the ACL\nResource are added.\n\nACEs provided in the update with
4200 aceid(s) already in the ACL completely\nreplace the ACE(s) in the ACL Resource.\n\nACEs provided in
4201 the update without aceid properties are added and\nassigned unique aceids in the ACL Resource.\n",
4202     "parameters": [
4203         { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" },
4204         { "$ref": "#/parameters/ace-filtered" },
4205     ],
4206     "name": "body",
4207     "in": "body",
4208     "required": true,
4209     "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Acl2-Update" },
4210     "x-example":
4211     {
4212         "aclist2": [
4213             {
4214                 "aceid": 1,
4215                 "subject": {
4216                     "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
4217                     "role": "SOME_STRING"
4218                 },
4219                 "resources": [
4220                     {
4221                         "href": "/light"
4222                     },
4223                     {
4224                         "href": "/door"
4225                     }
4226                 ],
4227                 "permission": 24
4228             },
4229             {
4230                 "aceid": 3,
4231                 "subject": {
4232                     "uuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
4233                 },
4234                 "resources": [
4235                     {
4236                         "href": "/light"
4237                     },
4238                     {
4239                         "href": "/door"
4240                     }
4241                 ],
4242                 "permission": 24
4243             }
4244         ],
4245         "rowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
4246     }
4247 },
4248 ],
4249 "responses": {

```

```

4250         "400": {
4251             "description" : "The request is invalid."
4252         },
4253         "201": {
4254             "description" : "The ACL entry is created."
4255         },
4256         "204": {
4257             "description" : "The ACL entry is updated."
4258         }
4259     },
4260     },
4261     "delete": {
4262         "description": "Deletes ACL entries.\nWhen DELETE is used without query parameters, all the
4263         ACE entries are deleted.\nWhen DELETE is used with a query parameter, only the ACEs matching
4264         the\nspecified parameter are deleted.\n",
4265         "parameters": [
4266             {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"},
4267             {"$ref": "#/parameters/ace-filtered"}
4268         ],
4269         "responses": {
4270             "200": {
4271                 "description" : "The matching ACEs or the entire ACL Resource has been successfully
4272                 deleted."
4273             },
4274             "400": {
4275                 "description" : "The request is invalid."
4276             }
4277         }
4278     }
4279 },
4280 },
4281 "parameters": {
4282     "interface" : {
4283         "in" : "query",
4284         "name" : "if",
4285         "type" : "string",
4286         "enum" : [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ]
4287     },
4288     "ace-filtered" : {
4289         "in" : "query",
4290         "name" : "aceid",
4291         "required" : false,
4292         "type" : "integer",
4293         "description" : "Only applies to the ACE with the specified aceid.",
4294         "x-example" : 2112
4295     }
4296 },
4297 "definitions": {
4298     "Acl2" : {
4299         "properties": {
4300             "owneruuid" : {
4301                 "description": "The value identifies the unique Resource owner\nFormat pattern according
4302                 to IETF RFC 4122.",
4303                 "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
4304                 9]{12}$",
4305                 "type": "string"
4306             },
4307             "rt" : {
4308                 "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
4309                 "items": {
4310                     "maxLength": 64,
4311                     "type": "string",
4312                     "enum": [ "oic.r.acl2" ]
4313                 },
4314                 "minItems": 1,
4315                 "readOnly": true,
4316                 "type": "array"
4317             },
4318             "aclist2" : {
4319                 "description": "Access Control Entries in the ACL Resource.",
4320                 "items": {

```

```

4321         "properties": {
4322             "aceid": {
4323                 "description": "An identifier for the ACE that is unique within the ACL. In cases
4324 where it isn't supplied in an update, the Server will add the ACE and assign it a unique value.",
4325                 "minimum": 1,
4326                 "type": "integer"
4327             },
4328             "permission": {
4329                 "description": "Bitmask encoding of CRUDN permission\nThe encoded bitmask indicating
4330 permissions.",
4331                 "x-detail-desc": [
4332                     "0 - No permissions",
4333                     "1 - Create permission is granted",
4334                     "2 - Read, observe, discover permission is granted",
4335                     "4 - Write, update permission is granted",
4336                     "8 - Delete permission is granted",
4337                     "16 - Notify permission is granted"
4338                 ],
4339                 "maximum": 31,
4340                 "minimum": 0,
4341                 "type": "integer"
4342             },
4343             "resources": {
4344                 "description": "References the application's Resources to which a security policy
4345 applies.",
4346                 "items": {
4347                     "description": "Each Resource must have at least one of these properties set.",
4348                     "properties": {
4349                         "href": {
4350                             "description": "When present, the ACE only applies when the href matches\nThis
4351 is the target URI, it can be specified as a Relative Reference or fully-qualified URI.",
4352                             "format": "uri",
4353                             "maxLength": 256,
4354                             "type": "string"
4355                         },
4356                         "wc": {
4357                             "description": "A wildcard matching policy.",
4358                             "pattern": "^[+*]$",
4359                             "type": "string"
4360                         }
4361                     },
4362                     "type": "object"
4363                 },
4364                 "type": "array"
4365             },
4366             "subject": {
4367                 "anyOf": [
4368                     {
4369                         "description": "This is the Device identifier.",
4370                         "properties": {
4371                             "uuid": {
4372                                 "description": "A UUID Device ID\nFormat pattern according to IETF RFC
4373 4122.",
4374                                 "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-
4375 fA-F0-9]{12}$",
4376                                 "type": "string"
4377                             }
4378                         },
4379                         "required": [
4380                             "uuid"
4381                         ],
4382                         "type": "object"
4383                     },
4384                     {
4385                         "description": "Security role specified as an <Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL
4386 <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
4387                         "properties": {
4388                             "authority": {
4389                                 "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A
4390 NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
4391                                 "type": "string"

```

```

4392         },
4393         "role": {
4394             "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
4395             "type": "string"
4396         }
4397     },
4398     "required": [
4399         "role"
4400     ],
4401     "type": "object"
4402 },
4403 {
4404     "properties": {
4405         "conntype": {
4406             "description": "This property allows an ACE to be matched based on the
4407 connection or message type.",
4408             "x-detail-desc": [
4409                 "auth-crypt - ACE applies if the Client is authenticated and the data
4410 channel or message is encrypted and integrity protected",
4411                 "anon-clear - ACE applies if the Client is not authenticated and the data
4412 channel or message is not encrypted but may be integrity protected"
4413             ],
4414             "enum": [
4415                 "auth-crypt",
4416                 "anon-clear"
4417             ],
4418             "type": "string"
4419         }
4420     },
4421     "required": [
4422         "conntype"
4423     ],
4424     "type": "object"
4425 }
4426 ]
4427 },
4428 "validity": {
4429     "description": "validity is an array of time-pattern objects.",
4430     "items": {
4431         "description": "The time-pattern contains a period and recurrence expressed in
4432 RFC5545 syntax.",
4433         "properties": {
4434             "period": {
4435                 "description": "String represents a period using the RFC5545 Period.",
4436                 "type": "string"
4437             },
4438             "recurrence": {
4439                 "description": "String array represents a recurrence rule using the RFC5545
4440 Recurrence.",
4441                 "items": {
4442                     "type": "string"
4443                 },
4444                 "type": "array"
4445             }
4446         },
4447         "required": [
4448             "period"
4449         ],
4450         "type": "object"
4451     },
4452     "type": "array"
4453 }
4454 },
4455 "required": [
4456     "aceid",
4457     "resources",
4458     "permission",
4459     "subject"
4460 ],
4461 "type": "object"
4462 },

```

```

4463         "type": "array"
4464     },
4465     "n": {
4466         "$ref":
4467         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
4468         schema.json#/definitions/n"
4469     },
4470     "id": {
4471         "$ref":
4472         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
4473         schema.json#/definitions/id"
4474     },
4475     "if" : {
4476         "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
4477         "items": {
4478             "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ],
4479             "type": "string"
4480         },
4481         "minItems": 1,
4482         "readOnly": true,
4483         "type": "array"
4484     }
4485 },
4486 "type" : "object",
4487 "required": [ "acllist2", "rowneruuid" ]
4488 },
4489 "Acl2-Update" : {
4490     "properties": {
4491         "rowneruuid" : {
4492             "description": "The value identifies the unique Resource owner\n Format pattern according
4493 to IETF RFC 4122.",
4494             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
4495 9]{12}$",
4496             "type": "string"
4497         },
4498         "acllist2" : {
4499             "description": "Access Control Entries in the ACL Resource.",
4500             "items": {
4501                 "properties": {
4502                     "aceid": {
4503                         "description": "An identifier for the ACE that is unique within the ACL. In cases
4504 where it isn't supplied in an update, the Server will add the ACE and assign it a unique value.",
4505                         "minimum": 1,
4506                         "type": "integer"
4507                     },
4508                     "permission": {
4509                         "description": "Bitmask encoding of CRUDN permission\nThe encoded bitmask indicating
4510 permissions.",
4511                         "x-detail-desc": [
4512                             "0 - No permissions",
4513                             "1 - Create permission is granted",
4514                             "2 - Read, observe, discover permission is granted",
4515                             "4 - Write, update permission is granted",
4516                             "8 - Delete permission is granted",
4517                             "16 - Notify permission is granted"
4518                         ],
4519                         "maximum": 31,
4520                         "minimum": 0,
4521                         "type": "integer"
4522                     },
4523                     "resources": {
4524                         "description": "References the application's Resources to which a security policy
4525 applies.",
4526                         "items": {
4527                             "description": "Each Resource must have at least one of these properties set.",
4528                             "properties": {
4529                                 "href": {
4530                                     "description": "When present, the ACE only applies when the href matches\nThis
4531 is the target URI, it can be specified as a Relative Reference or fully-qualified URI.",
4532                                     "format": "uri",
4533                                     "maxLength": 256,

```

```

4534         "type": "string"
4535     },
4536     "wc": {
4537         "description": "A wildcard matching policy.",
4538         "x-detail-desc": [
4539             "+ - Matches all discoverable Resources",
4540             "- - Matches all non-discoverable Resources",
4541             "* - Matches all Resources"
4542         ],
4543         "enum": [
4544             "+",
4545             "-",
4546             "*"
4547         ],
4548         "type": "string"
4549     }
4550 },
4551 "type": "object"
4552 },
4553 "type": "array"
4554 },
4555 "subject": {
4556     "anyOf": [
4557         {
4558             "description": "This is the Device identifier.",
4559             "properties": {
4560                 "uuid": {
4561                     "description": "A UUID Device ID\n Format pattern according to IETF RFC
4562 4122.",
4563                     "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-
4564 fA-F0-9]{12}$",
4565                     "type": "string"
4566                 }
4567             },
4568             "required": [
4569                 "uuid"
4570             ],
4571             "type": "object"
4572         },
4573         {
4574             "description": "Security role specified as an <Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL
4575 <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
4576             "properties": {
4577                 "authority": {
4578                     "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A
4579 NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
4580                     "type": "string"
4581                 },
4582                 "role": {
4583                     "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
4584                     "type": "string"
4585                 }
4586             },
4587             "required": [
4588                 "role"
4589             ],
4590             "type": "object"
4591         },
4592         {
4593             "properties": {
4594                 "conntype": {
4595                     "description": "This property allows an ACE to be matched based on the
4596 connection or message type.",
4597                     "x-detail-desc": [
4598                         "auth-crypt - ACE applies if the Client is authenticated and the data
4599 channel or message is encrypted and integrity protected",
4600                         "anon-clear - ACE applies if the Client is not authenticated and the data
4601 channel or message is not encrypted but may be integrity protected"
4602                     ],
4603                     "enum": [
4604                         "auth-crypt",

```

```

4605         "anon-clear"
4606     ],
4607     "type": "string"
4608 },
4609 },
4610     "required": [
4611         "conntype"
4612     ],
4613     "type": "object"
4614 }
4615 ]
4616 },
4617 "validity": {
4618     "description": "validity is an array of time-pattern objects.",
4619     "items": {
4620         "description": "The time-pattern contains a period and recurrence expressed in
4621 RFC5545 syntax.",
4622         "properties": {
4623             "period": {
4624                 "description": "String represents a period using the RFC5545 Period.",
4625                 "type": "string"
4626             },
4627             "recurrence": {
4628                 "description": "String array represents a recurrence rule using the RFC5545
4629 Recurrence.",
4630                 "items": {
4631                     "type": "string"
4632                 },
4633                 "type": "array"
4634             }
4635         },
4636         "required": [
4637             "period"
4638         ],
4639         "type": "object"
4640     },
4641     "type": "array"
4642 },
4643 },
4644 "required": [
4645     "resources",
4646     "permission",
4647     "subject"
4648 ],
4649 "type": "object"
4650 },
4651 "type": "array"
4652 }
4653 },
4654 "type" : "object"
4655 }
4656 }
4657 }
4658

```

4659 C.2.5 Property definition

4660 Table C-1 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.acl2" Resource Type.

4661 **Table C-1 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.acl2".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rowneruuid	string	Yes	Read Write	The value identifies the unique Resource owner Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.

rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
aclist2	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	Access Control Entries in the ACL Resource.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.
rowneruuid	string	No	Read Write	The value identifies the unique Resource owner Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
aclist2	array: see schema	No	Read Write	Access Control Entries in the ACL Resource.

C.2.6 CRUDN behaviour

Table C-2 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.acl2" Resource Type.

Table C-2 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.acl2".

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post	delete	observe

C.3 Credential

C.3.1 Introduction

This Resource specifies credentials a Device may use to establish secure communication.

Retrieves the credential data.

When used without query parameters, all the credential entries are returned.

When used with a query parameter, only the credentials matching the specified parameter are returned.

Note that write-only credential data will not be returned.

C.3.2 Well-known URI

/oic/sec/cred

C.3.3 Resource type

The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.cred".

C.3.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```
{
  "swagger": "2.0",
  "info": {
    "title": "Credential",
    "version": "v1.0-20181031",
    "license": {
```



```

4686         "name": "OCF Data Model License",
4687         "url":
4688 "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
4689 CENSE.md",
4690         "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
4691 reserved.",
4692     },
4693     "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
4694 },
4695 "schemas": ["http"],
4696 "consumes": ["application/json"],
4697 "produces": ["application/json"],
4698 "paths": {
4699     "/oic/sec/cred" : {
4700         "get": {
4701             "description": "This Resource specifies credentials a Device may use to establish secure
4702 communication.\nRetrieves the credential data.\nWhen used without query parameters, all the
4703 credential entries are returned.\nWhen used with a query parameter, only the credentials matching
4704 the specified\nparameter are returned.\n\nNote that write-only credential data will not be
4705 returned.\n",
4706             "parameters": [
4707                 {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"}
4708             ],
4709             {"$ref": "#/parameters/cred-filtered-credid"}
4710             {"$ref": "#/parameters/cred-filtered-subjectuuid"}
4711         ],
4712         "responses": {
4713             "200": {
4714                 "description": "",
4715                 "x-example":
4716                 {
4717                     "rt": ["oic.r.cred"],
4718                     "creds": [
4719                         {
4720                             "credid": 55,
4721                             "subjectuuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
4722                             "roleid": {
4723                                 "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
4724                                 "role": "SOME_STRING"
4725                             },
4726                             "credtype": 32,
4727                             "publicdata": {
4728                                 "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
4729                                 "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
4730                             },
4731                             "privatedata": {
4732                                 "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.raw",
4733                                 "data": "RAW-ENCODED-VALUE",
4734                                 "handle": 4
4735                             },
4736                             "optionaldata": {
4737                                 "revstat": false,
4738                                 "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
4739                                 "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
4740                             },
4741                             "period": "20160101T180000Z/20170102T070000Z",
4742                             "crms": [ "oic.sec.crm.pk10" ]
4743                         },
4744                         {
4745                             "credid": 56,
4746                             "subjectuuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
4747                             "roleid": {
4748                                 "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
4749                                 "role": "SOME_STRING"
4750                             },
4751                             "credtype": 1,
4752                             "publicdata": {
4753                                 "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
4754                                 "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
4755                             },
4756                             "privatedata": {
4757                                 "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.base64",

```

```

4757         "data": "BASE-64-ENCODED-VALUE",
4758         "handle": 4
4759     },
4760     "optionaldata": {
4761         "revstat": false,
4762         "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
4763         "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
4764     },
4765     "period": "20160101T180000Z/20170102T070000Z",
4766     "crms": [ "oic.sec.crm.pk10" ]
4767 },
4768 ],
4769 "rowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
4770 },
4771 ,
4772 "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Cred" }
4773 },
4774 "400": {
4775     "description": "The request is invalid."
4776 }
4777 },
4778 },
4779 "post": {
4780     "description": "Updates the credential Resource with the provided
4781 credentials.\n\nCredentials provided in the update with credid(s) not currently in the\ncredential
4782 Resource are added.\n\nCredentials provided in the update with credid(s) already in the\ncredential
4783 Resource completely replace the creds in the credential\nResource.\n\nCredentials provided in the
4784 update without credid(s) properties are\nadded and assigned unique credid(s) in the credential
4785 Resource.\n",
4786     "parameters": [
4787         { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" },
4788         {
4789             "name": "body",
4790             "in": "body",
4791             "required": true,
4792             "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Cred-Update" },
4793             "x-example":
4794             {
4795                 "creds": [
4796                     {
4797                         "credid": 55,
4798                         "subjectuuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
4799                         "roleid": {
4800                             "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
4801                             "role": "SOME_STRING"
4802                         },
4803                         "credtype": 32,
4804                         "publicdata": {
4805                             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
4806                             "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
4807                         },
4808                         "privatedata": {
4809                             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.raw",
4810                             "data": "RAW-ENCODED-VALUE",
4811                             "handle": 4
4812                         },
4813                         "optionaldata": {
4814                             "revstat": false,
4815                             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
4816                             "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
4817                         },
4818                         "period": "20160101T180000Z/20170102T070000Z",
4819                         "crms": [ "oic.sec.crm.pk10" ]
4820                     },
4821                     {
4822                         "credid": 56,
4823                         "subjectuuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
4824                         "roleid": {
4825                             "authority": "484b8a51-cb23-46c0-a5f1-b4aebef50ebe",
4826                             "role": "SOME_STRING"
4827                         }
4828                     }
4829                 ]
4830             }
4831         }
4832     ]
4833 }

```

```

4828         "credtype": 1,
4829         "publicdata": {
4830             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
4831             "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
4832         },
4833         "privatedata": {
4834             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
4835             "data": "BASE-64-ENCODED-VALUE",
4836             "handle": 4
4837         },
4838         "optionaldata": {
4839             "revstat": false,
4840             "encoding": "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
4841             "data": "PEM-ENCODED-VALUE"
4842         },
4843         "period": "20160101T180000Z/20170102T070000Z",
4844         "crms": [ "oic.sec.crm.pk10" ]
4845     },
4846     ],
4847     "rowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
4848 }
4849 }
4850 ],
4851 "responses": {
4852     "400": {
4853         "description": "The request is invalid."
4854     },
4855     "201": {
4856         "description": "The credential entry is created."
4857     },
4858     "204": {
4859         "description": "The credential entry is updated."
4860     }
4861 },
4862 },
4863 "delete": {
4864     "description": "Deletes credential entries.\nWhen DELETE is used without query parameters,
4865 all the cred entries are deleted.\nWhen DELETE is used with a query parameter, only the entries
4866 matching\nthe query parameter are deleted.\n",
4867     "parameters": [
4868         { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" },
4869         { "$ref": "#/parameters/cred-filtered-credid" },
4870         { "$ref": "#/parameters/cred-filtered-subjectuuid" }
4871     ],
4872     "responses": {
4873         "400": {
4874             "description": "The request is invalid."
4875         },
4876         "204": {
4877             "description": "The specific credential(s) or the the entire credential Resource has
4878 been successfully deleted."
4879         }
4880     }
4881 },
4882 },
4883 },
4884 "parameters": {
4885     "interface": {
4886         "in": "query",
4887         "name": "if",
4888         "type": "string",
4889         "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ]
4890     },
4891     "cred-filtered-credid": {
4892         "in": "query",
4893         "name": "credid",
4894         "required": false,
4895         "type": "integer",
4896         "description": "Only applies to the credential with the specified credid.",
4897         "x-example": 2112
4898     },

```

```

4899     "cred-filtered-subjectuuid" : {
4900         "in" : "query",
4901         "name" : "subjectuuid",
4902         "required" : false,
4903         "type" : "string",
4904         "description" : "Only applies to credentials with the specified subject UUID.",
4905         "x-example" : "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
4906     }
4907 },
4908 "definitions": {
4909     "Cred" : {
4910         "properties": {
4911             "rowneruuid" : {
4912                 "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
4913                 "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{12}$",
4914                 "type": "string"
4915             },
4916             "rt" : {
4917                 "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
4918                 "items": {
4919                     "maxLength": 64,
4920                     "type": "string",
4921                     "enum": ["oic.r.cred"]
4922                 },
4923                 "minItems": 1,
4924                 "readOnly": true,
4925                 "type": "array",
4926                 "uniqueItems": true
4927             },
4928             "n": {
4929                 "$ref":
4930                 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
4931                 schema.json#/definitions/n"
4932             },
4933             "id": {
4934                 "$ref":
4935                 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
4936                 schema.json#/definitions/id"
4937             },
4938             "creds" : {
4939                 "description": "List of credentials available at this Resource.",
4940                 "items": {
4941                     "properties": {
4942                         "credid": {
4943                             "description": "Local reference to a credential Resource.",
4944                             "type": "integer"
4945                         },
4946                         "credtype": {
4947                             "description": "Representation of this credential's type\nCredential Types - Cred
4948                             type encoded as a bitmask.0 - Empty credential used for testing1 - Symmetric pair-wise key2 -
4949                             Symmetric group key4 - Asymmetric signing key8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificatel6 - PIN or
4950                             password32 - Asymmetric encryption key.",
4951                             "maximum": 63,
4952                             "minimum": 0,
4953                             "type": "integer"
4954                         },
4955                         "credusage": {
4956                             "description": "A string that provides hints about how/where the cred is used\nThe
4957                             type of credusage.oic.sec.cred.trustca - Trust certificateoic.sec.cred.cert -
4958                             Certificateoic.sec.cred.rolecert - Role Certificateoic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca - Manufacturer
4959                             Certificate Trust Anchoroic.sec.cred.mfgcert - Manufacturer Certificate.",
4960                             "enum": [
4961                                 "oic.sec.cred.trustca",
4962                                 "oic.sec.cred.cert",
4963                                 "oic.sec.cred.rolecert",
4964                                 "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca",
4965                                 "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert"
4966                             ],
4967                             "type": "string"
4968                         }
4969                     }

```

```

4970         "crms": {
4971             "description": "The refresh methods that may be used to update this credential.",
4972             "items": {
4973                 "description": "Each enum represents a method by which the credentials are
4974 refreshed.oic.sec.crm.pro - Credentials refreshed by a provisioning serviceoic.sec.crm.rdp -
4975 Credentials refreshed by a key agreement protocol and random PINoic.sec.crm.psk - Credentials
4976 refreshed by a key agreement protocoloic.sec.crm.skdc - Credentials refreshed by a key distribution
4977 serviceoic.sec.crm.pk10 - Credentials refreshed by a PKCS#10 request to a CA.",
4978                 "enum": [
4979                     "oic.sec.crm.pro",
4980                     "oic.sec.crm.psk",
4981                     "oic.sec.crm.rdp",
4982                     "oic.sec.crm.skdc",
4983                     "oic.sec.crm.pk10"
4984                 ],
4985                 "type": "string"
4986             },
4987             "type": "array",
4988             "uniqueItems": true
4989         },
4990         "optionaldata": {
4991             "description": "Credential revocation status information\nOptional credential
4992 contents describes revocation status for this credential.",
4993             "properties": {
4994                 "data": {
4995                     "description": "The encoded structure.",
4996                     "type": "string"
4997                 },
4998                 "encoding": {
4999                     "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
5000 the optdata.",
5001                     "x-detail-desc": [
5002                         "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain."
5003                     ],
5004                     "enum": [
5005                         "oic.sec.encoding.pem"
5006                     ],
5007                     "type": "string"
5008                 },
5009                 "revstat": {
5010                     "description": "Revocation status flag - true = revoked.",
5011                     "type": "boolean"
5012                 }
5013             },
5014             "required": [
5015                 "revstat"
5016             ],
5017             "type": "object"
5018         },
5019         "period": {
5020             "description": "String with RFC5545 Period.",
5021             "type": "string"
5022         },
5023         "privatedata": {
5024             "description": "Private credential information\nCredential Resource non-public
5025 contents.",
5026             "properties": {
5027                 "data": {
5028                     "description": "The encoded value.",
5029                     "maxLength": 3072,
5030                     "type": "string"
5031                 },
5032                 "encoding": {
5033                     "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
5034 the privdata.",
5035                     "x-detail-desc": [
5036                         "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded private key.",
5037                         "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Encoding for Base64 encoded PSK.",
5038                         "oic.sec.encoding.handle - Data is contained in a storage sub-system
5039 referenced using a handle.",
5040                         "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."

```

```

5041         ],
5042         "enum": [
5043             "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5044             "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
5045             "oic.sec.encoding.handle",
5046             "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
5047         ],
5048         "type": "string"
5049     },
5050     "handle": {
5051         "description": "Handle to a key storage Resource.",
5052         "type": "integer"
5053     }
5054 },
5055 "required": [
5056     "encoding"
5057 ],
5058 "type": "object"
5059 },
5060 "publicdata": {
5061     "description": "Public credential information.",
5062     "properties": {
5063         "data": {
5064             "description": "The encoded value.",
5065             "maxLength": 3072,
5066             "type": "string"
5067         },
5068         "encoding": {
5069             "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
5070 the pubdata.",
5071             "x-detail-desc": [
5072                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain."
5073             ],
5074             "enum": [
5075                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem"
5076             ],
5077             "type": "string"
5078         }
5079     },
5080     "type": "object"
5081 },
5082 "roleid": {
5083     "description": "The role this credential possesses\nSecurity role specified as an
5084 <Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
5085     "properties": {
5086         "authority": {
5087             "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A NULL
5088 <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
5089             "type": "string"
5090         },
5091         "role": {
5092             "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
5093             "type": "string"
5094         }
5095     },
5096     "required": [
5097         "role"
5098     ],
5099     "type": "object"
5100 },
5101 "subjectuuid": {
5102     "anyOf": [
5103         {
5104             "description": "The id of the Device, which the cred entry applies to or \"*\n
5105 for wildcard identity.",
5106             "pattern": "^\\*$",
5107             "type": "string"
5108         },
5109         {
5110             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5111             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-

```

```

5112 F0-9]{12}$",
5113         "type": "string"
5114     }
5115 ]
5116 },
5117 },
5118 "type": "object"
5119 },
5120 "type": "array"
5121 },
5122 "if" : {
5123     "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
5124     "items": {
5125         "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ],
5126         "type": "string"
5127     },
5128     "minItems": 1,
5129     "readOnly": true,
5130     "type": "array"
5131 },
5132 },
5133 "type" : "object",
5134 "required": ["creds", "rowneruuid"]
5135 },
5136 "Cred-Update" : {
5137     "properties": {
5138         "rowneruuid" : {
5139             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5140             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{12}$",
5141             "type": "string"
5142         },
5143         "creds" : {
5144             "description": "List of credentials available at this Resource.",
5145             "items": {
5146                 "properties": {
5147                     "credid" : {
5148                         "description": "Local reference to a credential Resource.",
5149                         "type": "integer"
5150                     },
5151                     "credtype" : {
5152                         "description": "Representation of this credential's type\nCred
5153 type encoded as a bitmask.0 - Empty credential used for testing1 - Symmetric pair-wise key2 -
5154 Symmetric group key4 - Asymmetric signing key8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificatel6 - PIN or
5155 password32 - Asymmetric encryption key.",
5156                         "maximum": 63,
5157                         "minimum": 0,
5158                         "type": "integer"
5159                     },
5160                     "credusage" : {
5161                         "description": "A string that provides hints about how/where the cred is used\nThe
5162 type of credusage.oic.sec.cred.trustca - Trust certificateoic.sec.cred.cert -
5163 Certificateoic.sec.cred.rolecert - Role Certificateoic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca - Manufacturer
5164 Certificate Trust Anchoroic.sec.cred.mfgcert - Manufacturer Certificate.",
5165                         "enum": [
5166                             "oic.sec.cred.trustca",
5167                             "oic.sec.cred.cert",
5168                             "oic.sec.cred.rolecert",
5169                             "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca",
5170                             "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert"
5171                         ],
5172                         "type": "string"
5173                     },
5174                     "crms" : {
5175                         "description": "The refresh methods that may be used to update this credential.",
5176                         "items": {
5177                             "description": "Each enum represents a method by which the credentials are
5178 refreshed.oic.sec.crm.pro - Credentials refreshed by a provisioning serviceoic.sec.crm.rdp -
5179 Credentials refreshed by a key agreement protocol and random PINoic.sec.crm.psk - Credentials
5180 refreshed by a key agreement protocoloic.sec.crm.skdc - Credentials refreshed by a key distribution
5181 serviceoic.sec.crm.pk10 - Credentials refreshed by a PKCS#10 request to a CA.",

```

```

5183         "enum": [
5184             "oic.sec.crm.pro",
5185             "oic.sec.crm.psk",
5186             "oic.sec.crm.rdp",
5187             "oic.sec.crm.skdc",
5188             "oic.sec.crm.pk10"
5189         ],
5190         "type": "string"
5191     },
5192     "type": "array"
5193 },
5194 "optionaldata": {
5195     "description": "Credential revocation status information\nOptional credential
5196 contents describes revocation status for this credential.",
5197     "properties": {
5198         "data": {
5199             "description": "The encoded structure.",
5200             "type": "string"
5201         },
5202         "encoding": {
5203             "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
5204 the optdata.",
5205             "x-detail-desc": [
5206                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain."
5207             ],
5208             "enum": [
5209                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem"
5210             ],
5211             "type": "string"
5212         },
5213         "revstat": {
5214             "description": "Revocation status flag - true = revoked.",
5215             "type": "boolean"
5216         }
5217     },
5218     "required": [
5219         "revstat"
5220     ],
5221     "type": "object"
5222 },
5223 "period": {
5224     "description": "String with RFC5545 Period.",
5225     "type": "string"
5226 },
5227 "privatedata": {
5228     "description": "Private credential information\nCredential Resource non-public
5229 contents.",
5230     "properties": {
5231         "data": {
5232             "description": "The encoded value.",
5233             "maxLength": 3072,
5234             "type": "string"
5235         },
5236         "encoding": {
5237             "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
5238 the privdata.",
5239             "x-detail-desc": [
5240                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded private key.",
5241                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Encoding for Base64 encoded PSK.",
5242                 "oic.sec.encoding.handle - Data is contained in a storage sub-system
5243 referenced using a handle.",
5244                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
5245             ],
5246             "enum": [
5247                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
5248                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
5249                 "oic.sec.encoding.handle",
5250                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
5251             ],
5252             "type": "string"
5253         }
5254     },

```



```

5254         "handle": {
5255             "description": "Handle to a key storage Resource.",
5256             "type": "integer"
5257         },
5258     },
5259     "required": [
5260         "encoding"
5261     ],
5262     "type": "object"
5263 },
5264 "publicdata": {
5265     "properties": {
5266         "data": {
5267             "description": "The encoded value.",
5268             "maxLength": 3072,
5269             "type": "string"
5270         },
5271         "encoding": {
5272             "description": "Public credential information\nA string specifying the encoding
format of the data contained in the pubdata.",
5273             "x-detail-desc": [
5274                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain."
5275             ],
5276             "enum": [
5277                 "oic.sec.encoding.pem"
5278             ],
5279             "type": "string"
5280         }
5281     },
5282 },
5283 "type": "object"
5284 },
5285 "roleid": {
5286     "description": "The role this credential possesses\nSecurity role specified as an
<Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
5287     "properties": {
5288         "authority": {
5289             "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A NULL
<Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
5290             "type": "string"
5291         },
5292         "role": {
5293             "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
5294             "type": "string"
5295         }
5296     },
5297 },
5298 "required": [
5299     "role"
5300 ],
5301 "type": "object"
5302 },
5303 "subjectuuid": {
5304     "anyOf": [
5305         {
5306             "description": "The id of the Device, which the cred entry applies to or \"*\n
for wildcard identity.",
5307             "pattern": "^\\*$",
5308             "type": "string"
5309         },
5310         {
5311             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5312             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-
F0-9]{12}$",
5313             "type": "string"
5314         }
5315     ]
5316 },
5317 ],
5318 },
5319 },
5320 },
5321 "type": "object"
5322 },
5323 "type": "array"
5324 },

```

```

5325     "if" :
5326     {
5327         "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
5328         "items": {
5329             "enum": [
5330                 "oic.if.baseline"
5331             ],
5332             "type": "string"
5333         },
5334         "minItems": 1,
5335         "readOnly": true,
5336         "type": "array"
5337     },
5338 },
5339 "type" : "object"
5340 }
5341 }
5342 }
5343

```

5344 C.3.5 Property definition

5345 Table C-3 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.cred" Resource Type.

5346 **Table C-3 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.cred".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rowneruuid	string	Yes	Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
creds	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	List of credentials available at this Resource.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.
rowneruuid	string	No	Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
creds	array: see schema	No	Read Write	List of credentials available at this Resource.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.

5347 C.3.6 CRUDN behaviour

5348 Table C-4 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.cred" Resource Type.

5349 **Table C-4 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.cred".**

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post	delete	observe

C.4 Certificate Signing Request

C.4.1 Introduction

This Resource specifies a Certificate Signing Request.

C.4.2 Well-known URI

/oic/sec/csr

C.4.3 Resource type

The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.csr".

C.4.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```
{
  "swagger": "2.0",
  "info": {
    "title": "Certificate Signing Request",
    "version": "v1.0-20150819",
    "license": {
      "name": "OCF Data Model License",
      "url":
"https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
CENSE.md",
      "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
reserved."
    },
    "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
  },
  "schemes": ["http"],
  "consumes": ["application/json"],
  "produces": ["application/json"],
  "paths": {
    "/oic/sec/csr" : {
      "get": {
        "description": "This Resource specifies a Certificate Signing Request.\n",
        "parameters": [
          {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"}
        ],
        "responses": {
          "200": {
            "description": "",
            "x-example": {
              "rt": ["oic.r.csr"],
              "encoding" : "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
              "csr": "PEMENCODEDCSR"
            },
            "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Csr" }
          },
          "404": {
            "description" : "The Device does not support certificates and generating CSRs."
          },
          "503": {
            "description" : "The Device is not yet ready to return a response. Try again later."
          }
        }
      }
    }
  },
  "parameters": {
    "interface" : {
      "in" : "query",
      "name" : "if",
      "type" : "string",
      "enum" : [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ]
    }
  }
}
```

```

5412 },
5413 "definitions": {
5414   "Csr" : {
5415     "properties": {
5416       "rt" : {
5417         "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
5418         "items": {
5419           "maxLength": 64,
5420           "type": "string",
5421           "enum": ["oic.r.csr"]
5422         },
5423         "minItems": 1,
5424         "readOnly": true,
5425         "type": "array"
5426       },
5427       "encoding": {
5428         "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in CSR.",
5429         "x-detail-desc": [
5430           "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded CSR."
5431         ],
5432         "enum": [
5433           "oic.sec.encoding.pem"
5434         ],
5435         "readOnly": true,
5436         "type": "string"
5437       },
5438       "n": {
5439         "$ref":
5440         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
5441         schema.json#/definitions/n"
5442       },
5443       "id": {
5444         "$ref":
5445         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
5446         schema.json#/definitions/id"
5447       },
5448       "csr": {
5449         "description": "Signed CSR in ASN.1 in the encoding specified by the encoding property.",
5450         "maxLength": 3072,
5451         "readOnly": true,
5452         "type": "string"
5453       },
5454       "if": {
5455         "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
5456         "items": {
5457           "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ],
5458           "type": "string"
5459         },
5460         "minItems": 1,
5461         "readOnly": true,
5462         "type": "array"
5463       }
5464     },
5465     "type" : "object",
5466     "required": ["csr", "encoding"]
5467   }
5468 }
5469 }
5470

```

5471 C.4.5 Property definition

5472 Table C-5 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.csr" Resource Type.

5473 **Table C-5 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.csr".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.

encoding	string	Yes	Read Only	A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in CSR.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
csr	string	Yes	Read Only	Signed CSR in ASN.1 in the encoding specified by the encoding property.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.

C.4.6 CRUDN behaviour

Table C-6 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.csr" Resource Type.

Table C-6 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.csr".

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get			observe

C.5 Device Owner Transfer Method

C.5.1 Introduction

This Resource specifies properties needed to establish a Device owner.

C.5.2 Well-known URI

/oic/sec/doxm

C.5.3 Resource type

The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.doxm".

C.5.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```
{
  "swagger": "2.0",
  "info": {
    "title": "Device Owner Transfer Method",
    "version": "v1.0-20181001",
    "license": {
      "name": "OCF Data Model License",
      "url":
"https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
CENSE.md",
      "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
reserved."
    },
    "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
  },
  "schemes": ["http"],
  "consumes": ["application/json"],
```

```

5503 "produces": ["application/json"],
5504 "paths": {
5505     "/oic/sec/doxm" : {
5506         "get": {
5507             "description": "This Resource specifies properties needed to establish a Device owner.\n",
5508             "parameters": [
5509                 {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"}
5510             ],
5511             "responses": {
5512                 "200": {
5513                     "description": "",
5514                     "x-example":
5515                         {
5516                             "rt": ["oic.r.doxm"],
5517                             "oxms": [ 0, 2, 3 ],
5518                             "oxmsel": 0,
5519                             "sct": 16,
5520                             "owned": true,
5521                             "deviceuuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014",
5522                             "devowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
5523                             "rowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
5524                         }
5525                 },
5526                 "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Doxm" }
5527             },
5528             "400": {
5529                 "description": "The request is invalid."
5530             }
5531         }
5532     },
5533     "post": {
5534         "description": "Updates the DOXM Resource data.\n",
5535         "parameters": [
5536             {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"},
5537             {
5538                 "name": "body",
5539                 "in": "body",
5540                 "required": true,
5541                 "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Doxm-Update" },
5542                 "x-example":
5543                     {
5544                         "oxmsel": 0,
5545                         "owned": true,
5546                         "deviceuuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014",
5547                         "devowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9",
5548                         "rowneruuid": "e61c3e6b-9c54-4b81-8ce5-f9039c1d04d9"
5549                     }
5550             }
5551         ],
5552         "responses": {
5553             "400": {
5554                 "description": "The request is invalid."
5555             },
5556             "204": {
5557                 "description": "The DOXM entry is updated."
5558             }
5559         }
5560     }
5561 },
5562 },
5563 "parameters": {
5564     "interface" : {
5565         "in" : "query",
5566         "name" : "if",
5567         "type" : "string",
5568         "enum" : [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ]
5569     }
5570 },
5571 "definitions": {
5572     "Doxm" : {
5573         "properties": {

```

```

5574         "rowneruuid": {
5575             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5576             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
5577 9]{12}$",
5578             "type": "string"
5579         },
5580         "oxms": {
5581             "description": "List of supported owner transfer methods.",
5582             "items": {
5583                 "description": "The Device owner transfer methods that may be selected at Device on-
5584 boarding. Each value indicates a specific Owner Transfer method0 - Numeric OTM identifier for the
5585 Just-Works method (oic.sec.doxm.jw)1 - Numeric OTM identifier for the random PIN method
5586 (oic.sec.doxm.rdp)2 - Numeric OTM identifier for the manufacturer certificate method
5587 (oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert)3 - Numeric OTM identifier for the decap method (oic.sec.doxm.dcap)
5588 (deprecated).",
5589                 "type": "integer"
5590             },
5591             "readOnly": true,
5592             "type": "array"
5593         },
5594         "devowneruuid": {
5595             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5596             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
5597 9]{12}$",
5598             "type": "string"
5599         },
5600         "deviceuuid": {
5601             "description": "The uuid formatted identity of the Device\nFormat pattern according to
5602 IETF RFC 4122.",
5603             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
5604 9]{12}$",
5605             "type": "string"
5606         },
5607         "owned": {
5608             "description": "Ownership status flag.",
5609             "type": "boolean"
5610         },
5611         "n": {
5612             "$ref":
5613 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
5614 schema.json#/definitions/n"
5615         },
5616         "id": {
5617             "$ref":
5618 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
5619 schema.json#/definitions/id"
5620         },
5621         "oxmsel": {
5622             "description": "The selected owner transfer method used during on-boarding\nThe Device
5623 owner transfer methods that may be selected at Device on-boarding. Each value indicates a specific
5624 Owner Transfer method0 - Numeric OTM identifier for the Just-Works method (oic.sec.doxm.jw)1 -
5625 Numeric OTM identifier for the random PIN method (oic.sec.doxm.rdp)2 - Numeric OTM identifier for
5626 the manufacturer certificate method (oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert)3 - Numeric OTM identifier for the decap
5627 method (oic.sec.doxm.dcap) (deprecated).",
5628             "type": "integer"
5629         },
5630         "sct": {
5631             "description": "Bitmask encoding of supported credential types\nCredential Types -
5632 Cred type encoded as a bitmask.0 - Empty credential used for testing1 - Symmetric pair-wise key2 -
5633 Symmetric group key4 - Asymmetric signing key8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificatel6 - PIN or
5634 password32 - Asymmetric encryption key.",
5635             "maximum": 63,
5636             "minimum": 0,
5637             "type": "integer",
5638             "readOnly": true
5639         },
5640         "rt": {
5641             "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
5642             "items": {
5643                 "maxLength": 64,
5644                 "type": "string",

```

```

5645         "enum": ["oic.r.doxm"]
5646     },
5647     "minItems": 1,
5648     "readOnly": true,
5649     "type": "array"
5650 },
5651 "if": {
5652     "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
5653     "items": {
5654         "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ],
5655         "type": "string"
5656     },
5657     "minItems": 1,
5658     "readOnly": true,
5659     "type": "array"
5660 }
5661 },
5662 "type" : "object",
5663 "required": ["oxms", "oxmsel", "sct", "owned", "deviceuuid", "devowneruuid", "rowneruuid"]
5664 },
5665 "Doxm-Update" : {
5666     "properties": {
5667         "rowneruuid": {
5668             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5669             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
5670 9]{12}$",
5671             "type": "string"
5672         },
5673         "devowneruuid": {
5674             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5675             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
5676 9]{12}$",
5677             "type": "string"
5678         },
5679         "deviceuuid": {
5680             "description": "The uuid formatted identity of the Device\nFormat pattern according to
5681 IETF RFC 4122.",
5682             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
5683 9]{12}$",
5684             "type": "string"
5685         },
5686         "owned": {
5687             "description": "Ownership status flag.",
5688             "type": "boolean"
5689         },
5690         "oxmsel": {
5691             "description": "The selected owner transfer method used during on-boarding\nThe Device
5692 owner transfer methods that may be selected at Device on-boarding. Each value indicates a specific
5693 Owner Transfer method0 - Numeric OTM identifier for the Just-Works method (oic.sec.doxm.jw)1 -
5694 Numeric OTM identifier for the random PIN method (oic.sec.doxm.rdp)2 - Numeric OTM identifier for
5695 the manufacturer certificate method (oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert)3 - Numeric OTM identifier for the decap
5696 method (oic.sec.doxm.dcap) (deprecated).",
5697             "type": "integer"
5698         }
5699     },
5700     "type" : "object"
5701 }
5702 }
5703 }
5704

```

C.5.5 Property definition

Table C-7 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.doxm" Resource Type.

Table C-7 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.doxm".

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
---------------	------------	-----------	-------------	-------------

rowneruuid	string	Yes	Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
oxms	array: see schema	Yes	Read Only	List of supported owner transfer methods.
devowneruuid	string	Yes	Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
deviceuuid	string	Yes	Read Write	The uuid formatted identity of the Device Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
owned	boolean	Yes	Read Write	Ownership status flag.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
oxmsel	integer	Yes	Read Write	The selected owner transfer method used during on-boarding. The Device owner transfer methods that may be selected at Device on-boarding. Each value indicates a specific Owner Transfer method0 - Numeric OTM identifier for the Just-Works method (oic.sec.doxm.jw)1 - Numeric OTM identifier for the random PIN method (oic.sec.doxm.rdp)2 - Numeric OTM identifier for the manufacturer certificate method (oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert)3 - Numeric OTM identifier for the decap method (oic.sec.doxm.dcap) (deprecated).
sct	integer	Yes	Read Only	Bitmask encoding of supported credential types Credential Types - Cred type encoded as a bitmask.0 - Empty credential used for testing1 - Symmetric pair-wise key2 - Symmetric group key4 - Asymmetric signing

				key8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificate16 - PIN or password32 - Asymmetric encryption key.
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.
owneruuid	string		Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
devowneruuid	string		Read Write	Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
deviceuuid	string		Read Write	The uuid formatted identity of the Device Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
owned	boolean		Read Write	Ownership status flag.
oxmsel	integer		Read Write	The selected owner transfer method used during on-boarding The Device owner transfer methods that may be selected at Device on-boarding. Each value indicates a specific Owner Transfer method0 - Numeric OTM identifier for the Just-Works method (oic.sec.doxm.jw)1 - Numeric OTM identifier for the random PIN method (oic.sec.doxm.rdp)2 - Numeric OTM identifier for the manufacturer certificate method (oic.sec.doxm.mfgcert)3 - Numeric OTM identifier for the decap method (oic.sec.doxm.dcap) (deprecated).

C.5.6 CRUDN behaviour

Table C-8 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.doxm" Resource Type.

Table C-8 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.doxm".

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
--------	------	--------	--------	--------

	get	post		observe
--	-----	------	--	---------

C.6 Device Provisioning Status

C.6.1 Introduction

This Resource specifies Device provisioning status.

C.6.2 Well-known URI

/oic/sec/pstat

C.6.3 Resource type

The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.pstat".

C.6.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```
{
  "swagger": "2.0",
  "info": {
    "title": "Device Provisioning Status",
    "version": "v1.0-20191001",
    "license": {
      "name": "OCF Data Model License",
      "url":
        "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
        CENSE.md",
      "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
        reserved."
    },
    "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
  },
  "schemes": ["http"],
  "consumes": ["application/json"],
  "produces": ["application/json"],
  "paths": {
    "/oic/sec/pstat" : {
      "get": {
        "description": "This Resource specifies Device provisioning status.\n",
        "parameters": [
          {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"}
        ],
        "responses": {
          "200": {
            "description": "",
            "x-example":
              {
                "rt": ["oic.r.pstat"],
                "dos": {"s": 3, "p": true},
                "isop": true,
                "cm": 8,
                "tm": 60,
                "om": 2,
                "sm": 7,
                "rowneruuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014"
              },
            "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Pstat" }
          },
          "400": {
            "description": "The request is invalid."
          }
        }
      },
      "post": {
        "description": "Sets or updates Device provisioning status data.\n",
        "parameters": [
          {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"}
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}
```

```

5770     {
5771         "name": "body",
5772         "in": "body",
5773         "required": true,
5774         "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Pstat-Update" },
5775         "x-example":
5776             {
5777                 "dos": {"s": 3},
5778                 "tm": 60,
5779                 "om": 2,
5780                 "rowneruuid": "de305d54-75b4-431b-adb2-eb6b9e546014"
5781             }
5782     },
5783 ],
5784 "responses": {
5785     "400": {
5786         "description": "The request is invalid."
5787     },
5788     "204": {
5789         "description": "The PSTAT entry is updated."
5790     }
5791 }
5792 }
5793 },
5794 },
5795 "parameters": {
5796     "interface": {
5797         "in": "query",
5798         "name": "if",
5799         "type": "string",
5800         "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ]
5801     }
5802 },
5803 "definitions": {
5804     "Pstat": {
5805         "properties": {
5806             "rowneruuid": {
5807                 "description": "The UUID formatted identity of the Resource owner\nFormat pattern
5808 according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5809                 "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
5810 9]{12}$",
5811                 "type": "string"
5812             },
5813             "rt": {
5814                 "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
5815                 "items": {
5816                     "maxLength": 64,
5817                     "type": "string",
5818                     "enum": [ "oic.r.pstat" ]
5819                 },
5820                 "minItems": 1,
5821                 "readOnly": true,
5822                 "type": "array"
5823             },
5824             "om": {
5825                 "description": "Current operational mode\nDevice provisioning operation may be server
5826 directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer
5827 and indicates the provisioning operation modes1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning
5828 services2 - Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service4 - Client-directed provisioning8
5829 - Unused16 - Unused32 - Unused64 - Unused128 - Unused.",
5830                 "maximum": 7,
5831                 "minimum": 1,
5832                 "type": "integer"
5833             },
5834             "cm": {
5835                 "description": "Current Device provisioning mode\nDevice provisioning mode maintains a
5836 bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character
5837 in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 - Manufacturer reset state2
5838 - Device pairing and owner transfer state4 - Unused8 - Provisioning of credential management
5839 services16 - Provisioning of access management services32 - Provisioning of local ACLs64 - Initiate
5840 Software Version Validation128 - Initiate Secure Software Update.",

```

```

5841         "maximum": 255,
5842         "minimum": 0,
5843         "type": "integer",
5844         "readOnly": true
5845     },
5846     "n": {
5847         "$ref":
5848         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
5849         schema.json#/definitions/n"
5850     },
5851     "id": {
5852         "$ref":
5853         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
5854         schema.json#/definitions/id"
5855     },
5856     "isop": {
5857         "description": "true indicates Device is operational.",
5858         "readOnly": true,
5859         "type": "boolean"
5860     },
5861     "tm": {
5862         "description": "Target Device provisioning mode\nDevice provisioning mode maintains a
5863         bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character
5864         in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 - Manufacturer reset state2
5865         - Device pairing and owner transfer state4 - Unused8 - Provisioning of credential management
5866         services16 - Provisioning of access management services32 - Provisioning of local ACLs64 - Initiate
5867         Software Version Validation128 - Initiate Secure Software Update.",
5868         "maximum": 255,
5869         "minimum": 0,
5870         "type": "integer"
5871     },
5872     "sm": {
5873         "description": "Supported operational modes\nDevice provisioning operation may be server
5874         directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer
5875         and indicates the provisioning operation modes1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning
5876         services2 - Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service4 - Client-directed provisioning8
5877         - Unused16 - Unused32 - Unused64 - Unused128 - Unused.",
5878         "maximum": 7,
5879         "minimum": 1,
5880         "type": "integer",
5881         "readOnly": true
5882     },
5883     "dos": {
5884         "description": "Device on-boarding state\nDevice operation state machine.",
5885         "properties": {
5886             "p": {
5887                 "default": true,
5888                 "description": "'p' is TRUE when the 's' state is pending until all necessary changes
5889                 to Device Resources are complete.",
5890                 "readOnly": true,
5891                 "type": "boolean"
5892             },
5893             "s": {
5894                 "description": "The current or pending operational state.",
5895                 "x-detail-desc": [
5896                     "0 - RESET - Device reset state.",
5897                     "1 - RFOIM - Ready for Device owner transfer method state.",
5898                     "2 - RFPRO - Ready for Device provisioning state.",
5899                     "3 - RFNOP - Ready for Device normal operation state.",
5900                     "4 - SRESET - The Device is in a soft reset state."
5901                 ],
5902                 "maximum": 4,
5903                 "minimum": 0,
5904                 "type": "integer"
5905             }
5906         },
5907         "required": [
5908             "s"
5909         ],
5910         "type": "object"
5911     },

```

```

5912     "if" : {
5913         "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
5914         "items": {
5915             "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ],
5916             "type": "string"
5917         },
5918         "minItems": 1,
5919         "readOnly": true,
5920         "type": "array"
5921     },
5922 },
5923 "type" : "object",
5924 "required": [ "dos", "isop", "cm", "tm", "om", "sm", "rowneruuid" ]
5925 },
5926 "Pstat-Update" : {
5927     "properties": {
5928         "rowneruuid": {
5929             "description": "The UUID formatted identity of the Resource owner\nFormat pattern
5930 according to IETF RFC 4122.",
5931             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-
5932 9]{12}$",
5933             "type": "string"
5934         },
5935         "om": {
5936             "description": "Current operational mode\nDevice provisioning operation may be server
5937 directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer
5938 and indicates the provisioning operation modes1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning
5939 services2 - Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service4 - Client-directed provisioning8
5940 - Unused16 - Unused32 - Unused64 - Unused128 - Unused.",
5941             "maximum": 7,
5942             "minimum": 1,
5943             "type": "integer"
5944         },
5945         "tm": {
5946             "description": "Target Device provisioning mode\nDevice provisioning mode maintains a
5947 bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character
5948 in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 - Manufacturer reset state2
5949 - Device pairing and owner transfer state4 - Unused8 - Provisioning of credential management
5950 services16 - Provisioning of access management services32 - Provisioning of local ACLs64 - Initiate
5951 Software Version Validation128 - Initiate Secure Software Update.",
5952             "maximum": 255,
5953             "minimum": 0,
5954             "type": "integer"
5955         },
5956         "dos": {
5957             "description": "Device on-boarding state\nDevice operation state machine.",
5958             "properties": {
5959                 "p": {
5960                     "default": true,
5961                     "description": "'p' is TRUE when the 's' state is pending until all necessary changes
5962 to Device Resources are complete.",
5963                     "readOnly": true,
5964                     "type": "boolean"
5965                 },
5966                 "s": {
5967                     "description": "The current or pending operational state.",
5968                     "x-detail-desc": [
5969                         "0 - RESET - Device reset state.",
5970                         "1 - RFOTM - Ready for Device owner transfer method state.",
5971                         "2 - RFPRO - Ready for Device provisioning state.",
5972                         "3 - RFNOP - Ready for Device normal operation state.",
5973                         "4 - SRESET - The Device is in a soft reset state."
5974                     ],
5975                     "maximum": 4,
5976                     "minimum": 0,
5977                     "type": "integer"
5978                 }
5979             },
5980             "required": [
5981                 "s"
5982             ],

```

```

5983         "type": "object"
5984     },
5985 },
5986 "type" : "object"
5987 }
5988 }
5989 }
5990

```

C.6.5 Property definition

Table C-9 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.pstat" Resource Type.

Table C-9 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.pstat".

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rowneruuid	string	Yes	Read Write	The UUID formatted identity of the Resource owner Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
om	integer	Yes	Read Write	Current operational mode Device provisioning operation may be server directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer and indicates the provisioning operation modes 1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning services 2 - Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service 4 - Client-directed provisioning 8 - Unused 16 - Unused 32 - Unused 64 - Unused 128 - Unused.
cm	integer	Yes	Read Only	Current Device provisioning

				<p>mode Device provisioning mode maintains a bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 - Manufacturer reset state2 - Device pairing and owner transfer state4 - Unused8 - Provisioning of credential management services16 - Provisioning of access management services32 - Provisioning of local ACLs64 - Initiate Software Version Validation128 - Initiate Secure Software Update.</p>
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
isop	boolean	Yes	Read Only	true indicates Device is operational.
tm	integer	Yes	Read Write	<p>Target Device provisioning mode Device provisioning mode maintains a bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a</p>

				<p>Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 -</p> <p>Manufacturer reset state2 -</p> <p>Device pairing and owner transfer state4 -</p> <p>Unused8 -</p> <p>Provisioning of credential management services16 -</p> <p>Provisioning of access management services32 -</p> <p>Provisioning of local ACLs64 -</p> <p>Initiate Software Version Validation128 -</p> <p>Initiate Secure Software Update.</p>
sm	integer	Yes	Read Only	<p>Supported operational modes</p> <p>Device provisioning operation may be server directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer and indicates the provisioning operation</p> <p>modes1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning services2 -</p> <p>Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service4 - Client-</p>

				directed provisioning8 - Unused16 - Unused32 - Unused64 - Unused128 - Unused.
dos	object: see schema	Yes	Read Write	Device on-boarding state Device operation state machine.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.
rowneruuid	string	No	Read Write	The UUID formatted identity of the Resource owner Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.
om	integer	No	Read Write	Current operational mode Device provisioning operation may be server directed or client (aka provisioning service) directed. The value is a bitmask encoded as integer and indicates the provisioning operation modes 1 - Server-directed utilizing multiple provisioning services2 - Server-directed utilizing a single provisioning service4 - Client-directed provisioning8 - Unused16 - Unused32 - Unused64 - Unused128 - Unused.
tm	integer	No	Read Write	Target Device provisioning mode

				Device provisioning mode maintains a bitmask of the possible provisioning states of a Device. The value can be either 8 or 16 character in length. If its only 8 characters it represents the lower byte value1 - Manufacturer reset state2 - Device pairing and owner transfer state4 - Unused8 - Provisioning of credential management services16 - Provisioning of access management services32 - Provisioning of local ACLs64 - Initiate Software Version Validation128 - Initiate Secure Software Update.
dos	object: schema see	No	Read Write	Device on-boarding state Device operation state machine.

C.6.6 CRUDN behaviour

Table C-10 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.pstat" Resource Type.

Table C-10 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.pstat".

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post		observe

C.7 Asserted Roles

C.7.1 Introduction

This Resource specifies roles that have been asserted.

C.7.2 Well-known URI

/oic/sec/roles

C.7.3 Resource type

The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.roles".

C.7.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```
{
  "swagger": "2.0",
  "info": {
    "title": "Asserted Roles",
    "version": "v1.0-20170323",
    "license": {
      "name": "OCF Data Model License",
      "url":
        "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
        CENSE.md",
      "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
        reserved."
    },
    "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
  },
  "schemes": ["http"],
  "consumes": ["application/json"],
  "produces": ["application/json"],
  "paths": {
    "/oic/sec/roles" : {
      "get": {
        "description": "This Resource specifies roles that have been asserted.\n",
        "parameters": [
          {"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"}
        ],
        "responses": {
          "200": {
            "description": "",
            "x-example":
              {
                "roles" :[
                  {
                    "credid":1,
                    "credtype":8,
                    "subjectuuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
                    "publicdata":
                      {
                        "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
                        "data":"PEMENCODEDROLECERT"
                      },
                    "optionaldata":
                      {
                        "revstat": false,
                        "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
                        "data":"PEMENCODEDISSUERCERT"
                      }
                  },
                  {
                    "credid":2,
                    "credtype":8,
                    "subjectuuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
                    "publicdata":
                      {
                        "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
                        "data":"PEMENCODEDROLECERT"
                      },
                    "optionaldata":
                      {
                        "revstat": false,
                        "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
                        "data":"PEMENCODEDISSUERCERT"
                      }
                  }
                ]
              }
            }
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

```

6067         }
6068     }
6069     ],
6070     "rt":["oic.r.roles"],
6071     "if":["oic.if.rw" ]
6072 }
6073 ,
6074 "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Roles" }
6075 },
6076 "400": {
6077     "description" : "The request is invalid."
6078 }
6079 },
6080 ],
6081 "post": {
6082     "description": "Update the roles Resource, i.e., assert new roles to this server.\n\nNew
6083 role certificates that match an existing certificate (i.e., publicdata\nand optionaldata are the
6084 same) are not added to the Resource (and 204 is\nreturned).\n\nThe provided credid values are
6085 ignored, the Resource assigns its own.\n",
6086     "parameters": [
6087         { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" },
6088         {
6089             "name": "body",
6090             "in": "body",
6091             "required": true,
6092             "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Roles-update" },
6093             "x-example":
6094             {
6095                 "roles" :[
6096                     {
6097                         "credid":1,
6098                         "credtype":8,
6099                         "subjectuuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
6100                         "publicdata":
6101                         {
6102                             "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6103                             "data":"PEMENCODEDROLECERT"
6104                         },
6105                         "optionaldata":
6106                         {
6107                             "revstat": false,
6108                             "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6109                             "data":"PEMENCODEDISSUERCERT"
6110                         }
6111                     },
6112                     {
6113                         "credid":2,
6114                         "credtype":8,
6115                         "subjectuuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
6116                         "publicdata":
6117                         {
6118                             "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6119                             "data":"PEMENCODEDROLECERT"
6120                         },
6121                         "optionaldata":
6122                         {
6123                             "revstat": false,
6124                             "encoding":"oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6125                             "data":"PEMENCODEDISSUERCERT"
6126                         }
6127                     }
6128                 ]
6129             }
6130         }
6131     ],
6132     "responses": {
6133         "400": {
6134             "description" : "The request is invalid."
6135         },
6136         "204": {
6137             "description" : "The roles entry is updated."

```

```

6138     }
6139   },
6140 },
6141 "delete": {
6142   "description": "Deletes roles Resource entries.\nWhen DELETE is used without query
6143 parameters, all the roles entries are deleted.\nWhen DELETE is used with a query parameter, only the
6144 entries matching\nthe query parameter are deleted.\n",
6145   "parameters": [
6146     { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" },
6147     { "$ref": "#/parameters/roles-filtered" }
6148   ],
6149   "responses": {
6150     "200": {
6151       "description": "The specified or all roles Resource entries have been successfully
6152 deleted."
6153     },
6154     "400": {
6155       "description": "The request is invalid."
6156     }
6157   }
6158 },
6159 },
6160 },
6161 "parameters": {
6162   "interface": {
6163     "in": "query",
6164     "name": "if",
6165     "type": "string",
6166     "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ]
6167   },
6168   "roles-filtered": {
6169     "in": "query",
6170     "name": "credid",
6171     "required": false,
6172     "type": "integer",
6173     "description": "Only applies to the credential with the specified credid.",
6174     "x-example": 2112
6175   }
6176 },
6177 "definitions": {
6178   "Roles": {
6179     "properties": {
6180       "rt": {
6181         "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
6182         "items": {
6183           "maxLength": 64,
6184           "type": "string",
6185           "enum": [ "oic.r.roles" ]
6186         },
6187         "minItems": 1,
6188         "readOnly": true,
6189         "type": "array"
6190       },
6191       "n": {
6192         "$ref":
6193 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6194 schema.json#/definitions/n"
6195       },
6196       "id": {
6197         "$ref":
6198 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6199 schema.json#/definitions/id"
6200       },
6201       "roles": {
6202         "description": "List of role certificates.",
6203         "items": {
6204           "properties": {
6205             "credid": {
6206               "description": "Local reference to a credential Resource.",
6207               "type": "integer"
6208             }

```

```

6209         "credtype": {
6210             "description": "Representation of this credential's type\nCredential Types - Cred
6211 type encoded as a bitmask.0 - Empty credential used for testing1 - Symmetric pair-wise key2 -
6212 Symmetric group key4 - Asymmetric signing key8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificate16 - PIN or
6213 password32 - Asymmetric encryption key.",
6214             "maximum": 63,
6215             "minimum": 0,
6216             "type": "integer"
6217         },
6218         "credusage": {
6219             "description": "A string that provides hints about how/where the cred is used\nThe
6220 type of credusage.oic.sec.cred.trustca - Trust certificateoic.sec.cred.cert -
6221 Certificateoic.sec.cred.rolecert - Role Certificateoic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca - Manufacturer
6222 Certificate Trust Anchoroic.sec.cred.mfgcert - Manufacturer Certificate.",
6223             "enum": [
6224                 "oic.sec.cred.trustca",
6225                 "oic.sec.cred.cert",
6226                 "oic.sec.cred.rolecert",
6227                 "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca",
6228                 "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert"
6229             ],
6230             "type": "string"
6231         },
6232         "crms": {
6233             "description": "The refresh methods that may be used to update this credential.",
6234             "items": {
6235                 "description": "Each enum represents a method by which the credentials are
6236 refreshed.oic.sec.crm.pro - Credentials refreshed by a provisioning serviceoic.sec.crm.rdp -
6237 Credentials refreshed by a key agreement protocol and random PINoic.sec.crm.psk - Credentials
6238 refreshed by a key agreement protocoloic.sec.crm.skdc - Credentials refreshed by a key distribution
6239 serviceoic.sec.crm.pk10 - Credentials refreshed by a PKCS#10 request to a CA.",
6240                 "enum": [
6241                     "oic.sec.crm.pro",
6242                     "oic.sec.crm.psk",
6243                     "oic.sec.crm.rdp",
6244                     "oic.sec.crm.skdc",
6245                     "oic.sec.crm.pk10"
6246                 ],
6247                 "type": "string"
6248             },
6249             "type": "array"
6250         },
6251         "optionaldata": {
6252             "description": "Credential revocation status information\nOptional credential
6253 contents describes revocation status for this credential.",
6254             "properties": {
6255                 "data": {
6256                     "description": "This is the encoded structure.",
6257                     "type": "string"
6258                 },
6259                 "encoding": {
6260                     "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
6261 the optdata.",
6262                     "x-detail-desc": [
6263                         "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
6264                         "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
6265                         "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
6266                         "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain.",
6267                         "oic.sec.encoding.der - Encoding for DER encoded certificate.",
6268                         "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
6269                     ],
6270                     "enum": [
6271                         "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
6272                         "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
6273                         "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
6274                         "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6275                         "oic.sec.encoding.der",
6276                         "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
6277                     ],
6278                     "type": "string"
6279                 }
6280             }
6281         },

```

```

6280         "revstat": {
6281             "description": "Revocation status flag - true = revoked.",
6282             "type": "boolean"
6283         },
6284     },
6285     "required": [
6286         "revstat"
6287     ],
6288     "type": "object"
6289 },
6290 "period": {
6291     "description": "String with RFC5545 Period.",
6292     "type": "string"
6293 },
6294 "privatedata": {
6295     "description": "Private credential information\nCredential Resource non-public
6296 contents.",
6297     "properties": {
6298         "data": {
6299             "description": "The encoded value.",
6300             "maxLength": 3072,
6301             "type": "string"
6302         },
6303         "encoding": {
6304             "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
6305 the privdata.",
6306             "x-detail-desc": [
6307                 "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
6308                 "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
6309                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
6310                 "oic.sec.encoding.uri - URI reference.",
6311                 "oic.sec.encoding.handle - Data is contained in a storage sub-system
6312 referenced using a handle.",
6313                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
6314             ],
6315             "enum": [
6316                 "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
6317                 "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
6318                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
6319                 "oic.sec.encoding.uri",
6320                 "oic.sec.encoding.handle",
6321                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
6322             ],
6323             "type": "string"
6324         },
6325         "handle": {
6326             "description": "Handle to a key storage Resource.",
6327             "type": "integer"
6328         }
6329     },
6330     "required": [
6331         "encoding"
6332     ],
6333     "type": "object"
6334 },
6335 "publicdata": {
6336     "description": "Public credential information.",
6337     "properties": {
6338         "data": {
6339             "description": "This is the encoded value.",
6340             "maxLength": 3072,
6341             "type": "string"
6342         },
6343         "encoding": {
6344             "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
6345 the pubdata.",
6346             "x-detail-desc": [
6347                 "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
6348                 "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
6349                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
6350                 "oic.sec.encoding.uri - URI reference."

```



```

6351         "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain.",
6352         "oic.sec.encoding.der - Encoding for DER encoded certificate.",
6353         "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
6354     ],
6355     "enum": [
6356         "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
6357         "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
6358         "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
6359         "oic.sec.encoding.uri",
6360         "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6361         "oic.sec.encoding.der",
6362         "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
6363     ],
6364     "type": "string"
6365 },
6366 },
6367 "type": "object"
6368 },
6369 "roleid": {
6370     "description": "The role this credential possesses\nSecurity role specified as an
6371 <Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
6372     "properties": {
6373         "authority": {
6374             "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A NULL
6375 <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
6376             "type": "string"
6377         },
6378         "role": {
6379             "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
6380             "type": "string"
6381         }
6382     },
6383     "required": [
6384         "role"
6385     ],
6386     "type": "object"
6387 },
6388 "subjectuuid": {
6389     "anyOf": [
6390         {
6391             "description": "The id of the Device, which the cred entry applies to or \"*\n
6392 for wildcard identity.",
6393             "pattern": "^\\*$",
6394             "type": "string"
6395         },
6396         {
6397             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
6398             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-
6399 F0-9]{12}$",
6400             "type": "string"
6401         }
6402     ]
6403 },
6404 },
6405 "type": "object"
6406 },
6407 "type": "array"
6408 },
6409 "if": {
6410     "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
6411     "items": {
6412         "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ],
6413         "type": "string"
6414     },
6415     "minItems": 1,
6416     "readOnly": true,
6417     "type": "array"
6418 },
6419 },
6420 "type": "object",
6421 "required": [ "roles" ]

```

```

6422 },
6423 "Roles-update" : {
6424   "properties": {
6425     "roles": {
6426       "description": "List of role certificates.",
6427       "items": {
6428         "properties": {
6429           "credid": {
6430             "description": "Local reference to a credential Resource.",
6431             "type": "integer"
6432           },
6433           "credtype": {
6434             "description": "Representation of this credential's type\nCred
6435 type encoded as a bitmask.0 - Empty credential used for testing1 - Symmetric pair-wise key2 -
6436 Symmetric group key4 - Asymmetric signing key8 - Asymmetric signing key with certificatel6 - PIN or
6437 password32 - Asymmetric encryption key.",
6438             "maximum": 63,
6439             "minimum": 0,
6440             "type": "integer"
6441           },
6442           "credusage": {
6443             "description": "A string that provides hints about how/where the cred is used\nThe
6444 type of credusage.oic.sec.cred.trustca - Trust certificateoic.sec.cred.cert -
6445 Certificateoic.sec.cred.rolecert - Role Certificateoic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca - Manufacturer
6446 Certificate Trust Anchoroic.sec.cred.mfgcert - Manufacturer Certificate.",
6447             "enum": [
6448               "oic.sec.cred.trustca",
6449               "oic.sec.cred.cert",
6450               "oic.sec.cred.rolecert",
6451               "oic.sec.cred.mfgtrustca",
6452               "oic.sec.cred.mfgcert"
6453             ],
6454             "type": "string"
6455           },
6456           "crms": {
6457             "description": "The refresh methods that may be used to update this credential.",
6458             "items": {
6459               "description": "Each enum represents a method by which the credentials are
6460 refreshed.oic.sec.crm.pro - Credentials refreshed by a provisioning serviceoic.sec.crm.rdp -
6461 Credentials refreshed by a key agreement protocol and random PINoic.sec.crm.psk - Credentials
6462 refreshed by a key agreement protocoloic.sec.crm.skdc - Credentials refreshed by a key distribution
6463 serviceoic.sec.crm.pk10 - Credentials refreshed by a PKCS#10 request to a CA.",
6464               "enum": [
6465                 "oic.sec.crm.pro",
6466                 "oic.sec.crm.psk",
6467                 "oic.sec.crm.rdp",
6468                 "oic.sec.crm.skdc",
6469                 "oic.sec.crm.pk10"
6470               ],
6471               "type": "string"
6472             },
6473             "type": "array"
6474           },
6475           "optionaldata": {
6476             "description": "Credential revocation status information\nOptional credential
6477 contents describes revocation status for this credential.",
6478             "properties": {
6479               "data": {
6480                 "description": "This is the encoded structure.",
6481                 "type": "string"
6482               },
6483               "encoding": {
6484                 "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
6485 the optdata.",
6486                 "x-detail-desc": [
6487                   "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
6488                   "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
6489                   "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
6490                   "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain.",
6491                   "oic.sec.encoding.der - Encoding for DER encoded certificate.",
6492                   "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."

```

```

6493         ],
6494         "enum": [
6495             "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
6496             "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
6497             "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
6498             "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6499             "oic.sec.encoding.der",
6500             "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
6501         ],
6502         "type": "string"
6503     },
6504     "revstat": {
6505         "description": "Revocation status flag - true = revoked.",
6506         "type": "boolean"
6507     }
6508 },
6509 "required": [
6510     "revstat"
6511 ],
6512 "type": "object"
6513 },
6514 "period": {
6515     "description": "String with RFC5545 Period.",
6516     "type": "string"
6517 },
6518 "privatedata": {
6519     "description": "Private credential information\nCredential Resource non-public
6520 contents.",
6521     "properties": {
6522         "data": {
6523             "description": "The encoded value.",
6524             "maxLength": 3072,
6525             "type": "string"
6526         },
6527         "encoding": {
6528             "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
6529 the privdata.",
6530             "x-detail-desc": [
6531                 "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
6532                 "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
6533                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
6534                 "oic.sec.encoding.uri - URI reference.",
6535                 "oic.sec.encoding.handle - Data is contained in a storage sub-system
6536 referenced using a handle.",
6537                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
6538             ],
6539             "enum": [
6540                 "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
6541                 "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
6542                 "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
6543                 "oic.sec.encoding.uri",
6544                 "oic.sec.encoding.handle",
6545                 "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
6546             ],
6547             "type": "string"
6548         },
6549         "handle": {
6550             "description": "Handle to a key storage Resource.",
6551             "type": "integer"
6552         }
6553     },
6554     "required": [
6555         "encoding"
6556     ],
6557     "type": "object"
6558 },
6559 "publicdata": {
6560     "description": "Public credential information.",
6561     "properties": {
6562         "data": {
6563             "description": "The encoded value.",

```

```

6564         "maxLength": 3072,
6565         "type": "string"
6566     },
6567     "encoding": {
6568         "description": "A string specifying the encoding format of the data contained in
6569 the pubdata.",
6570         "x-detail-desc": [
6571             "oic.sec.encoding.jwt - RFC7517 JSON web token (JWT) encoding.",
6572             "oic.sec.encoding.cwt - RFC CBOR web token (CWT) encoding.",
6573             "oic.sec.encoding.base64 - Base64 encoded object.",
6574             "oic.sec.encoding.uri - URI reference.",
6575             "oic.sec.encoding.pem - Encoding for PEM encoded certificate or chain.",
6576             "oic.sec.encoding.der - Encoding for DER encoded certificate.",
6577             "oic.sec.encoding.raw - Raw hex encoded data."
6578         ],
6579         "enum": [
6580             "oic.sec.encoding.jwt",
6581             "oic.sec.encoding.cwt",
6582             "oic.sec.encoding.base64",
6583             "oic.sec.encoding.uri",
6584             "oic.sec.encoding.pem",
6585             "oic.sec.encoding.der",
6586             "oic.sec.encoding.raw"
6587         ],
6588         "type": "string"
6589     }
6590 },
6591 "type": "object"
6592 },
6593 "roleid": {
6594     "description": "The role this credential possesses\nSecurity role specified as an
6595 <Authority> & <Rolename>. A NULL <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
6596     "properties": {
6597         "authority": {
6598             "description": "The Authority component of the entity being identified. A NULL
6599 <Authority> refers to the local entity or Device.",
6600             "type": "string"
6601         },
6602         "role": {
6603             "description": "The ID of the role being identified.",
6604             "type": "string"
6605         }
6606     },
6607     "required": [
6608         "role"
6609     ],
6610     "type": "object"
6611 },
6612 "subjectuuid": {
6613     "anyOf": [
6614         {
6615             "description": "The id of the Device, which the cred entry applies to or \"*\n
6616 for wildcard identity.",
6617             "pattern": "^[\\*]$",
6618             "type": "string"
6619         },
6620         {
6621             "description": "Format pattern according to IETF RFC 4122.",
6622             "pattern": "^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-
6623 F0-9]{12}$",
6624             "type": "string"
6625         }
6626     ]
6627 },
6628 },
6629 "type": "object"
6630 },
6631 "type": "array"
6632 }
6633 },
6634 "type": "object",

```

```

6635     "required": ["roles"]
6636   }
6637 }
6638 }
6639

```

6640 C.7.5 Property definition

6641 Table C-11 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.roles" Resource Type.

6642 **Table C-11 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.roles".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
roles	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	List of role certificates.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.
roles	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	List of role certificates.

6643 C.7.6 CRUDN behaviour

6644 Table C-12 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.roles" Resource Type.

6645 **Table C-12 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.roles".**

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post	delete	observe

6646 C.8 Security Profile

6647 C.8.1 Introduction

6648 Resource specifying supported and active security profile(s).

6649

6650 C.8.2 Well-known URI

6651 /oic/sec/sp

6652 C.8.3 Resource type

6653 The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.sp".

6654 C.8.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```

6655 {
6656   "swagger": "2.0",
6657   "info": {
6658     "title": "Security Profile",
6659     "version": "v1.0-20190208",
6660     "license": {
6661       "name": "OCF Data Model License",
6662       "url":
6663         "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
6664         CENSE.md",
6665       "x-copyright": "copyright 2016-2017, 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
6666       reserved."

```

```

6667     },
6668     "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
6669 },
6670 "schemes": ["http"],
6671 "consumes": ["application/json"],
6672 "produces": ["application/json"],
6673 "paths": {
6674     "/oic/sec/sp" : {
6675         "get": {
6676             "description": "Resource specifying supported and active security profile(s).\n",
6677             "parameters": [
6678                 { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" }
6679             ],
6680             "responses": {
6681                 "200": {
6682                     "description": "",
6683                     "x-example":
6684                         {
6685                             "rt": ["oic.r.sp"],
6686                             "supportedprofiles" : ["1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0", " 1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0"],
6687                             "currentprofile" : "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0"
6688                         },
6689                     "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/SP" }
6690                 },
6691                 "400": {
6692                     "description": "The request is invalid."
6693                 }
6694             }
6695         },
6696         "post": {
6697             "description": "Sets or updates Device provisioning status data.\n",
6698             "parameters": [
6699                 { "$ref": "#/parameters/interface" },
6700                 {
6701                     "name": "body",
6702                     "in": "body",
6703                     "required": true,
6704                     "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/SP-Update" },
6705                     "x-example":
6706                         {
6707                             "supportedprofiles" : ["1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0", " 1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0"],
6708                             "currentprofile" : "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0"
6709                         }
6710                 }
6711             ],
6712             "responses": {
6713                 "200": {
6714                     "description": "",
6715                     "x-example":
6716                         {
6717                             "rt": ["oic.r.sp"],
6718                             "supportedprofiles" : ["1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0", " 1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.2.0"],
6719                             "currentprofile" : "1.3.6.1.4.1.51414.0.0.1.0"
6720                         },
6721                     "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/SP" }
6722                 },
6723                 "400": {
6724                     "description": "The request is invalid."
6725                 }
6726             }
6727         }
6728     }
6729 },
6730 "parameters": {
6731     "interface" : {
6732         "in" : "query",
6733         "name" : "if",
6734         "type" : "string",
6735         "enum" : [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ]
6736     }
6737 },

```

```

6738 "definitions": {
6739   "SP" : {
6740     "properties": {
6741       "rt": {
6742         "description": "Resource Type of the Resource.",
6743         "items": {
6744           "maxLength": 64,
6745           "type": "string",
6746           "enum": ["oic.r.sp"]
6747         },
6748         "minItems": 1,
6749         "readOnly": true,
6750         "type": "array"
6751       },
6752       "n": {
6753         "$ref":
6754         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6755         schema.json#/definitions/n"
6756       },
6757       "id": {
6758         "$ref":
6759         "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
6760         schema.json#/definitions/id"
6761       },
6762       "currentprofile": {
6763         "description": "Security Profile currently active.",
6764         "type": "string"
6765       },
6766       "supportedprofiles": {
6767         "description": "Array of supported Security Profiles.",
6768         "items": {
6769           "type": "string"
6770         },
6771         "type": "array"
6772       },
6773       "if": {
6774         "description": "The interface set supported by this Resource.",
6775         "items": {
6776           "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ],
6777           "type": "string"
6778         },
6779         "minItems": 1,
6780         "readOnly": true,
6781         "type": "array"
6782       }
6783     },
6784     "type" : "object",
6785     "required": ["supportedprofiles", "currentprofile"]
6786   },
6787   "SP-Update" : {
6788     "properties": {
6789       "currentprofile": {
6790         "description": "Security Profile currently active.",
6791         "type": "string"
6792       },
6793       "supportedprofiles": {
6794         "description": "Array of supported Security Profiles.",
6795         "items": {
6796           "type": "string"
6797         },
6798         "type": "array"
6799       }
6800     },
6801     "type" : "object"
6802   }
6803 }
6804 }
6805

```

C.8.5 Property definition

Table C-13 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.sp" Resource Type.

Table C-13 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.sp".

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type of the Resource.
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
currentprofile	string	Yes	Read Write	Security Profile currently active.
supportedprofiles	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	Array of supported Security Profiles.
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The interface set supported by this Resource.
currentprofile	string		Read Write	Security Profile currently active.
supportedprofiles	array: see schema		Read Write	Array of supported Security Profiles.

C.8.6 CRUDN behaviour

Table C-14 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.sp" Resource Type.

Table C-14 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.sp".

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post		observe

C.9 Auditable Event List

C.9.1 Introduction

This Resource contains the Auditable Events that have been logged on the Device.

C.9.2 Well-known URI

/oic/sec/ael

C.9.3 Resource type

The Resource Type is defined as: "oic.r.ael".

C.9.4 OpenAPI 2.0 definition

```
{
  "swagger": "2.0",
  "info": {
    "title": "Auditable Event List",
    "version": "2019-10-03",
    "license": {
      "name": "OCF Data Model License",
      "url": "https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/core/blob/e28a9e0a92e17042ba3e83661e4c0fbce8bdc4ba/LI
```



```

6830 CENSE.md",
6831         "x-copyright": "Copyright 2019 Open Connectivity Foundation, Inc. All rights
6832 reserved."
6833     },
6834     "termsOfService": "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/DISCLAIMER.md"
6835 },
6836 "schemes": ["http"],
6837 "consumes": ["application/json"],
6838 "produces": ["application/json"],
6839 "paths": {
6840     "/AelResURI": {
6841         "get": {
6842             "description": "This Resource contains the Auditable Events that have
6843 been logged on the Device.",
6844             "parameters": [{"$ref": "#/parameters/interface"}],
6845             "responses": {
6846                 "200": {
6847                     "description": "Example response payload. In this
6848 example, 'oic.d.light' Device has logged 2 Auditable Event Entries: Update attempt against
6849 '/room1/led1' Resource was denied, and Delete attempt against '/room1/led1' Resource was denied.
6850 Both Auditable Event Entries belong to 'AccessControl (0x01)' category and 'WARN' priority (2).",
6851                     "x-example": {
6852                         "rt": [ "oic.r.ael" ],
6853                         "events": [
6854                             {
6855                                 "aeid": "AC-1",
6856                                 "category": 1,
6857                                 "priority": 2,
6858                                 "timestamp": "2018-11-
6859 13T20:22:39+00:00",
6860                                 "message": "Access Denied",
6861                                 "auxiliaryinfo":
6862 [ "[2001::1]:1234", "0f33887b-f7d6-4fdb-9125-dd4b60d5aaae", "/room1/led1", "UPDATE", "RFNOP", "No
6863 roles asserted" ]
6864                             },
6865                             {
6866                                 "aeid": "AC-1",
6867                                 "category": 1,
6868                                 "priority": 2,
6869                                 "timestamp": "2018-11-
6870 13T20:20:00+00:00",
6871                                 "message": "Access Denied",
6872                                 "auxiliaryinfo":
6873 [ "[2001::1]:1234", "0f33887b-f7d6-4fdb-9125-dd4b60d5aaae", "/room1/led1", "DELETE", "RFNOP", "No
6874 roles asserted" ]
6875                             }
6876                         ],
6877                     "usedspace": 2,
6878                     "maxspace": 5
6879                 },
6880                 "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Ael" }
6881             }
6882         }
6883     },
6884     "post": {
6885         "description": "An UPDATE operation may set the 'categoryfilter'
6886 and/or 'priorityfilter' Properties.",
6887         "parameters": [
6888             {
6889                 "$ref": "#/parameters/interface"
6890             },
6891             {
6892                 "in": "body",
6893                 "name": "body",
6894                 "required": false,
6895                 "schema": { "$ref": "#/definitions/Ael-Update" },
6896                 "x-example": {
6897                     "categoryfilter": 3,
6898                     "priorityfilter": 1
6899                 }
6900             }
6901         ]
6902     }
6903 }

```

```

6901         ],
6902         "responses": {
6903             "204": {
6904                 "description": "The new categoryfilter and
6905 priorityfilter were set."
6906             }
6907         }
6908     }
6909 },
6910     "parameters": {
6911         "interface": {
6912             "in": "query",
6913             "name": "if",
6914             "type": "string",
6915             "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ]
6916         }
6917     },
6918     "definitions": {
6919         "Aee": {
6920             "description": "Auditable Event Entry logged by a Device",
6921             "type": "object",
6922             "properties": {
6923                 "aeid": {
6924                     "description": "Identity of the logged event",
6925                     "type": "string",
6926                     "readOnly": true
6927                 },
6928                 "devicetype": {
6929                     "description": "Device type which generated this Security
6930 Event (e.g. oic.d.light)",
6931                     "type": "array",
6932                     "minItems": 1,
6933                     "items": {
6934                         "type": "string",
6935                         "maxLength": 64
6936                     },
6937                     "readOnly": true
6938                 },
6939                 "di": {
6940                     "$ref":
6941 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.types-schema.json#/definitions/uuid"
6942                 },
6943                 "category": {
6944                     "description": "Category of this Auditable Event: 0x01
6945 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification),
6946 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication), 0x80 (Reserved)",
6947                     "type": "integer",
6948                     "enum": [
6949                         1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128
6950                     ],
6951                     "readOnly": true
6952                 },
6953                 "priority": {
6954                     "definitions": "Priority of this Auditable Event: 0 (CRIT), 1
6955 (ERR), 2 (WARN), 3 (INFO), 4 (DEBUG)",
6956                     "type": "integer",
6957                     "enum": [
6958                         0, 1, 2, 3, 4
6959                     ],
6960                     "readOnly": true
6961                 },
6962                 "timestamp": {
6963                     "description": "Time when this Auditable Event occurred",
6964                     "type": "string",
6965                     "format": "date-time",
6966                     "readOnly": true
6967                 },
6968                 "message": {
6969                     "description": "Description for this Auditable Event",
6970                     "type": "string",
6971

```

```

6972         "readOnly": true
6973     },
6974     "auxiliaryinfo": {
6975         "description": "Supplementary info for Auditable Event
6976 message. (e.g. URI of specific Resource in ACE2 for 'Access Denied' message)",
6977         "type": "array",
6978         "minItems": 0,
6979         "items": {
6980             "type": "string"
6981         },
6982         "readOnly": true
6983     }
6984 },
6985 "required": [
6986     "aeid", "category", "priority", "timestamp"
6987 ],
6988 },
6989 "Ael": {
6990     "description": "Resource for storing Auditable Events List",
6991     "type": "object",
6992     "properties": {
6993         "rt": {
6994             "description": "Resource Type",
6995             "type": "array",
6996             "minItems": 1,
6997             "uniqueItems": true,
6998             "items": {
6999                 "maxLength": 64,
7000                 "type": "string",
7001                 "enum": [ "oic.r.ael" ]
7002             },
7003             "readOnly": true
7004         },
7005         "n": {
7006             "$ref":
7007 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
7008 schema.json#/definitions/n"
7009         },
7010         "id": {
7011             "$ref":
7012 "https://openconnectivityfoundation.github.io/core/schemas/oic.common.properties.core-
7013 schema.json#/definitions/id"
7014         },
7015         "if": {
7016             "description": "The OCF Interface set supported by this
7017 Resource",
7018             "type": "array",
7019             "minItems": 2,
7020             "uniqueItems": true,
7021             "items": {
7022                 "type": "string",
7023                 "enum": [ "oic.if.baseline", "oic.if.rw" ]
7024             },
7025             "readOnly": true
7026         },
7027         "events": {
7028             "description": "This list stores AEEs whose 'category'
7029 Property value is filtered by 'categoryfilter' Property and 'priority' Property value is equal or
7030 less than the value of 'priorityfilter' Property.",
7031             "type": "array",
7032             "uniqueItems": true,
7033             "items": {
7034                 "$ref": "#/definitions/Aee"
7035             }
7036         },
7037         "usedspace": {
7038             "description": "Current used space for logged AEEs. The
7039 Device updates this Property whenever new AEEs are logged.",
7040             "type": "integer",
7041             "default": 0,
7042

```

```

7043         "readOnly": true
7044     },
7045     "maxspace": {
7046         "description": "This means the maximum allowable storage size
7047 for AEEs that can be stored in 'events' list. The Manufacturer chooses this value.",
7048         "type": "integer",
7049         "readOnly": true
7050     },
7051     "unit": {
7052         "description": "The unit for 'usedspace' and 'maxspace'
7053 Properties. The Manufacturer chooses this value.",
7054         "type": "string",
7055         "enum": [
7056             "Kbyte",
7057             "Byte"
7058         ],
7059         "default": "Byte",
7060         "readOnly": true
7061     },
7062     "categoryfilter": {
7063         "description": "This value decides what categories of AEEs
7064 are to be logged. Meaning of each bit: 0x01 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08
7065 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification), 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication), 0x80 (Reserved).
7066 e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0xff: log all events of all categories, e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0x03:
7067 log all events of 'AC (== 0x01)' and 'OB (==0x02)' categories ",
7068         "type": "integer",
7069         "default": 255
7070     },
7071     "priorityfilter": {
7072         "description": "The AEEs whose 'priority' values are equal to
7073 or smaller than this value are logged. A smaller value means a higher priority. Meaning of each
7074 value: 0 (CRIT), 1 (ERR), 2 (WARN), 3 (INFO), 4 (DEBUG). e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to DEBUG
7075 (==4) all AEEs will be logged, e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to 1, CRIT (==0) and ERR (==1) AEEs
7076 will be logged ",
7077         "type": "integer",
7078         "default": 4,
7079         "enum": [
7080             0, 1, 2, 3, 4
7081         ]
7082     },
7083     },
7084     "required": [
7085         "events", "usedspace", "maxspace"
7086     ],
7087 },
7088 "Ael-Update": {
7089     "type": "object",
7090     "properties": {
7091         "categoryfilter": {
7092             "description": "This value decides what categories of AEEs
7093 are to be logged. Meaning of each bit: 0x01 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08
7094 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification), 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication). e.g.) if
7095 categoryfilter == 0xff: log all events of all categories, e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0x03: log all
7096 events of 'AC (== 0x01)' and 'OB (==0x02)' categories ",
7097             "type": "integer",
7098             "default": 255
7099         },
7100         "priorityfilter": {
7101             "description": "The AEEs whose 'priority' values are equal to
7102 or smaller than this value are logged. A smaller value means a higher priority. Meaning of each
7103 value: 0 (CRIT), 1 (ERR), 2 (WARN), 3 (INFO), 4 (DEBUG). e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to DEBUG
7104 (==4) all AEEs will be logged, e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to 1, CRIT (==0) and ERR (==1) AEEs
7105 will be logged ",
7106             "type": "integer",
7107             "default": 4,
7108             "enum": [
7109                 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
7110             ]
7111         }
7112     }
7113 }

```

7114 }
7115 }
7116

7117 **C.9.5 Property definition**

7118 Table C-15 defines the Properties that are part of the "oic.r.ael" Resource Type.

7119 **Table C-15 – The Property definitions of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.ael".**

Property name	Value type	Mandatory	Access mode	Description
aeid	string	Yes	Read Only	Identity of the logged event
devicetype	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Device type which generated this Security Event (e.g. oic.d.light)
di	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
category	integer	Yes	Read Only	Category of this Auditable Event: 0x01 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification), 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication), 0x80 (Reserved)
priority	integer	Yes	Read Only	
timestamp	string	Yes	Read Only	Time when this Auditable Event occurred
message	string	No	Read Only	Description for this Auditable Event
auxiliaryinfo	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Supplementary info for Auditable Event message. (e.g. URI of specific Resource in ACE2 for 'Access Denied' message)
rt	array: see schema	No	Read Only	Resource Type
n	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
id	multiple types: see schema	No	Read Write	
if	array: see schema	No	Read Only	The OCF Interface set

				supported by this Resource
events	array: see schema	Yes	Read Write	This list stores AEEs whose 'category' Property value is filtered by 'categoryfilter' Property and 'priority' Property value is equal or less than the value of 'priorityfilter' Property.
usedspace	integer	Yes	Read Only	Current used space for logged AEEs. The Device updates this Property whenever new AEEs are logged.
maxspace	integer	Yes	Read Only	This means the maximum allowable storage size for AEEs that can be stored in 'events' list. The Manufacturer chooses this value.
unit	string	No	Read Only	The unit for 'usedspace' and 'maxspace' Properties. The Manufacturer chooses this value.
categoryfilter	integer	No	Read Write	This value decides what categories of AEEs are to be logged. Meaning of each bit: 0x01 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification), 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication), 0x80 (Reserved).

				e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0xff: log all events of all categories, e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0x03: log all events of 'AC' (== 0x01) and 'OB' (==0x02) categories
priorityfilter	integer	No	Read Write	The AEEs whose 'priority' values are equal to or smaller than this value are logged. A smaller value means a higher priority. Meaning of each value: 0 (CRIT), 1 (ERR), 2 (WARN), 3 (INFO), 4 (DEBUG). e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to DEBUG (==4) all AEEs will be logged, e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to 1, CRIT (==0) and ERR (==1) AEEs will be logged
categoryfilter	integer		Read Write	This value decides what categories of AEEs are to be logged. Meaning of each bit: 0x01 (Access Control), 0x02 (Onboarding), 0x04 (Device), 0x08 (Authentication), 0x10 (SVR Modification), 0x20 (Cloud), 0x40 (Communication). e.g.) if categoryfilter == 0xff: log all events of all categories, e.g.) if categoryfilter

				== 0x03: log all events of 'AC (== 0x01)' and 'OB (==0x02)' categories
priorityfilter	integer		Read Write	The AEEs whose 'priority' values are equal to or smaller than this value are logged. A smaller value means a higher priority. Meaning of each value: 0 (CRIT), 1 (ERR), 2 (WARN), 3 (INFO), 4 (DEBUG). e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to DEBUG (==4) all AEEs will be logged, e.g.) if priorityfilter is set to 1, CRIT (==0) and ERR (==1) AEEs will be logged

C.9.6 CRUDN behaviour

Table C-16 defines the CRUDN operations that are supported on the "oic.r.ael" Resource Type.

Table C-16 – The CRUDN operations of the Resource with type "rt" = "oic.r.ael".

Create	Read	Update	Delete	Notify
	get	post		observe

Annex D (informative)

OID definitions

This annex captures the OIDs defined throughout the document. The OIDs listed are intended to be used within the context of an X.509 v3 certificate. MAX is an upper bound for SEQUENCES of UTF8Strings and OBJECT IDENTIFIERS and should not exceed 255.

```
id-OCF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    private(4) enterprise(1) OCF(51414) }

-- OCF Security specific OIDs

id-ocfSecurity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 0 }
id-ocfX509Extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 1 }

-- OCF Security Categories

id-ocfSecurityProfile ::= { id-ocfSecurity 0 }
id-ocfCertificatePolicy ::= { id-ocfSecurity 1 }

-- OCF Security Profiles

sp-unspecified ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 0 }
sp-baseline ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 1 }
sp-black ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 2 }
sp-blue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 3 }
sp-purple ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfSecurityProfile 4 }

sp-unspecified-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-unspecified 0}
sp-baseline-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-baseline 0}
sp-black-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-black 0}
sp-blue-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-blue 0}
sp-purple-v0 ::= ocfSecurityProfileOID {id-sp-purple 0}

ocfSecurityProfileOID ::= UTF8String

-- OCF Security Certificate Policies

ocfCertificatePolicy-v1 ::= { id-ocfCertificatePolicy 2}

-- OCF X.509v3 Extensions

id-ocfX509Extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OCF 1 }
id-ocfCompliance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ocfX509Extensions 0 }
id-ocfSecurityClaims OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ocfX509Extensions 1 }
id-ocfCPLAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ocfX509Extensions 2 }

ocfVersion ::= SEQUENCE {
    major    INTEGER,
    minor    INTEGER,
    build    INTEGER}

ocfCompliance ::= SEQUENCE {
    version      ocfVersion,
    securityProfile SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ocfSecurityProfileOID,
    deviceName    UTF8String,
    deviceManufacturer UTF8String}

claim-secure-boot ::= ocfSecurityClaimsOID { id-ocfSecurityClaims 0 }
```

```

7183 claim-hw-backed-cred-storage ::= ocfSecurityClaimsOID { id-ocfSecurityClaims 1 }
7184
7185 ocfSecurityClaimsOID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
7186
7187 ocfSecurityClaims ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) of ocfSecurityClaimsOID
7188
7189 cpl-at-IANAPen ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfCPLAttributes 0 }
7190 cpl-at-model ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfCPLAttributes 1 }
7191 cpl-at-version ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER { id-ocfCPLAttributes 2 }
7192
7193 ocfCPLAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
7194     cpl-at-IANAPen UTF8String,
7195     cpl-at-model UTF8String,
7196     cpl-at-version UTF8String}

```

Annex E (informative)

Security considerations specific to Bridged Protocols

The text in this Annex is provided for information only. This Annex has no normative impact. This information is applicable at the time of initial publication and may become out of date.

E.1 Security Considerations specific to the AllJoyn Protocol

This clause intentionally left empty.

E.2 Security Considerations specific to the Bluetooth LE Protocol

BLE GAP supports two security modes, security mode 1 and security mode 2. Each security mode has several security levels (see Table E.1)

Security mode 1 and Security level 2 or higher would typically be considered secure from an OCF perspective. The appropriate selection of security mode and level is left to the vendor.

Table E.1 GAP security mode

GAP security mode	security level
Security mode 1	1 (no security)
	2 (Unauthenticated pairing with encryption)
	3 (Authenticated pairing with encryption)
	4 (Authenticated LE Secure Connections pairing with encryption)
Security mode 2	1 (Unauthenticated pairing with data signing)
	2 (Authenticated pairing with data signing)

Figure E-1 shows how communications in both ecosystems of OCF-BLE Bridge Platform are secured by their own security.




Figure E-1 Security Considerations for BLE Bridge

E.3 Security Considerations specific to the oneM2M Protocol

This clause intentionally left empty.

E.4 Security Considerations specific to the U+ Protocol

A U+ server supports one of the TLS 1.2 cipher suites as in Table E.2 defined in IETF RFC 5246.

Table E.2 TLS 1.2 Cipher Suites used by U+

Cipher Suite
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8

The security of the Haier U+ Protocol is proprietary, and further details are presently unavailable.

E.5 Security Considerations specific to the Z-Wave Protocol

Z-Wave currently supports two kinds of security class which are S0 Security Class and S2 Security Class, as shown in Table E.3. Bridged Z-wave Servers using S2 Security Class for communication with a Virtual Bridged Client would typically be considered secure from an OCF perspective. The appropriate selection for S2 Security Class and Class Name is left to the vendor.

Figure E-2 presents how OCF Client and Bridged Z-Wave Server communicate based upon their own security.




Figure E-2 Security Considerations for Z-Wave Bridge

All 3 types of S2 Security Class such as S2 Access Control, S2 Authenticated and S2 Unauthenticated provides the following advantages from the security perspective;

- The unique device specific key for every secure device enables validation of device identity and prevents man-in-the-middle compromises to security
- The Secure cryptographic key exchange methods during inclusion achieves high level of security between the Virtual Z-Wave Client and the Bridged Z-Wave Server.
- Out of band key exchange for product authentication which is combined with device specific key prevents eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attack vectors.

See Table E.3 for a summary of Z-Wave Security Classes.

Table E.3 Z-Wave Security Class

Security Class	Class Name	Validation of device identity	Key Exchange	Message Encapsulation
S2	S2 Access Control	Device Specific key	Out-of-band inclusion	Encrypted command transmission
	S2 Authenticated	Device Specific key	Out-of-band inclusion	Encrypted command transmission
	S2 Unauthenticated	Device Specific key	Z-wave RF band used for inclusion	Encrypted command transmission
S0	S0 Authenticated	N/A	Z-wave RF band used for inclusion	Encrypted command transmission

On the other hand, S0 Security Class has the vulnerability of security during inclusion by exchanging of temporary 'well-known key' (e.g. 1234). As a result of that, it could lead the disclosure of the network key if the log of key exchange methods is captured, so Z-Wave devices might be no longer secure in that case.

E.6 Security Considerations specific to the Zigbee Protocol

The Zigbee 3.0 stack supports multiple security levels. A security level is supported by both the network (NWK) layer and application support (APS) layer. A security attribute in the Zigbee 3.0 stack, "nwkSecurityLevel", represents the security level of a device.

The security level `nwkSecurityLevel > 0x04` provides message integrity code (MIC) and/or AES128-CCM encryption (ENC). Zigbee Servers using `nwkSecurityLevel > 0x04` would typically be considered secure from an OCF perspective. The appropriate selection for `nwkSecurityLevel` is left to the vendor.

See Table E.4 for a summary of the Zigbee Security Levels.

Table E.4 Zigbee 3.0 Security Levels to the Network, and Application Support layers

Security Level Identifier	Security Level Sub-Field	Security Attributes	Data Encryption	Frame Integrity (Length of M of MIC, in Number of Octets)
0x00	'000'	None	OFF	NO (M=0)
0x01	'001'	MIC-32	OFF	YES(M=4)
0x02	'010'	MIC-64	OFF	YES(M=8)
0x03	'011'	MIC-128	OFF	YES(M=16)
0x04	'100'	ENC	ON	NO(M=0)
0x05	'101'	ENC-MIC-32	ON	YES(M=4)
0x06	'110'	ENC-MIC-64	ON	YES(M=8)
0x07	'111'	ENC-MIC-128	ON	YES(M=16)

Figure E-3 shows how communications in both ecosystems of OCF-Zigbee Bridge Platform are secured by their own security.




Figure E-3 Security Considerations for Zigbee Bridge

E.7 Security Considerations specific to the the EnOcean Radio Protocol

The EnOcean Radio Protocol supports four different security levels. The security level depends on which security mechanisms are used. Table E.5 defines them

Table E.5 EnOcean Radio Protocol security levels

Level	Features	Replay Attack Vulnerability	Eavesdropping Vulnerability
0	No Features (Unsecure)	Yes	Yes

1	With Encryption only	Yes	No
2	Without Encryption but with RLC and CMAC	No	Yes
3	With Encryption, RLC and CMAC	No	No

The security levels 1 and 2 have been declared deprecated and shall not longer be used. Security level 3 uses Variable AES Encryption, Rolling Code (RLC) and a cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC) with private keys and public vectors. Technically each feature can be combined with every other feature, even if it is obsolete or unreasonable.

Figure E-4 shows how communications in both ecosystems of OCF- EnOcean Bridge Platform are secured by their own security




Figure E-4 Security Considerations for EnOcean Bridge